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Abstract
The widely held belief that BQP strictly contains BPP raises fundamental questions: upcoming generations
of quantum computers might already be too large to be simulated classically. Gottesman asked ([Got04]): Is
it possible to experimentally test that these systems perform as they should, if we cannot efficiently compute
predictions for their behavior? As phrased by Vazirani in [Vaz07]: If computing predictions for quantum
mechanics requires exponential resources, is quantum mechanics a falsifiable theory? In cryptographic settings,
an untrusted future company wants to sell a quantum computer or perform a delegated quantum computation.
Can the customer be convinced of correctness without the ability to compare results to predictions?
To provide answers to these questions, we define Quantum Prover Interactive Proofs (QPIP). Whereas in
standard interactive proofs [GMR85] the prover is computationally unbounded, here our prover is in BQP,
representing a quantum computer. The verifier models our current computational capabilities: it is a BPP
machine, with access to only a few qubits. Our main theorem can be roughly stated as: “Any language
in BQP has a QPIP which hides the computation from the prover”. We provide two proofs. The simpler
one uses a new (possibly of independent interest) quantum authentication scheme (QAS) based on random
Clifford elements. This QPIP, however, involves two way quantum communication for polynomially many
rounds. Our second protocol uses polynomial codes QAS due to Ben-Or, Crépeau, Gottesman, Hassidim, and
Smith [BOCG+06], combined with secure multiparty quantum computation techniques. This protocol involves
quantum communication from the verifier to the prover at the start of the protocol, and classical communication
throughout the rest of the protocol. Both protocols are inherently “blind”: both the quantum circuit and the input
remain unknown to the prover.
This is the journal version of work reported in 2008 ([ABOE08]) and presented in ICS 2010. The protocols
are slightly modified from the original version, whereas some of the proofs required major modifications and
corrections. Notably, the claim that the polynomial QPIP is fault tolerant was removed.
After deriving the results in [ABOE08], we learnt that Broadbent, Fitzsimons, and Kashefi [BFK08] have
independently suggested “universal blind quantum computation” using completely different methods (measure-
ment based quantum computation). Their construction implicitly implies similar implications. The protocol in
[BFK08] was flawed but based on similar ideas, Fitzsimons and Kashefi have provided a protocol and proof
of blind verifiable computation in [FK12]. The initial independent works ([ABOE08],[BFK08]) ignited a long
line of research of blind and verifiable quantum computation, which we survey here, along with connections
to various cryptographic problems. Importantly, the problems of making the results fault tolerant, as well as
removing the need for quantum communication altogether, remain open.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
As far as we know today, the quantum mechanical description of many-particle systems requires exponential
resources to simulate. This has the following fundamental implication: the results of an experiment conducted
on a many-particle physical system described by quantum mechanics cannot be predicted (in general) by classical
computational devices in any reasonable amount of time. This important realization (or belief), which stands at
the heart of the interest in quantum computation, led Gottesman [Got04] to ask: Can a classical verifier verify
the correctness of quantum evolutions? The question was phrased by Vazirani [Vaz07] as: Is quantum mechanics
a falsifiable physical theory? Assuming that small quantum systems obey quantum mechanics to an extremely
high accuracy, it is still possible that the physical description of large systems deviates significantly from quantum
mechanics. Since there is no efficient way to make the predictions of the experimental outcomes for most large
quantum systems, there is no way to test or falsify this possibility experimentally, using the usual scientific
paradigm of predict and compare.
This question has practical implications. Experimentalists who attempt to realize quantum computers would like to
know how to test that their systems indeed perform the way they should. But most tests cannot be compared to any
predictions! The tests whose predictions can in fact be computed do not actually test the more interesting aspects
of quantum mechanics, namely those which cannot be simulated efficiently classically.
The problem arises in cryptographic situations as well. It is natural to expect that the first generations of
quantum computers will be extremely expensive, and thus quantum computations would be delegated to untrusted
companies. Is there any way for the customer to trust the outcome, without the need to trust the company
which performed the computation, even though the customer cannot verify the outcome of the computation
(since he cannot simulate it)? And even if the company is honest, can the customer detect innocent errors in
such a computation? Given the amounts of grant money and prestige involved, the possibility of dishonesty of
experimentalists and experimentalists’ bias inside the academia should not be ignored either [Roo03, Wik08].
As Vazirani points out [Vaz07], an answer to these questions is already given in the form of Shor’s factoring
algorithm [Sho97]. Indeed, quantum mechanics does not seem to be falsifiable using the usual scientific paradigm,
assuming that BQP is strictly lager than BPP. However, Shor’s algorithm does provide a way for falsification, by
means of an experiment which lies outside of the usual scientific paradigm: though its result cannot be predicted
and then compared to the experimental outcome, it can be verified once the outcome of the experiment is known
(by simply taking the product of the factors and checking that this gives the input integer).
This, however, does not fully address the issues raised above. Consider, for example, a company called Q-Wave
which is trying to convince a customer that it has managed to build a quantum computer of 100 qubits. Such a
system is already too big to simulate classically. However, any factoring algorithm that is run on a system of a
100 qubits can be easily performed by today’s classical technology. For delegated quantum computations, how
can Shor’s algorithm help in convincing a customer of correctness of, say, the computation of the BQP complete
problem of approximating the Jones polynomial [AJL06, AA06, FKLW01, BFLW09]? As for experimental results,
it is difficult to rigorously state which aspects of quantum mechanics are exactly falsified or verified by the
possibility to apply Shor’s algorithm. Moreover, we are now facing a time in which small quantum computers
of a few tens of qubits may very well be realizable; yet, factoring is still impossible in such systems, and we would
nevertheless like to be able to test their evolution.
We thus pose the following main question: Can one be convinced of the correctness of the computation of any
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polynomial quantum circuit? Alternatively, can one be convinced of the “correctness” of the quantum mechanical
description of any quantum experiment that can be conducted in the laboratory, even though one cannot compute
the predictions for the outcomes of this experiment? In this paper, we address the above fundamental question in a
rigorous way and provide a positive answer to these questions, in a well defined framework. We do this by taking
a computational point of view on the interaction between the supposed quantum computer, and the entity which
attempts to verify that the quantum computer indeed computes what it should.
1.2 Quantum Prover Interactive Proofs (QPIP)
Interactive proof systems, defined by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR85], play a crucial role in the theory
of computer science. Roughly, a language L is said to have an interactive proof if there exists a computationally
unbounded prover (denoted P) and a BPP verifier (V) such that for any instance x in L, P convincesV of the fact
that x ∈ L with probability ≥ 23 (completeness). Otherwise, when x /∈ L, there does not exist a prover who can
convince V that x ∈ L with probability higher than 13 (soundness).
Quantum interactive proofs in which the prover is an unbounded quantum computer, and the verifier is a BQP
machine have previously been studied in [Wat03]. The starting point of this work is the observation that Shor’s
factoring algorithm [Sho97] can be viewed as an interactive proof of a very different kind: one between a classical
BPP verifier, and a quantum polynomial time (BQP) prover, in which the prover convinces the verifier of the
factors of a given number (this can be easily converted to the usual IP formalism of membership in a language by
converting the search problem to a decision problem in the standard way).
One might suspect that such an interactive proof exists for all problems inside BQP ∩ NP by asking the BQP
prover to find the witness, which the classical verifier can then verify. We do not know this to be true; the trouble
with this argument is that the fact that the problem is in BQP ∩ NP does not guarantee that the BQP machine can
also find a witness efficiently - decision to search reductions are known only for NP-complete problems. In any
case, it is widely believed that BQP is not contained in NP ( and in fact not even in the polynomial hierarchy -
see [Aar09] and references therein). The main goal of this paper is to generalize the interactive point of view of
Shor’s algorithm, as mentioned above, in order to show that a BPP verifier can be convinced of the result of any
polynomial quantum circuit, using interaction with the BQP prover (the quantum computer). In other words, we
would like to extend the above interactive proof (which is specific to factoring) to a BQP complete problem.
To this end we define a new model of quantum interactive proofs which we call quantum prover interactive proofs
(QPIP). The simplest definition would be an interactive proof in which the prover is a BQP machine and the
verifier a BPP classical machine. In some sense, this model captures the possible interaction between the quantum
world (for instance, quantum systems in the lab) and the classical world. However, we do not know how to provide
interactive proofs for all problems in BQP with only classical interaction; this is a major open problem (see Section
1.8). We therefore modify the model a little, and allow the verifier additional access to a constant number of qubits.
The verifier can be viewed as modeling our current computational abilities, and so in some sense, the verifier
represents “us”.
Definition 1.1 A Language L is said to have a Quantum Prover Interactive Proof (QPIPκ) with completeness c
and soundness s (where c − s is a constant) if there exists a pair of algorithms (P,V), where P is the prover and
V is the verifier, with the following properties:
• The prover P is a BQP machine, which also has access to a quantum channel which can transmit κ qubits.
• The verifier V is a hybrid quantum-classical machine. Its classical part is a BPP machine. The quantum
part is a register of κ qubits, on which the verifier can perform arbitrary quantum operations and which has
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access to a quantum channel which can transmit κ qubits. At any given time, the verifier is not allowed to
possess more than κ qubits. The interaction between the quantum and classical parts of the verifier is the
usual one: the classical part controls which operations are to be performed on the quantum register, and
outcomes of measurements of the quantum register can be used as input to the classical machine.
• There is also a classical communication channel between the prover and the verifier, which can transmit
polynomially many bits at any step.
• At any given step, either the verifier or the prover perform computations on their registers and send bits and
qubits through the relevant channels to the other party.
We require:
• Completeness: if x ∈ L, then after interacting with P, V accepts with probability ≥ c.
• Soundness: if x /∈ L, then the verifier rejects with probability ≥ 1− s regardless of the prover P′ (who has
the same description as P) with whom he is interacting.
Abusing notation, we denote the class of languages for which such a proof exists also by QPIPκ. Throughout the
paper, when we refer to QPIP without a subscript, we are assuming the subscript is a constant c. We remark that
our definition of QPIPκ is asymmetric - the verifier is “convinced” only if the quantum circuit outputs 1. This
asymmetry seems irrelevant in our context of verifying correctness of quantum computations. Indeed, it is possible
to define a symmetric version of QPIPκ (which we denote by QPIPsymκ ) in which the verifier is convinced of
correctness of the prover’s outcome whether or not x ∈ L rather than only if x ∈ L; see Appendix A for the
definition.
1.3 Main Results
Our main results are phrased in terms of the BQP complete problem Q-CIRCUITγ :
Definition 1.2 The promise problem Q-CIRCUITγ consists of a quantum circuit made of a sequence of gates,
U = UN . . .U1, acting on n input bits. The task is to distinguish between two cases for all x ∈ {0, 1}n:
Q-CIRCUITYES : ‖((|1〉 〈1| ⊗ In−1)U |x〉 ‖2 ≥ 1− γ
Q-CIRCUITNO : ‖((|1〉 〈1| ⊗ In−1)U |x〉 ‖2 ≤ γ
when we are promised that one of the two cases holds.
Q-CIRCUITγ is a BQP complete problem as long as 1 − 2γ > 1poly(n) . Throughout this paper, if we refer to
Q-CIRCUIT (without the parameter γ), we are assuming that γ satisfies the above inequality. Our main result is:
Theorem 1.1 For 0 < ε < 1 and γ < 1 − ε, the language Q-CIRCUITγ has a QPIPO(log( 1
ε
)) with completeness
1− γ and soundness ε+ γ.
We note that although we provide QPIP protocols only for the language Q-CIRCUIT (for which the initial state is
always a standard basis state), our proofs can be extended to security for a modified language for which the initial
state is an arbitrary quantum state. In addition, we prove soundness against an unbounded prover, rather than a
BQP prover (as given in Definition 1.1). By setting ε to a constant, we obtain a QPIPc for a constant c, which
gives our main theorem:
Theorem 1.2 There exists a constant c for which BQP = QPIPc.
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Proof: Since Q-CIRCUIT is BQP complete, the fact that BQP is in QPIPc follows from Theorem 1.1. QPIPc is
trivially in BQP since the BQP machine can simulate both prover, verifier and their interactions. 
Thus, a BQP prover can convince the verifier of any language he can compute. Since BQP is closed under
completion, we also get equality to the symmetric version of QPIPc (see Appendix A for the proof):
Corollary 1.3 There exists a constant c for which BQP = QPIPsymc
Our main tools for the proof of Theorem 1.1 are quantum authentication schemes (QAS) [BCG+02]. Roughly,
a QAS allows two parties to communicate in the following way. First, Alice sends an encoded quantum state to
Bob. Then Bob decodes the state and decides whether or not it is valid. If the state was not altered along the way,
then upon decoding, Bob gets the same state that Alice had sent (and declares it valid). If the state was altered, the
scheme is ε-secure if Bob declares a wrong state valid with probability at most ε. The basic idea used to extend a
QAS to a QPIP is that similar security can be achieved, even if the state needs to be rotated by unitary gates, as
long as the verifier can control how the unitary gates affect the authenticated states.
1.3.1 Clifford QAS based QPIP
We start with a simple QAS (which we extend to a QPIP) based on random Clifford group operations (it is
reminiscent of Clifford based quantum t-designs [AE07, ABW08]). The Clifford QAS based QPIP demonstrates
some key ideas and might be of interest on its own due to its simplicity. However, the QPIP has the disadvantage
that it requires two way quantum communication between the prover and the verifier.
We first describe the Clifford QAS. To encode a state of n qubits, Alice tensors the state with e qubits in the
state |0〉, and applies a random Clifford operator on the n+ e qubits. To decode, Bob removes the Clifford operator
chosen by Alice and checks if the e auxiliary qubits are in the state |0〉⊗e (see Protocol 3.1 for a complete description
of the QAS). We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1.4 The Clifford scheme given in Protocol 3.1 is a QAS with security ε = 2−e.
This QAS might be interesting in its own right due to its simplicity. To construct a QPIP using this QAS, we
simply use the prover as an untrusted storage device: the verifier asks the prover for the authenticated qubits on
which he would like to apply the next gate, decodes them by applying the appropriate inverse Clifford operators,
applies the gate, applies new random Clifford operators and sends the resulting qubits to the prover. As we show in
the following theorem, this protocol (see Protocol 4.1 for full details) is a QPIP:
Theorem 1.5 For 0 < ε < 1 and γ < 1 − ε, Protocol 4.1 is a QPIPO(log( 1
ε
)) with completeness 1 − γ and
soundness γ + ε for Q-CIRCUITγ .
1.3.2 Polynomial code QAS based QPIP
Our second type of QPIP uses a QAS due to Ben-Or, Crépeau, Gottesman, Hassidim and Smith [BOCG+06]. This
QAS is based on signed quantum polynomial codes (defined in Definition 2.6) , which are quantum polynomial
codes [ABO97] of degree at most d multiplied by some random sign (1 or −1) at every coordinate (this is called
the sign key k) and a random Pauli at every coordinate (the Pauli key). The QAS simply consists of Alice encoding
a single qudit using the signed polynomial code and Bob checking if the received state is indeed encoded under the
signed polynomial code (described in further detail in Protocol 5.1). We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1.6 The polynomial authentication scheme as described in Protocol 5.1 is a QAS with security ε = 2−d.
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The security proof of the polynomial code based QAS is subtle, and was missing from the original paper [BOCG+06];
we provide it here.
To extend the polynomial based QAS to a QPIP, we first note that performing Clifford gates in this setting is very
easy. Due to its algebraic structure, the signed polynomial code allows applying Clifford gates without knowing the
sign key (if the same sign key is used for all registers). This was used in [BOCG+06] for secure multiparty quantum
computation; here we use it to allow the prover to perform gates without knowing the sign key or the Pauli key. To
perform Toffoli gates, the verifier first creates authenticated magic states (used in [Sho96],[BK05],[BOCG+06])
and sends them to the prover. The prover can apply a Toffoli gate by first applying Clifford operations between the
computation qubits and a magic state, then measuring 3 of the computation qubits, and then adaptively applying
a Clifford correction based on the measurement results (for more details on applying Toffoli gates using Toffoli
states see Section 2.3.1). Note that since the prover obtains a measurement result encoded under the polynomial
QAS, he must send it to the verifier to be decoded before he can perform an adaptive Clifford correction. It follows
that with authenticated magic states and classical assistance from the verifier, the prover can perform universal
computation using only Clifford group operations and measurements (universality was proved for qubits in [BK05]
and for higher dimensions it was shown in [ABO97]).
The polynomial QPIP protocol (Protocol 6.1) goes as follows. The prover receives all authenticated qubits in
the beginning. Those include the inputs to the circuit, as well as authenticated magic states required to perform
Toffoli gates. The prover can then perform universal computation as described above. Except for the first round,
any further communication between the verifier and prover (occuring when implementing the Toffoli gates) is thus
classical. We show that this protocol is a QPIP in the following theorem:
Theorem 1.7 For 0 < ε < 1 and γ < 1− ε, Protocol 6.1 is a QPIPO(log( 1
ε
)) protocol with completeness 1−γ and
soundness γ + ε for Q-CIRCUITγ .
We remark that in the study of the classical notion of IP, a natural question is to ask how powerful the prover must
be to prove certain classes of languages. It is known that a PSPACE prover is capable of proving any language
in PSPACE to a BPP verifier, and similarly, it is known that NP or #P restricted provers can prove any language
which they can compute to a BPP verifier. This is not known for coNP, SZK or PH [AB09]. It is natural to ask
what is the power of a BQP prover; our results imply that such a prover can prove the entire class of BQP (albeit
to a verifier who is not entirely classical). Thus, we provide a characterization of the power of a BQP prover.
We stress the open question of characterizing this power when the interaction between the prover and verifier is
completely classical (discussed in Section 1.8).
1.3.3 Blindness
In the works [Chi01, AS06] a related question was raised: in our cryptographic setting, if we distrust the company
performing the delegated quantum computation, we might want to keep both the input and the function which is
being computed secret. Can this be done while maintaining the confidence in the outcome? A simple modification
of our protocols to work on universal quantum circuits gives the following theorem, which we prove in Section 7:
Theorem 1.8 Theorem 1.1 holds also in a blind setting, namely, the prover does not get any information regarding
the function being computed and its input.
We note that an analogous result for NP-hard problems was shown already in the late 80’s to be impossible (in the
setting of classical communication) unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses [AFK87].
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To achieve Theorem 1.8, we modify our construction so that the circuit that the prover performs is a universal
quantum circuit, i.e., a fixed sequence of gates which gets as input a description of a quantum circuit (with gates
from a constant size universal set of gates) plus an input string to that circuit, and applies the input quantum circuit
to the input string. Since the universal quantum circuit is fixed, it reveals nothing about the input quantum circuit
or the input string to it. To prove blindness, we simply need to show that the input states provided to the prover by
the verifier (and all messages provided to the prover during the protocol) do not leak information about the input to
the universal circuit. This is done by showing that at all times, the prover’s state is independent of the input to the
universal circuit.
Proving blindness of the Clifford scheme is quite straightforward and done in the following theorem (which we
prove in Section 7):
Theorem 1.9 (Blindness of the Clifford Based QPIP) The state of the prover in the Clifford based QPIP (Proto-
col 4.1) is independent of the input to the circuit which is being computed throughout the protocol.
On the other hand, proving blindness of the polynomial scheme is a bit more involved, due to the classical
interaction:
Theorem 1.10 (Blindness of the Polynomial Based QPIP) The state of the prover in the polynomial based QPIP
(Protocol 6.1) remains independent of the input to the circuit which is being computed throughout the protocol.
1.3.4 Interpretation
We will now present some corollaries which clarify the connection between the results and the motivating questions,
and show that one can use the QPIP protocols designed here to address the various issues raised in Sec. 1.1.
We start with some basic questions. Conditioned that the verifier does not abort, does he know that the final
state of the machine is very close to the correct state that was supposed to be the outcome of the computation?
This unfortunately is not the case. It may be that the prover can make sure that the verifier aborts with very high
probability, but when he does not abort, the outcome of the computation is wrong. However a weaker form of
the above result (which achieves what is reasonable to hope for) does hold: if we know that the probability of
not aborting is high, then we can deduce something about the probability of the final state being very close to the
correct state.
Corollary 1.11 For the Clifford based QPIP protocol with security parameter ε, if the verifier does not abort with
probability≥ β then the trace distance between the final density matrix conditioned on the verifier’s accepting and
the correct final state, is at most εβ .
The proof is given in Section 8 - it is simple for the Clifford QPIP. For the polynomial scheme a similar corollary
holds, with a proof which is more involved:
Corollary 1.12 For the polynomial based QPIP protocol with security parameter ε, if the verifier does not abort
with probability ≥ β, and the correct final state is a standard basis state, then the trace distance between the final
density matrix conditioned on the verifier’s acceptance and the correct final state is at most εβ .
The following corollary (which we prove in Appendix A) contains another implication of Theorem 1.2. We show
that under a somewhat stronger assumption than BQP 6= BPP, but still a widely believed assumption, it is possible
to lower bound the computational power of the prover (and deduce that the prover is not within BPP) by efficiently
testing the prover (assuming the prover passes the test with high probability).
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Corollary 1.13 Assume that there is a language L ∈ BQP and there is a polynomial time sampleable distribution
D on the instances of L on which any BPP machine errs with non negligible probability (e.g. the standard
cryptographic assumption about the hardness of Factoring or Discrete Log). If the verifier runs a QPIP (with
soundness γ + ε and completeness 1− γ) on Q-CIRCUITγ on an instance drawn from D and does not abort with
probability ≥ β (where β − 4ε1−2γ is a constant), then the prover’s computational power cannot be simulated by a
BPP machine.
1.4 Proofs Overview
As mentioned, we rely on two different quantum authentication schemes (and their proofs of security) in order to
derive and prove completeness and soundness of our two QPIPs.
1.4.1 Clifford QAS
To prove the security of the Clifford QAS (as stated in Theorem 1.4) we first prove in Lemma 3.2 that any non
identity attack of Eve is mapped by the random Clifford operator to a uniform mixture over all non identity Pauli
operators. We call this property of Clifford operators (as stated in Lemma 3.2) operator decohering by Cliffords or
in short, Clifford decoherence. Next, we show that the uniform mixture over Pauli operators changes the auxiliary
0 states used in the Clifford authentication scheme with high probability, and the non identity attack is therefore
likely to be detected by Bob’s decoding procedure.
1.4.2 Clifford QPIP
To prove the soundness of the Clifford based QPIP (stated in Theorem 1.5), we use Clifford decoherence to reduce
the soundness of the QPIP to the security of the QAS. We do this by showing in Claim 4.2 that Clifford decoherence
(Lemma 3.2) allows us to shift all attacks of the prover to the end of the protocol (at which point we can simply
apply the security proof of the QAS). This shifting is clearly possible if the prover’s attack is the identity operator.
If the prover’s attack is non identity, Clifford decoherence maps the prover’s attack to a uniform mixture over all
non identity Pauli operators. It follows that after the verifier decodes the state sent by the prover, the state will
essentially be maximally mixed, and whatever the verifier applies at this point commutes with the prover’s attack
which is currently acting on the state (this is shown in Lemma 4.6). Note that it is important that the verifier does
not check the states for correctness in each round (by measuring the auxiliary qubits and checking whether they
are 0); instead, he only checks in the final round. If the verifier had instead checked the states for correctness in
each round, we could not have used the shifting technique due to Clifford decoherence, since the verifier would be
applying a non unitary operator (measurement). We thereby obtain a simple QPIP, with a rather short proof.
The key disadvantage of this protocol is the two way quantum communication required in each round.
1.4.3 Polynomial based QAS
To strengthen the results, we use a polynomial based QPIP instead. The proof of the security of the corresponding
QAS (Theorem 1.6) requires some care, due to a subtle point which was not addressed in [BOCG+06]. To prove
Theorem 1.6, we first prove in Lemma 5.2 that no non identity Pauli attack can preserve the signed polynomial code
for more than 2 of the sign keys, and thus the sign key suffices in order to protect against any non identity Pauli
attack of Eve’s. Next, we need to show that the scheme is secure against general attacks. This, surprisingly, does
not follow by linearity from the security against Pauli attacks (as is the case in quantum error correcting codes): if
we omit the Pauli key we get an authentication scheme which is secure against Pauli attacks but not against general
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attacks1. We proceed by showing (with some similarity to the Clifford based QAS) that the random Pauli key
effectively translates Eve’s attack to a mixture (not necessarily uniform like in the Clifford case) of Pauli operators
acting on a state encoded by a random signed polynomial code. We call this property of random Pauli keys Pauli
decoherence (see Lemma 5.1).
1.4.4 Polynomial based QPIP
We proceed to proving the soundness of the polynomial based QPIP (as stated in Theorem 1.7). Unlike in the
Clifford case, the soundness of the polynomial QPIP cannot be directly reduced to the security of the polynomial
QAS, because the prover’s attack cannot be shifted to the end of the protocol in the polynomial QPIP. This is due to
the weakness of Pauli decoherence relative to Clifford decoherence. In more detail, Clifford decoherence first maps
the prover’s attack to a convex sum over Pauli operators, and then further maps each non-identity Pauli operator to
a uniform mixture over all non identity Pauli operators. Pauli decoherence only performs the first step: it maps the
prover’s attack to a convex sum over Pauli operators (which are weighted according to the original attack). This
does not create a maximally mixed state, and therefore does not allow the same shifting of the prover’s attack to the
end of the protocol. Thus, the proof of Theorem 1.7 does not use the proof of the polynomial QAS (Theorem 1.6)
as a black box, and in fact that proof is not strictly needed for the proof of Theorem 1.7. However, we included
Theorem 1.6 and its proof for completeness (as it was not written before), and mainly because the two key ideas
used in that proof will also be used in the proof of the polynomial based QPIP. Recall that these two key ideas
are Pauli decoherence from Lemma 5.1 and security of the sign key against Pauli attacks from Lemma 5.2 (which
takes up most of the technical effort involved in proving Theorem 1.6).
To prove soundness of the polynomial QPIP, we first note that if all of the classical messages sent from the
verifier to the prover were fixed ahead of time, shifting the prover’s attacks to the end of the protocol would be
fine, as the verifier’s messages to the prover do not depend on the prover’s measurement results. Once we shift
the prover’s attacks, we can apply the two main ideas (Pauli decoherence from Lemma 5.1 and security of the
sign key from Lemma 5.2) used in the proving the security of the polynomial QAS to obtain soundness of the
polynomial QPIP. However, in the actual polynomial QPIP protocol, the classical interaction does depend on the
prover’s messages. We employ an idea from [FK12] (see Figure 7 in their paper): as part of the analysis, we fix the
interaction transcript at the start of the protocol (to allow shifting of the prover’s attacks) and then project onto this
fixed interaction transcript at the end of the protocol to enforce consistency. This technique (which is formalized in
Claim 6.1) essentially partitions the prover’s Hilbert space according to the interaction transcript, and we can then
apply the two key ideas used in proving the security of the polynomial QAS in each partition.
1.4.5 Blindness
Proving blindness of the Clifford scheme (as stated in Theorem 1.9) is quite straightforward and is done by showing
that, due to the randomness of the Clifford encoding operator, the prover’s state is maximally mixed at all times.
This is because applying a random Clifford operator on a state results in a maximally mixed state (see Lemma 4.4).
See Section 7 for the full proof.
Proving blindness of the polynomial scheme (as stated in Theorem 1.10) is a bit more involved due to the classical
interaction - see Section 7. Without the classical interaction, we could use the randomness of the Pauli keys to show
that the prover’s state is always maximally mixed (this relies on the fact that applying a random Pauli operator to
a state results in a maximally mixed state, as stated in Lemma 4.5). When we include classical interaction (for
1Without Pauli keys, the sign key can be determined up to ±1 from a measurement of the state. This follows from the uniqueness of
signed polynomials, which is proven in Fact 5.1.
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the purpose of decoding measurement results), we need to show that the measurement results (even if altered by
a malicious prover) do not leak information about the input state. This is due to the fact that measurement results
are initially distributed uniformly at random, and even if a malicious prover attacks, his attack can be reduced to
a convex sum over Pauli operators (due to Lemma 5.1), which preserves the uniform distribution. Note that we
could have simplified this proof significantly by including extra randomness in the magic states, which would serve
essentially as a one time pad for the decoded measurement results (this would have complicated the description of
the polynomial QPIP protocol, Protocol 6.1) . However, it is interesting to note that this extra randomness is not
needed for blindness, and that the protocol is blind due to the randomness of the measurement results and the Pauli
keys.
1.4.6 Interpretation
We prove the corollaries (Corollary 1.11 and Corollary 1.12) given in Section 1.3.4 in Section 8. Both proofs
rely on using the format of the prover’s state, as shown in Claim 4.2 for the Clifford QPIP and Claim 6.1 for the
polynomial QPIP, to first determine what the prover’s state will look like conditioned on the verifier’s acceptance.
In the Clifford case, the trace distance can then be determined quite easily, due to the simplicity of Claim 4.2. The
format of the prover’s final state in the polynomial case is significantly more involved. The proof of Corollary 1.12
proceeds by analyzing the effect of two different types of Pauli attack operators (trivial and non trivial) in order to
show that the trace distance between the final state after acceptance and the correct final state is correlated to the
probability of acceptance and the security parameter.
1.5 Changes from Conference Version
This journal version is a corrected and elaborated version of the conference version, and a new author (U.M) was
added. We describe here in detail the differences from the conference version.
1.5.1 Soundness
Clifford Scheme The main difference between the Clifford QPIP protocol in this version and theconference
version is that in this version the verifier checks correctness (by measuring the auxiliary 0 states) only in the final
round, whereas in the conference version, the verifier checked correctness each time he received qubits from the
prover. The conference version of the protocol is actually not sound; the prover can cheat by deviating only slightly
in each round. Since there are polynomially many rounds, this can add up to a significant deviation in the final
state, without being detected, using essentially the zeno effect.
The security proof in the original version assumed that all attacks of the provercould be shifted to the end of
the protocol; namely, that the prover only deviated at the end of the protocol. While this does not hold in the
original protocol, in the new scheme this can be proven, which is what makes the proof go through. The final proof
eventually turns out to go along similar lines to the original one, except for this change in the protocol.
Polynomial Scheme The protocol for the polynomial QPIP remained the same. However, the security proof
needed to be changed dramatically, due to the same incorrect assumption used in the Clifford QPIP regarding
shifting the prover’s attacks to the end of the protocol (as mentioned above). Whereas in the Clifford scheme
a minor change in the protocol sufficed to guarantee that this assumption actually holds, we did not have such
a simple solution in the polynomial scheme. As described in Section 1.4, this is because the weakness of Pauli
decoherence relative to Clifford decoherence: Pauli decoherence does not map the attack to a uniform mixture
over Paulis, thus preventing shifting the prover’s attacks to the end of the protocol. The polynomial QPIP proof
therefore required major revisions, because we could not simply reduce to the security of the polynomial QAS.
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1.5.2 Fault Tolerance
In the original version of the paper a scheme for making the protocol fault tolerant was proposed and was claimed
to be secure. Unfortunately, there is a fatal flaw in the proof; we retract the claim about fault tolerance (see open
questions in Section 1.8 for possible approaches left for future work).
We describe below the proposal for fault tolerance of [ABOE08] and the bug. The proposed protocol was: at the
first stage of the protocol, authenticated qudits are sent from the verifier to the prover, one by one. As soon as the
prover receives an authenticated qudit, he protects his qudits using his own concatenated error correcting codes so
that the effective error in the encoded authenticated qudit is constant. This constant accuracy can be maintained for
a long time by the prover, by performing error correction with respect to his error correcting code (see [ABO97]).
Thus, polynomially many such authenticated states can be passed to the prover in sequence. A constant effective
error is not good enough, but can be amplified to an arbitrary inverse polynomial by purification. Indeed, the prover
cannot perform purification on his own since the purification compares authenticated qudits and the prover does
not know the authentication code. However, the verifier can help the prover by using classical communication.
This way the prover can reduce the effective error on his encoded authenticated qudits to inverse polynomial, and
perform the usual fault tolerant construction of the given circuit, with the help of the verifier in performing the gates.
The problem with this approach is that the purification protocol could leak information about the sign key; during
the purification protocol the verifier tells the prover which states are good enough for him to keep and which he
should throw away. A cheating prover could lie on all of his messages to the verifier; eventually, he will figure out
which of his lies will lead to the verifier accepting, and this should give him information about the sign key chosen
by the verifier. Once the sign key is no longer hidden from the prover, the QPIP protocol is no longer secure. The
problem seems to be difficult. In Section 1.8 we describe why several other possible avenues we tried, in order to
achieve fault tolerance, failed; It remains open to achieve blind verifiable QPIPs in the noisy setting, even when
we allow the verifier to hold a polylogarithmic quantum register, rather than a constant one.
1.6 Related Work
Related Work in Blindness and Verifiability The question of delegated blind computation was asked by Childs
in [Chi01] and by Arrighi and Salvail in [AS06], who proposed schemes to deal with such scenarios. However
[Chi01] does not deal with a cheating prover, so the protocol is not verifiable. Also, the setting is somewhat
different; rather than limiting the quantum space of the verifier, the verifier is limited to only performing Pauli
gates. In [AS06], Arrighi and Salvail provide a blind interactive quantum protocol in this setting for a restricted set
of functions, and prove its security against a restricted set of attacks.
Independent work After deriving the results of the first version of this paper, we learned that Broadbent,
Fitzsimons, and Kashefi [BFK08] have claimed related results. Using measurement based quantum computation,
they construct a protocol for universal blind quantum computation. In their case, it suffices that the verifier’s
register consists of a single qubit. Their results have similar implications to ours in terms of the QPIP notion,
though these are implicit in [BFK08]. However, their protocol was not secure against general attacks (as noted in
[FK12]). However, based on similar ideas, Fitzsimons and Kashefi suggested a measurement based protocol which
is both verifiable and blind, and prove its security in [FK12] (a key idea they used to prove security was also useful
in our proof of the polynomial QPIP, as described in Section 1.4).
Follow-up Work Since the results presented here were first posted [ABOE08], together with the [BFK08] paper,
there had been a surge of results investigating the notions of blind quantum computation, verifiable quantum com-
putation, the ability to perform those in a noisy environment fault tolerantly, as well as experimental demonstrations.
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As mentioned, Fitzimons and Kashefi gave a different QPIP protocol which is both verifiable and blind, based
on measurement based quantum computation [FK12]. Our protocol seems to be simpler to state, but the [FK12]
has the advantage of only requiring a single qubit at the verifier’s end.
In [BGS12], Broadbent, Gutoski and Stebila provided a framework for analysing blind QPIPs in the context of
one time quantum programs; a sketch for a proof of the blindness (but not of the verifiability) of a protocol very
similar to our polynomial based protocol (Protocol 6.1) is given in that paper in Section 6.1. In [MF16], Morimae
and Fitzsimons proposed a very nice and simple QPIP protocol which is just verifiable but not blind. Moreover,
it requires the verifier only to be able to measure qubits in the standard or Hadamard basis; it is based on the idea
of the prover generating the history state known from Kitaev’s QMA proof ([KSV02]). Additional blind QPIP
protocols were proposed in [HM15], [Mor14] and [Bro15].
A very interesting question which branched out from the results presented here, was taken by Reichardt, Unger
and Vazirani[RUV12]. In their work, they proposed a protocol in which a BPP verifier could verify a BQP
computation by only classical interaction, when interacting with two BQP entangled provers [RUV12]. Since then,
there have been several papers which have explored the model of multiple BQP provers and a single BPP verifier
(such as [Mck13], [GKW15], [HPDF15], [HH16]).
The difficulties in providing a fault tolerant blind verifiable protocol with onlyO(1) qubits at the verifier’s end seem
hard to get around. There have been several attempts to suggest solutions, including the conference version of this
paper [ABOE08] as well as [FK12, TFMI16] but to the best of our knowledge this problem remains importantly
open, even when the verifier is allowed to hold a polylogarithmic quantum register.
.
As for experimental demonstrations, we mention a few: of blind computing in [BKB+12],[GRB+16] and of
verifiable computing in [BFKW13]).
1.7 Fault Tolerance Open Questions and Attempts
Technically, the main open question raised by this work is to provide a fault tolerant version of these results. In
work yet to be published ([ASMZ17]), it is shown that fault tolerance can be achieved if only one of the tasks
(blindness or verification) is required. However, we do not know how to achieve fault tolerance for both tasks
simultanuously. Moreover, we do not even know how to do this when allowing the verifier a quantum register of
polylogarithmic size. There seems to be an inherent problem in any of the straightforward approaches to making
our schemes fault tolerant, which we now explain.
We already discussed above why the approach which we suggested in the original paper, of purification with
the help of the verifier (see Section 1.5.2), failed. Another attempt is to create a fault tolerant version of the Clifford
protocol by running a fault tolerant circuit, which involved the prover passing the qubits back to the verifier for
correction at every step of the circuit. This seemed to require the verifier to measure and check for errors when
correcting, which compromises the soundness of the Clifford protocol as explained in Section 1.5.1 (recall from
Section 1.4 that the verifier only checks for errors at the end of the current Clifford protocol).
We also attempted to create a fault tolerant version of the polynomial protocol by using blind computation to allow
the prover to create the authenticated states on his own; the prover can then do everything in his lab fault tolerantly.
This idea seemed troublesome because the prover did not have to honestly run the blind computation in order to
create the authenticated states, and his dishonesty during the state creation phase could potentially compromise
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security later on in the protocol.
Finally, we attempted to use standard fault tolerant techniques (e.g. [ABO97]) in order to simulate the QPIP
protocol, both by the verifier and the prover. The protocol will start with the verifier (who now has a quantum
register of polylogarithmic size) creating a fault tolerant encoding of his authenticated states, and sending those to
the prover. The prover will act as expected by the QPIP protocol, but will keep correcting the state with respect
to the code used for fault tolerance. Unfortunately, we do not yet know how to extend our security proofs to hold
for this protocol, though it may be secure. A natural attempt to prove security would be to reduce the security in
the noisy case to that of the ideal case. In other words, we would like to claim that if the protocol is insecure in
the noisy setting, then the prover can also cheat in the noiseless setting (by simulating the noise). Unfortunately,
we do not know how to claim that the prover can simulate the effect of the noise acting on the authenticated states,
since the noise may depend on the private keys of the verifier (this is because the verifier’s circuit to create the
authenticated states depends on these keys). One might hope to use error correction techniques to remove the
dependence of the noise on the keys, but this approach turns out to fail due to a very subtle issue - namely, due
to teleportation-like effects, dependencies on the keys may propagate through the error correction to qubits which
were previously subject to errors independent of the keys. Hence, we leave this approach for future investigation.
1.8 Conclusion and Open Questions
The results presented here introduced the notion of interactive proofs with quantum provers and this journal version
provides rigorous proofs of the two QPIPs presented in [ABOE08]. These results show that the fundamental
questions regarding the falsifiability of the high complexity regime of quantum mechanics, the ability to delegate
quantum computations to untrusted servers, and the ability to test that experimental quantum systems behave as they
should can all be done using interactive protocols between a BQP prover and a classical (BPP) verifier augmented
with O(1) qubits.
This work has revolutionary implications in the context of philosophy of science. It suggests that experiments
can be conducted in a structured adaptive way, along the lines of interactive proofs [GMR85]; this can be called
”interactive experiments” and suggests a new approach to confirmation of physical theories. Following discussions
with us at preliminary stages of this work, Jonathan Yaari has studied “Interactive proofs with Nature” from the
philosophy of science perspective [Yaa08]. The philosophical aspects of this possibility of interactive experiments
suggested by our QPIP protocols were also discussed by Aharonov and Vazirani in [AV12]. A very interesting
question is whether interactive experiments can be designed to test conjectured physical theories, even in the
absence of full control of the physical system as is required in our protocols. A particularly interesting example
is high Tc superconductivity, in which guesses regarding the governing Hamiltonian exist. It would be extremely
interesting to be able to test the correctness of the Hamiltonian using such interactive techniques, without resorting
to full fledged quantum computational power.
Perhaps the most important and intriguing open question that emerges from this work is whether it is possible
to remove the necessity for even a small quantum register, and achieve similar results in the more natural QPIP
model in which the verifier is entirely classical. This would have interesting fundamental implications regarding
the ability of a classical system to learn and test a quantum system; it is likely that such a protocol might also have
implications on the major open problem of quantum PCP [AAV13].
Finally, we can also ask whether it is possible to achieve blind (rather than verifiable) computation, in two different
settings. The question of blind computation involves a client who would like to ask a BQP server to run a BQP
circuit. The client does not wish to verify the result of the computation, but just to ensure that the server does
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not learn anything about the computation, even though he is able to run the computation. If the client is a BQP
machine (but does some amount of work which is independent of the size of the computation) and there is only
one round of interaction, this problem is known as quantum fully homomorphic encryption. While there have
been several results exploring this question, such as [DSS16], [BJ14] and [YPDF14] (which is an impossibility
result regarding information theoretically secure quantum homomorphic encryption), quantum fully homomorphic
encryption remains an open question. We can also change the model slightly by allowing classical interaction and
restricting the client to be a BPP machine. This variant also remains open.
We remark that this area is notorious for the difficulty in providing rigorous protocols and proofs of security, as
the arguments involved are very delicate and subtle. We hope that this journal version makes a useful contribution
in this direction. We believe that the techniques presented here will be very useful in the vastly growing area of
delegated quantum computation and quantum cryptographic protocols.
Paper Organization We start with some notations and background in Sec. 2. In Section 3, we present the Clifford
QAS and prove its security. In Section 4, we present the Clifford QPIP and prove security. Sections 5 and 6 present
the polynomial QAS and QPIP. Blind delegated quantum computation is proved in Section 7. The corollaries
related to the interpretations of the results are proven in Section 8. Appendix A contains the definition of QPIPsymκ
as well as the proofs of Corollary 1.3 and Corollary 1.13. Appendix B contains useful lemmas about Clifford and
Pauli operators, Appendix C contains proofs of the technical lemmas required in Sections 3 and 4 and Appendix
D contains proofs of correctness of the logical operators on signed polynomial codes. Finally, in Appendix E we
provide a notation table; this is especially helpful in reading Section 6, as we introduce a significant amount of
notation in that section.
2 Background
2.1 Quantum Authentication
Quantum authentication is a protocol by which a sender A and a receiver B are capable of verifying that the state
sent by A had not been altered while transmitted to B.
2.1.1 Quantum Security
If B is a quantum machine, we would like our authentication definition to capture the following two requirements.
On the one hand, in the absence of intervention, the received state should be the same as the sent state and moreover,
B should not abort. On the other hand, we want that when the adversary does intervene, then with all but a small
probability (or in fact, distance in terms of density matrices), either B rejects or his received state is the same as
that sent by A.
This is formalized below for pure states; one can deduce the appropriate statement about fidelity of mixed
states, or for states that are entangled to the rest of the world (see [BCG+02] Appendix B).
Definition 2.1 (adapted from Barnum et. al. [BCG+02]). A quantum authentication scheme (QAS) from l to
m = l + e qubits, with security ε, is a pair of polynomial time quantum algorithms A and B together with a set of
classical keys K such that:
• A takes as input a state |ψ〉 on l qubits and chooses k ∈ K uniformly at random. A then applies a unitary
operator Ak on the state of m qubits |ψ〉 |0〉⊗e obtaining:
Ak(|ψ〉 |0〉⊗e) (1)
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• B takes as input a state of m qubits and a classical key k ∈ K. He applies a unitary operator Bk to
the input state to obtain an output state of m qubits. B declares the state valid if the last e qubits of the
output state lie in the space |0〉 〈0|⊗e and declares the state erroneous if the last e qubits lie in the space
ΠABR = I − |0〉 〈0|⊗e.
We require:
• Completeness: For all keys k ∈ K,
BkAk(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗e)A†kB
†
k = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗e (2)
To quantify soundness, define the projections:
Π
|ψ〉
1 = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ I
⊗e +
(
I⊗l − |ψ〉 〈ψ|
)
⊗ΠABR (3)
Π
|ψ〉
0 = (I
⊗l − |ψ〉 〈ψ|)⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗e (4)
Then
• Soundness: For any super-operator O (representing a possible intervention by the adversary), let ρB be
defined by
ρB =
1
|K|
∑
k
Bk(O(Ak(|ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗e)A†k))B
†
k (5)
Then the quantum authentication scheme is ε-secure if:
Tr(Π|ψ〉1 ρB) ≥ 1− ε (6)
2.2 Pauli and Clifford Gates in F2
The n-qubits Pauli group consists of all elements of the form P = P1 ⊗ P2⊗. . .⊗Pn where Pi ∈ {I, X, Y, Z},
together with the multiplicative factors −1 and ±i. We will use a subset of this group, which we denote as Pn,
which includes all operators P = P1 ⊗ P2⊗. . .⊗Pn but not the multiplicative factors.
The Pauli groupPn is a basis to the matrices acting on n-qubits. We can write any matrix U over a vector space
A ⊗ B (where A is the space of n qubits) as
∑
P∈Pn P ⊗ UP where UP is some (not necessarily unitary) matrix
on B.
Let Cn denote the n-qubit Clifford group. Recall that it is a finite subgroup of unitaries acting on n qubits
generated by the Hadamard matrix-H, by K =
(
1 0
0 i
)
, and by controlled-NOT. The Clifford group is char-
acterized by the property that it maps the Pauli group Pn to itself, up to a phase α ∈ {±1,±i}. That is:
∀C ∈ Cn, P ∈ Pn : αCPC† ∈ Pn
Fact 2.1 [DLT02] A random element from the Clifford group on n qubits can be sampled efficiently by choosing
a string k of poly(n) bits uniformly at random. The map from k to the group element represented as a product of
Clifford group generators can be computed in classical polynomial time.
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2.3 Generalized Gates over Fq
Definition 2.2 The generalized Pauli operators over Fq perform the following maps:
X |a〉 = |(a+ 1) mod q〉 (7)
Z |a〉 = ωaq |a〉 (8)
Y = XZ (9)
where ωq = e2πi/q is the primitive q-root of the unity.
We note that ZX = ωqXZ. The generalized Pauli group consists of generalized Pauli operators, together with the
multiplicative factor ωq. We use the same notation, Pn, for the standard and generalized Pauli groups, as it will be
clear by context which one is being used.
Definition 2.3 For vectors x, z in Fmq , we denote by Px,z the Pauli operator Zz1Xx1⊗. . .⊗ZzmXxm .
We now define the other generalized gates we will need:
Definition 2.4 Generalized Gates
1. The generalized Fourier transform over Fq performs the following map on a ∈ Fq:
F |a〉 def= 1√
q
∑
b
ωabq |b〉 (10)
2. The generalized r- variant of the Fourier transform over Fq performs the following map on a ∈ Fq:
Fr |a〉
def
=
1
√
q
∑
b
ωrabq |b〉 (11)
3. The generalized CNOT gate, which we denote as SUM, performs the following map on a, b ∈ Fq:
SUM |a〉 |b〉 def= |a〉 |(a+ b) mod q〉 (12)
4. The generalized Toffoli gate T performs the following map on a, b, c ∈ Fq:
T |a〉 |b〉 |c〉 def= |a〉 |b〉 |c+ ab〉 (13)
5. The multiplication gate Mr (for r ∈ Fq, r 6= 0) performs the following map on a ∈ Fq:
Mr |a〉
def
= |ra〉 (14)
6. The generalized controlled phase gate, which we denote as CPG, performs the following map on a, b ∈ Fq:
CPG |a〉 |b〉 = ωabq |a〉 |b〉 (15)
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2.3.1 Toffoli Gate by Teleportation
If given a resource state (which we will also refer to as a magic state or a Toffoli state) of the following form:
1
q
∑
a,b∈Fq
|a, b, ab〉 (16)
it is possible to apply a Toffoli gate using only Clifford operations and measurements. This can be done as follows.
Assume we would like to apply the Toffoli gate to the state |c, d, e〉, resulting in |c, d, e+ cd〉. We start with the
following state:
1
q
∑
a,b∈Fq
|a, b, ab, c, d, e〉
We then perform the following Clifford entangling operations: a SUM gate from register 6 to register 3, inverse
sum gates from register 1 to 4 and register 2 to 5, and an inverse Fourier gate on register 6 resulting in:
1
q
∑
a,b∈Fq
|a, b, ab〉 −→ 1√
q3
∑
a,b,l∈Fq
ω−le |a, b, ab+ e, c− a, d− b, l〉 (17)
We then measure registers 4,5, and 6 obtaining measurement results x, y, z where x corresponds to register 4, etc..
The renormalized state after measurement on the unmeasured registers (the first three registers) is then:
ω−ze |c− x, d− y, (c− x)(d− y) + e〉 (18)
Then we apply the following correction to the state (on the first three remaining registers):
Cx,y,z
def
= T (Xx ⊗Xy ⊗ Zz)T † = (XxZ−yz ⊗XyZ−xz ⊗XxyZz)SUMy1,3SUM
x
2,3CPG
−z
1,2 (19)
where the subscript denotes the registers (the first is the control and second is the target). We note that the above
correction involves Toffoli gates, but since they are acting by conjugation on Pauli operators, the expression is
actually a Clifford operator. It is easy to check that after applying Cx,y,z to the state in equation 18, the resulting
state is:
|c, d, e+ cd〉 (20)
2.4 Conjugation Properties of Generalized Gates
In this section, we describe how the gates above conjugate operators in the Pauli group. We begin with the SUM
gate. It is easy to check that:
SUM(ZzAXxA ⊗ ZzBXxB )SUM† = (ZzA−zBXxA ⊗ ZzBXxB+xA) (21)
Next, the Fourier gate swaps the roles of the X and Z Pauli operators; i.e. for r ∈ Fq (r 6= 0)
FrZ
zXxF †r = X
−r−1zZrx (22)
Finally, the multiplication gate Mr (again for r ∈ Fq where r 6= 0) has the following conjugation behavior:
MrZ
zXxM †r = Z
r−1zXrx (23)
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2.5 Signed Polynomial Codes
We first define polynomial codes:
Definition 2.5 Polynomial error correction code [ABO97]. Given m, d, q and {α1, . . . , αm} where αi are distinct
non zero values from Fq, the encoding of a ∈ Fq is |Sa〉
|Sa〉
def
=
1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|f(α1), . . ., f(αm)〉 (24)
We use here m = 2d+ 1, in which case the code subspace is its own dual. It is easy to see that this code can detect
up to d errors [ABO97]. In this paper, we will be using signed polynomial codes:
Definition 2.6 ([BOCG+06]) The signed polynomial code with respect to a string k ∈ {±1}m is defined by:∣∣∣Ska〉 def= 1√
qd
∑
f :deg(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|k1 · f(α1). . .km · f(αm)〉
We again use m = 2d + 1. Similar to the polynomial code, the signed polynomial code can detect d errors and is
self dual [BOCG+06]. We will require the following encoding circuit:
Definition 2.7 Let Ek be a unitary operator such that:
Ek |a〉 |0〉⊗m−1 =
∣∣∣Ska〉
Ek is the encoding circuit, which we describe in further detail in Section 2.5.2. We will write ρk to denote that a
density matrix ρ is encoded with the signed polynomial code with respect to k; i.e. if ρ is one qudit, then
ρk
def
= Ek(ρ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗m−1)E†k (25)
2.5.1 Signed Polynomial Code Logical Gates
For proofs of all claims and lemmas below, see Appendix D. We first provide the logical X operator:
Claim 2.1 For x ∈ Fq and k ∈ {−1, 1}m, the logical X operator X̃xk obeys the following identity:
X̃xk
∣∣∣Ska〉 def= (Xk1x ⊗ · · · ⊗Xkmx) ∣∣∣Ska〉 = ∣∣∣Ska+x〉 (26)
Similarly for logical SUM, we consider the transitive application of controlled-sum, that is a SUM operation applied
between the j’th register of |Sa〉 and |Sb〉.
Claim 2.2 For all k ∈ {−1, 1}m, the logical SUM operator S̃UM obeys the following identity:
S̃UM
∣∣∣Ska〉 ∣∣∣Skb 〉 def= (SUM)⊗m ∣∣∣Ska〉 ∣∣∣Skb 〉 = ∣∣∣Ska〉 ∣∣∣Ska+b〉 (27)
where each SUM gate in the tensor product acts between registers i and m+ i for 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Showing what is the logical Fourier transform on the signed polynomial code requires more work. We need the
following lemma:
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Lemma 2.3 For any m distinct numbers {αi}m1 there exist interpolation coefficients {ci}m1 such that
m∑
i=1
cif(αi) = f(0) (28)
for any polynomial of degree ≤ m− 1.
We are now ready to define the logical Fourier transform.
Claim 2.4 For all k ∈ {−1, 1}m, the logical Fourier operator F̃ obeys the following identity:
F̃
∣∣∣Ska〉 def= Fc1 ⊗ Fc2⊗. . .⊗Fcm ∣∣∣Ska〉 = 1√q∑b ωabq ∣∣∣S̃kb 〉 (29)
where
∣∣∣S̃kb 〉 is the encoding of b in a signed polynomial code of degree m− d on m registers.
Finally, we define the logical Z operator.
Claim 2.5 For z ∈ Fq and k ∈ {−1, 1}m, the logical Pauli Z operator Z̃zk obeys the following identity:
Z̃zk
∣∣∣Ska〉 def= (Zk1c1z ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zkmcmz) ∣∣∣Ska〉 = ωzaq ∣∣∣Ska〉 (30)
2.5.2 Signed Polynomial Encoding Circuit
The encoding circuit Ek first applies a Fourier transform on the first d 0 states, and then interpolates to fill in the
rest of the state. The following unitary operator performs the interpolation:
Definition 2.8 Let Dk be a unitary operator such that
Dk |a〉 |k2f(α2), . . . , kd+1f(αd+1)〉 |0〉⊗d = |k1f(α1), . . . , kmf(αm)〉
such that deg(f) ≤ d and f(0) = a.
Now if F is the generalized Fourier transform (see equation 10) it is easy to check that
Ek = Dk(I ⊗ F⊗d ⊗ I) (31)
We now describe Dk in further detail.
Claim 2.6 The operatorDk can be written as a product of SUM operators controlled by registers 1, . . . , d+1 with
target registers 1, d+ 2, . . . ,m and a multiplication operator on the first register. More explicitly:
Dk =
∏
i
SUM
hi(α1)kik1
i,1 (Mk1h0(α1) ⊗ I
⊗m−1)
∏
i,j
SUM
hi(αj)kikj
i,j
∏
j
SUM
h0(αj)kj
1,j (32)
where 2 ≤ i ≤ d+ 1, d+ 2 ≤ j ≤ m and for i′ ∈ {0, 2, ..., d+ 1} and α0 = 0
hi′(x) =
∏
l∈{0,2,...,d+1}
l 6=i′
x− αl
αi′ − αl
(33)
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Proof: Observe that
h0(x)f(0) +
∑
2≤i≤d+1
hi(x)f(αi) = f(x) (34)
It follows that for all d + 2 ≤ j ≤ m, register j holds the following value after the controlled sum operations
detailed above:
k0f(0)(h0(αj)k0kj) +
∑
2≤i≤d+1
kif(αi)(hi(αj)kikj) = kj(h0(αj)f(0) +
∑
2≤i≤d+1
hi(αj)f(αi)) (35)
= kjf(αj) (36)
Now we can see that the controlled sum operations have performed the following mapping:∣∣∣f(0), k2f(α2), . . . , kd+1f(αd+1), 0d〉→ |f(0), k2f(α2), . . . , kmf(αm)〉 (37)
The only thing left to do is map the first register from f(0) to k1f(α1). To do this, first multiply the first register
by k1h0(α1) by using the multiplication operation Mk1h0(α1), where
Mk1h0(α1) |a〉 = |k1h0(α1)a〉 (38)
The multiplication operator performs the following mapping:
|f(0), k2f(α2), . . . , kmf(αm)〉 → |k1h0(α1)f(0), k2f(α2), . . . , kmf(αm)〉 (39)
Then apply controlled sum operations from registers î ∈ {2, . . . , d + 1} to register 1 hî(α1)kik1 times. Due to
equation 34, the value in the first register after these operations is:
k1h0(α1)f(0) +
∑
2≤i≤d+2
kif(αi)(hi(α1)kik1) = k1(h0(α1)f(0) + hi(α1)f(αi)) (40)
= k1f(α1) (41)
It follows that the final controlled sum operations have performed the following mapping:
|k1h0(α1)f(0), k2f(α2), . . . , kmf(αm)〉 → |k1f(α1), k2f(α2), . . . , kmf(αm)〉 (42)

3 Clifford Authentication Scheme
We now define a quantum authentication scheme based on Clifford operations. Let Km be the set of authentication
keys, consisting of succinct descriptions of Clifford operations in Cm (i.e. Clifford operations on m qubits); these
descriptions exist due to Fact 2.1.
Protocol 3.1 Clifford based QAS : Given is a state |ψ〉 on l qubits. Let e ∈ N be such that 2−e = ε. We denote
m = l + e. We denote by Ck the operator specified by a key k ∈ Km.
• Encoding - Ak: Alice applies Ck on the state |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗e.
• Decoding - Bk: Bob applies C†k to the received state. Bob measures the e auxiliary registers and declares
the state valid if they are all 0, otherwise Bob aborts.
Theorem 1.4 The Clifford scheme given in Protocol 3.1 is a QAS with security ε = 2−e.
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3.1 The Overall Proof of Theorem 1.4
The completeness of this protocol is trivial. In the following proof, we show soundness by first showing that any
attack of Eve can be decomposed into a distribution over Pauli attacks. We then show that averaging over the
random Clifford operators maps a Pauli operator to a uniform distribution over Paulis; the effective transformation
on the original state is an application of a random Pauli. These two facts are summarized by Claim 3.1. We
conclude the proof of Theorem 1.4 by showing that any Pauli attack is detected with high probability.
Proof of Theorem 1.4: We denote the space of the message sent from Alice to Bob as M . Without loss of
generality, we can assume that Eve adds to the message a system E (of arbitrary dimension) and performs a unitary
transformation U on the joint system. We note that there is a representation of U as
∑
P∈Pm P ⊗ UP , where P
acts on the message space M , and UP is not necessarily unitary and acts on the environment E. This is because the
Pauli matrices form a basis for the 2m × 2m matrix vector space. We first characterize the effect that Eve’s attack
has on the unencoded message: |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗e.
Claim 3.1 Let ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉⊗e be the state of Alice before the application of the Clifford operator. For
any attack U =
∑
P∈Pm P ⊗ UP by Eve, Bob’s state after decoding is sρ +
1−s
4m−1
∑
P 6=I PρP
†, where s =
Tr(UIρEU
†
I ).
We proceed with the proof of the theorem. From the above claim we know what Bob’s state after Eve’s
intervention is and we would like to bound its projection on P |ψ〉0 (defined in equation 4):
Tr
(
Π
|ψ〉
0
(
sρ+
1− s
4m − 1
∑
Q∈Pm\{I}
QρQ†
))
= sTr(Π|ψ〉0 ρ) +
1− s
4m − 1
∑
Q∈Pm\{I}
Tr(Π|ψ〉0 QρQ
†) (43)
By definition of Π|ψ〉0 we see that Tr(Π
|ψ〉
0 ρ) = 0. On the other hand: Tr(Π
|ψ〉
0 QρQ
†) ≤ 1 when Q does not flip
any auxiliary qubits, and vanishes otherwise. The Pauli operators that do not flip auxiliary qubits can be written as
Q′⊗Q′′ whereQ′ ∈ Pl andQ′′ ∈ {I, Z}⊗e. It follows that the number of such operators is exactly 4l2e. Omitting
the identity Im we are left with 4l2e − 1 operators which are undetected by our scheme. We return to Eq. 43:
. . . ≤ (1− s)(4
l2e − 1)
4m − 1
(44)
≤ 1− s
2e
(45)
The security follows from the fact that 1 − s ≤ 1, and hence the projection is bounded by 12e . This concludes the
proof. 
We remark that the above proof in fact implies a stronger theorem: interventions that are very close to I are
even more likely to keep the state in the space defined by Π|ψ〉1 .
3.2 Proof of Claim 3.1
Let U =
∑
P∈Pm P ⊗ UP be the operator applied by Eve. We denote ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗e the state of Alice
prior to encoding. Let us now write ρBob, the state of Bob’s system after decoding and before measuring the e
auxiliary qubits. For clarity of reading we omit the normalization factor |Cm| and denote the Clifford operation
applied by Alice (Bob) C (C†):
ρBob =
1
|Cm|
TrE
( ∑
C∈Cm
(C ⊗ IE)†U
(
(C ⊗ IE)ρ(C ⊗ IE)† ⊗ ρE
)
U †(C ⊗ IE)
)
(46)
At this point, we require the following lemma which states that a random Clifford conjugating an operator has the
effect of decohering (removing the cross terms) of the operator:
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Lemma 3.2 (Clifford Decoherence) Let ρ′ be a density matrix on m′ > m qubits and let U =
∑
P∈Pm
P ⊗ UP be
a matrix acting on ρ′ by conjugation. Then
1
|Cm|
∑
C∈Cm
(C⊗I)†U(C⊗I)ρ′(C⊗I)†U †(C⊗I) = (I⊗UI)ρ′(I⊗UI)†+
1
|Pm| − 1
∑
P,Q∈Pm\{I}
(P⊗UQ)ρ′(P⊗UQ)†
The proof of the above lemma is in Section 3.3. Applying Lemma 3.2, we have
ρBob = TrE [(I ⊗ UI)ρ⊗ ρE(I ⊗ UI)† +
1
|Pm| − 1
∑
P,Q∈Pm\{I}
(P ⊗ UQ)ρ⊗ ρE(P ⊗ UQ)†] (47)
= ρ · Tr(UIρEU †I ) +
1
|Pm| − 1
∑
P,Q∈Pm\{I}
PρP † · Tr(UQρEU †Q) (48)
= ρ · Tr(UIρEU †I ) +
1
|Pm| − 1
(
∑
P∈Pm\{I}
PρP †) · (
∑
Q∈Pm\{I}
Tr(UQρEU
†
Q)) (49)
We now require the following lemma, which allows us to trace out the extra space a prover may use as part of his
attack. See Section 3.3 for the proof:
Lemma 3.3 Let U =
∑
P∈Pm P ⊗ UP be a unitary operator acting on m
′ > m qubits. For any density matrix τ
acting on the last m′ −m qubits: ∑
P∈Pm
Tr(UP τU
†
P ) = Tr(τ) = 1 (50)
We apply Lemma 3.3 to write Bob’s state as:
sρ+
(1− s)
4m − 1
∑
P∈Pm\{I}
(
PρP †
)
(51)
for s = Tr(UIρEU
†
I), which concludes the proof of Claim 3.1.
3.3 Proofs of Technical Lemmas
In this section we prove Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3.
3.3.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2
To prove Lemma 3.2, we require the following three lemmata, which we prove in Appendix C. The lemma below
states that applying a random Clifford operator in Cm (by conjugation) to a non identity Pauli operator P ∈ Pm
maps it to a Pauli operator Q ∈ Pm chosen uniformly over all non-identity Pauli operators:
Lemma 3.4 (Pauli Partitioning by Cliffords) For everyP,Q ∈ Pm\{I} it holds that :
∣∣{C ∈ Cm|C†PC = Q}∣∣ =
|Cm|
|Pm|−1 =
|Cm|
4m−1 .
The following two lemmas describe the effect of conjugating an operator by a random Pauli or Clifford operator.
The lemma below (Lemma 3.5) is used in the proof of the lemma after it (Lemma 3.6), and since it will be useful
also when we handle the polynomial codes based protocol later on, we state it here with generalized Pauli operators:
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Lemma 3.5 (Pauli Twirl) Let P 6= P ′ be generalized Pauli operators. For any density matrix ρ′ on m′ > m
qubits it holds that ∑
Q∈Pm
(Q†PQ⊗ I)ρ′(Q†(P ′)†Q⊗ I) = 0
Lemma 3.6 (Clifford Twirl) Let P 6= P ′ be Pauli operators. For any density matrix ρ′ on m′ > m qubits it holds
that ∑
C∈Cm
(C†PC ⊗ I)ρ′(C†(P ′)†C ⊗ I) = 0
We now proceed to the proof of Lemma 3.2:
Proof of Lemma 3.2: We start with
1
|Cm|
∑
C∈Cm
(C ⊗ I)†U(C ⊗ I)ρ′(C ⊗ I)†U †(C ⊗ I) = 1
|Cm|
∑
P,P ′∈Pm
∑
C∈Cm
(C†PC ⊗ UP )ρ′(C†P ′C ⊗ UP ′)†
We use Lemma 3.6 and are left only with P = P ′
. . . =
1
|Cm|
∑
P∈Pm
∑
C∈Cm
(C†PC ⊗ UP )ρ′(C†PC ⊗ UP )† (52)
We first consider the case were P = I, then:
1
|Cm|
∑
C∈Cm
(C†PC ⊗ UP )ρ′(C†PC ⊗ UP )† = (I ⊗ UI)ρ′(I ⊗ UI)† (53)
On the other hand when, P 6= I by Lemma 3.4:
1
|Cm|
∑
C∈Cm
(C†PC ⊗ UP )ρ′(C†PC ⊗ UP )† =
1
|Pm| − 1
∑
Q∈P\{I}
(Q⊗ UP )ρ′(Q⊗ UP )† (54)

3.3.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.3: We analyze the action of U on the density matrix 12mI ⊗ τ . We first notice that U is a
trace preserving operator, that is: 12mTr(U(I ⊗ τ)U
†) = 12mTr(I ⊗ τ) = Tr(τ). On the other hand it holds that:
1
2m
Tr
(
U(I ⊗ τ)U †
)
=
1
2m
∑
P,P ′∈Pm
Tr
(
(P ⊗ UP )(I ⊗ τ)(P ′ ⊗ UP ′)†
)
(55)
=
1
2m
∑
P,P ′∈Pm
Tr
(
PIP ′† ⊗ UP τU †P ′
)
(56)
=
1
2m
∑
P,P ′∈Pm
Tr
(
PP ′†
)
Tr
(
UP τU
†
P ′
)
(57)
If P 6= P ′ then Tr
(
PP ′†
)
= 0, and therefore:
. . . =
1
2m
∑
P∈Pm
Tr
(
I
)
Tr
(
UP τU
†
P
)
=
∑
P∈Pm
Tr
(
UP τU
†
P
) (58)
It follows that Tr(τ) =
∑
P∈Pm Tr(UP τU
†
P ), which concludes the proof.

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4 Quantum Interactive Proofs with Clifford Authentication
Protocol 4.1 Clifford based Interactive Proof for Q-CIRCUIT: Fix a security parameter ε. Given is a quantum
circuit consisting of two-qubit gates, U = UN . . .U1, acting on n input qubits with error probability reduced to
≤ γ. The verifier chooses n authentication keys k1, . . . , kn ∈ Ke+1, where e = dlog 1ε e. The verifier authenticates
the input qubits of the circuit one by one using the Clifford QAS ; that is qubit j is authenticated using operation
Ckj on e + 1 qubits. The verifier sends the authenticated qubits to the prover P. In round i (for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ), the
verifier asks P to return the qubits on which Ui will act. The verifier decodes these qubits by applying the inverse
Clifford operator. The verifier then applies Ui, authenticates the resulting qubits with new authentication keys and
the same (unmeasured) auxiliary qubits and sends the qubits to P. In round N + 1, the prover sends the verifier
the first authenticatd qubit, which the verifier decodes and rejects if the auxiliary qubits are not valid. The verifier
then measures the decoded qubit (which contains the result of the circuit) and accepts or rejects accordingly. In
any case that the verifier does not get the correct number of qubits during the protocol he aborts.
Theorem 1.5 For 0 < ε < 1 and γ < 1 − ε, Protocol 4.1 is a QPIPO(log( 1
ε
)) with completeness 1 − γ and
soundness γ + ε for Q-CIRCUITγ .
The quantum communication is linear in the number of gates. For ε = 12 , we get e = 1, and so the verifier uses
a register of 4 qubits (2 per gate). In fact 3 is enough, since each of the authenticated qubits can be decoded (or
encoded and sent) on its own before a new authenticated qubit is handled.
4.1 Overall Proof of Theorem 1.5
Let us first analyze completeness:
Claim 4.1 (Completeness) For any γ > 0, Protocol 4.1 is a QPIP protocol with completeness 1 − γ for
Q-CIRCUIT.
Proof: To prove completeness, we assume the prover is honest and we will show that if x ∈ L, the verifier accepts
with probability ≥ 1− γ. Since the prover is honest, the state at all times is indeed the correctly authenticated state
of the circuit. Thus, the output qubit is indeed an authentication of a (possibly mixed) state, which if measured,
outputs 1 with probability ≥ 1 − γ (the error in the circuit is ≤ γ). The decoding of the output block received by
the verifier will thus result in accept with probability ≥ 1− γ. 
To prove that Protocol 4.1 has soundness γ + ε, we will first observe that each round is essentially a run of the
Clifford authentication scheme (the only difference is that the auxiliary qubits are not measured and checked by
the verifier in each round). Let round i be the round in which the verifier applies Ui. Each round can be seen as an
authentication protocol on the 1 or 2 authenticated qubits requested by V ; the rest of the qubits are independently
authenticated and can therefore be thought of as the extra space of the verifier. Therefore, we can apply the main
claim involved in the soundness proof of the authentication scheme (Claim 3.1) in each round to just the qubits
requested by V .
We will use the claim below to prove soundness, and then we will prove the claim by induction:
Claim 4.2 (Clifford QPIP State Evolution) The state held by the prover at the start of round i (before sending
qubits for Ui to the verifier) can be written as:
Oi(CkρiC
†
k ⊗ ρEi)(O
i)†
where Ck = Ck1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ckn , Oi is a unitary, ρi = (Ui−1 · · ·U1)ρ(Ui−1 · · ·U1)† (ρ is the initial density n qubit
matrix), and ρEi represents the prover’s extra space.
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This is the claim, which, as mentioned in Section 1.4 of the introduction, uses the strong properties of Clifford
decoherence (Lemma 3.2) to show that the attack of the prover can be passed through all rounds to the end of the
protocol. Using this claim, we will prove soundness:
Claim 4.3 (Soundness) For any ε, γ > 0, Protocol 4.1 is a QPIP protocol with soundness γ + ε for Q-CIRCUIT.
Proof: Assume Claim 4.2 holds. Before the prover sends the verifier the first authenticated qubit in round N + 1
(the final round), Claim 4.2 implies that his state is:
ON+1(CkρN+1C
†
k ⊗ ρEN+1)(O
N+1)†
Now we can average over all of the authentication keys except k1, since they will not be used for decoding. After
averaging, the prover’s state can be written as:
1
|Ce+1|n−1
∑
k2,...,kn
ON+1(CkρN+1C
†
k ⊗ ρEN+1)(O
N+1)†
Here we require the following lemma, which states that random Clifford operators acting on a state turn it into a
maximally mixed state:
Lemma 4.4 (Clifford Mixing) For a matrix ρ on spaces A⊗B, where A is the space of n qubits and n ∈ N
1
|Cn|
∑
C∈Cn
(C ⊗ IB)ρ(C ⊗ IB)† =
1
2n
IA ⊗ TrA(ρ)
The proof of this lemma follows from a similar lemma which uses Pauli operators instead of Clifford operators:
Lemma 4.5 (Pauli Mixing) For a matrix ρ on two spaces A,B
1
Pn
∑
P∈Pn
(P ⊗ IB)ρ(P ⊗ IB)† =
1
qn
IA ⊗ TrA(ρ)
The proofs of both Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.5 can be found in Appendix B. By applying Lemma 4.4,we can see
that the averaging changes the state in the final round to:
ON+1(Ck1TrA(ρN+1)C
†
k1
⊗ ρAEN+1)(O
N+1)† (59)
where
ρAEN+1 =
1
2(n−1)(e+1)
IA ⊗ ρEN+1 (60)
and A represents the space of all computational qubits other than the first. Now we proceed to write down the state
after the verifier’s decoding. Namely, the verifier will decode by applying C†k1 , and then we can average over k1,
obtaining:
1
|Ce+1|
∑
k1∈Ke+1
(C†k1 ⊗ IAEN+1)O
N+1(Ck1TrA(ρN+1)C
†
k1
⊗ ρAEN+1)(O
N+1)†(Ck1 ⊗ IAEN+1) (61)
Now we can directly apply Claim 3.1 to obtain the state after decoding. This is done by replacing ρ in the statement
of Claim 3.1 with TrA(ρN+1) and replacing ρE in the statement with ρAEN+1 . We would like to bound the
projection of the state on Π|1〉0 :
Tr
(
Π
|1〉
0
(
sTrA(ρN+1) +
1− s
4m − 1
∑
Q∈Pm\{I}
Q(TrA(ρN+1))Q†
))
(62)
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= sTr(Π|1〉0 TrA(ρN+1)) +
1− s
4m − 1
∑
Q∈Pm\{I}
Tr(Π|1〉0 Q(TrA(ρN+1))Q
†) (63)
Due to the circuit error γ, Tr(Π|1〉0 ρN+1) ≤ γ. The rest of the upper bound is exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1.4
(see the explanation linking equations 43 and 44), and the final upper bound is:
sTr(Π|1〉0 ρN+1) +
1− s
4m − 1
∑
Q∈Pm\{I}
Tr(Π|1〉0 QρN+1Q
†) ≤ sγ + 1− s
2e
(64)
≤ γ + 1
2e
(65)

4.2 Proof of Claim 4.2
We now proceed to the proof of the claim. We will require the following lemma, which we will prove after
completing the current proof:
Lemma 4.6 (Unitary Commutation) For all unitariesU acting onA, a space of k qubits (for k ∈ N), and density
matrices ρ acting on A⊗B, we have:∑
Q6=I∈Pk
(UQ⊗ I)ρ(UQ⊗ I)† =
∑
Q6=I∈Pk
(QU ⊗ I)ρ(QU ⊗ I)†
We prove Claim 4.2 by induction. The base case is clear. For the inductive step, we assume the claim holds for
round i and show that it holds for round i+ 1. When the verifier requests the qubits needed for Ui, the prover sends
back register Ri, which contains the authenticated qudits required to apply Ui. Assume Ri is the first register of
the state written below and that it contains 2 authenticated qudits. Then the prover sends backRi from the state as
given in the inductive step:
Oi(CkρiC
†
k ⊗ ρEi)(O
i)† (66)
We now write the state after the verifier decodes registerRi (and after averaging over the Clifford keys for register
Ri):
1
|Ce+1|
∑
k1,k2∈Ke+1
(Ck1 ⊗ Ck2 ⊗ I)†Oi(CkρiC
†
k ⊗ ρEi)(O
i)†(Ck1 ⊗ Ck2 ⊗ I) (67)
Next, we can decompose Oi as
∑
P∈P|Ri|
P ⊗ OiP , where P acts on register Ri and OiP acts on all other qubits
(i.e. the remaining computational qubits as well as the extra space of the prover). Applying Lemma 3.2, we can
write the state as:
(I ⊗OiI)Ck′(ρi ⊗ ρEi)C
†
k′(I ⊗O
i
I)
† +
1
|P|Ri|| − 1
∑
P,Q6=I∈P|Ri|
(Q⊗OiP )Ck′(ρi ⊗ ρEi)C
†
k′(Q⊗O
i
P )
† (68)
where Ck′ = I ⊗ Ck3 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ckn ⊗ IE . The verifier then applies the gate Ui and authenticates register Ri with
fresh keys Ck̂1⊗Ck̂2 . Let U
′
i = (Ck̂1⊗Ck̂2)Ui; this is the operation applied to the decoded state (given in equation
68) by the verifier. First observe the action of this operation on the first term of the decoded state; it is now:
(I ⊗OiI)Ck̂(ρi+1 ⊗ ρEi)C
†
k̂
(I ⊗OiI)† (69)
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whereCk̂ = (Ck̂1⊗Ck̂2⊗I)Ck′ . To determine what happens to the second term of the decoded state in equation 68
after the verifier applies U ′i , we will apply the unitary commutation lemma, Lemma 4.6. We first write the second
term (after application of U ′i ) in a way which makes it easier to apply Lemma 4.6:
1
|P|Ri|| − 1
∑
P,Q6=I∈P|Ri|
(I ⊗OiP )(U ′iQ⊗ I)Ck′(ρi ⊗ ρEi)C
†
k′(U
′
iQ⊗ I)†(I ⊗OiP )† (70)
Now we apply Lemma 4.6, obtaining that the above expression is equal to:
1
|P|Ri|| − 1
∑
P,Q6=I∈P|Ri|
(I ⊗OiP )(QU ′i ⊗ I)Ck′(ρi ⊗ ρEi)C
†
k′(QU
′
i ⊗ I)†(I ⊗OiP )† (71)
=
1
|P|Ri|| − 1
∑
P,Q6=I∈P|Ri|
(Q⊗OiP )(U ′i ⊗ I)Ck′(ρi ⊗ ρEi)C
†
k′(U
′
i ⊗ I)†(Q⊗OiP )† (72)
=
1
|P|Ri|| − 1
∑
P,Q6=I∈P|Ri|
(Q⊗OiP )Ck̂(ρi+1 ⊗ ρEi)C
†
k̂
(Q⊗OiP )† (73)
It follows that the entire state is:
(I ⊗OiI)Ck̂(ρi+1 ⊗ ρEi)C
†
k̂
(I ⊗OiI)† +
1
|P|Ri|| − 1
∑
P,Q6=I∈P|Ri|
(Q⊗OiP )Ck̂(ρi+1 ⊗ ρEi)C
†
k̂
(Q⊗OiP )† (74)
We require one last observation: as it stands, the above state consists of a superoperator acting onCk̂(ρi+1⊗ρEi)C
†
k̂
.
To see that the above operation is a superoperator, note that it was obtained by conjugating a unitary by Clifford
operators, and then averaging over the Clifford operators. By expanding the extra space from ρEi to ρEi+1 , we can
instead assume we have a unitary Oi+1 acting on Ck̂(ρi+1 ⊗ ρEi+1)C
†
k̂
.
4.2.1 Proof of Lemma 4.6 (Unitary Commutation)
We obtain the following equality from Lemma 4.5:
1
|Pk|
∑
Q 6=I∈Pk
(Q⊗ I)ρ(Q⊗ I)† = 1
2k
· I ⊗ TrA(ρ)−
1
|Pk|
ρ
where ρ is a matrix on spaces A,B and Q acts on A. We have:
1
|Pk|
∑
Q 6=I∈Pk
(UQ⊗ I)ρ(UQ⊗ I)† = (U ⊗ I)( 1
2k
· I ⊗ TrA(ρ)−
1
|Pk|
ρ)(U ⊗ I)† (75)
=
1
2k
· I ⊗ TrA(ρ)−
1
|Pk|
(U ⊗ I)ρ(U ⊗ I)† (76)
=
1
2k
· I ⊗ TrA((U ⊗ I)ρ(U ⊗ I)†)−
1
|Pk|
(U ⊗ I)ρ(U ⊗ I)† (77)
=
1
|Pk|
∑
Q 6=I∈Pk
(QU ⊗ I)ρ(QU ⊗ I)† (78)
This concludes the proof.
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5 Signed Polynomial Code Authentication Scheme
Let Km be the set of pairs of Pauli and sign operators which will be used for authentication; i.e. Km =
{(k, z, x)|k ∈ {−1, 1}m, x, z ∈ Fmq }.
Protocol 5.1 Polynomial Authentication protocol : Alice wishes to send the state |ψ〉 of dimension q. She chooses
a security parameter d, a code length m = 2d+ 1, and selects k′ = (k, z, x) ∈ Km at random.
• Encoding - Ak′: Alice applies Ek to |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉⊗m−1 to encode |ψ〉 using the signed quantum polynomial
code of polynomial degree d (see Definition 2.7). She then applies the Pauli ZzXx defined by x, z ∈ Fmq
(i.e., for j ∈ {1, ..,m} she applies ZzjXxj on the j’th qubit).
• Decoding - Bk′: Bob applies the inverse of Ak′; he applies (ZzXx)† followed by E†k. Bob measures the
m− 1 auxiliary registers and declares the state valid if they are all 0, otherwise Bob aborts.
Theorem 1.6 The polynomial authentication scheme as described in Protocol 5.1 is a QAS with security ε = 2−d.
5.1 The Overall Proof of Theorem 1.6
The completeness of this protocol is trivial. We proceed to prove the security of the protocol. As in the proof of
Theorem 1.4, we first show that any intervention made by the adversary can be broken down into a distribution
over generalized Pauli interventions. This is given by the Pauli decoherence lemma, Lemma 5.1, which is the
weaker analogue of the Clifford decoherence lemma (Lemma 3.2). We then state and prove the sign key security
lemma (Lemma 5.2), which states that non identity Pauli interventions by the adversary on states authenticated
with the signed polynomial code are detected with high probability. We note that the main difference between the
polynomial and Clifford QAS proofs is the ease in which we can prove the security of each QAS against Eve’s
non trivial Pauli interventions. In the Clifford case, this is easy because a random Pauli will change the auxiliary 0
states with high probability (see the explanation between equation 43 and equation 44 in the proof of Theorem 1.4).
In the polynomial case, the sign key security lemma (Lemma 5.2) requires quite a few technical details.
Proof of Theorem 1.6: We denote ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗e the state of Alice prior to encoding. Let U be
the attack made by Eve on the joint system, including the message space M and Eve’s environment E. Bob’s state
prior to measuring but after applying the decoding operators is:
ρBob =
1
2m|Pm|
TrE
( ∑
Q∈Pm
k∈{−1,1}m
(QEk ⊗ IE)†U
(
(QEk ⊗ IE)ρ⊗ ρE(QEk ⊗ IE)†
)
U †(QEk ⊗ IE)
)†
(79)
At this point we require Lemma 5.1 (it is analogous to Lemma 3.2), which allows us to reduce general adversary
interventions to adversary interventions which are generalized Pauli operators. The lemma states that a random
Pauli conjugating an operator has the effect of decohering (removing the cross terms) of the operator (we will
prove this lemma in Section 5.2):
Lemma 5.1 (Pauli Decoherence) Let ρ be a matrix on m′ > m qudits and let U =
∑
P∈Pm
P ⊗ UP be a matrix
acting on ρ. Then
1
|Pm|
∑
Q∈Pm
(Q⊗ I)†U(Q⊗ I)ρ(Q⊗ I)†U †(Q⊗ I) =
∑
P∈Pm
(P ⊗ UP )ρ(P ⊗ UP )†
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We decompose the attack U made by Eve to U =
∑
P∈Pm P ⊗ UP (where P acts on the space M and UP acts on
the space E) and then apply the lemma to equation 79 by replacing ρ in the lemma with EkρE
†
k, obtaining:
ρBob =
1
2m
TrE
( ∑
P∈Pm,k∈{−1,1}m
(E†kPEk ⊗ UP )ρ⊗ ρE(E
†
kPEk ⊗ UP )
†
)
(80)
=
1
2m
∑
P∈Pm,k∈{−1,1}m
E†kPEkρE
†
kP
†Ek · Tr(UPρEU †P ) (81)
We set αP = Tr
(
U †PUPρE
)
. Bob’s state is now:
· · · = αI · ρ+
1
2m
∑
P∈Pm\{I},k∈{−1,1}m
αP · E†kPEkρE
†
kP
†Ek (82)
Recall that we are interested in the projection of Bob’s state onto Π|ψ〉0 (defined in equation 4), which can now be
written as:
Tr(Π|ψ〉0 ρBob) = αITr(Π
|ψ〉
0 ρ) +
1
2m
∑
P∈Pm\{I},k∈{−1,1}m
αPTr(Π
|ψ〉
0 E
†
kPEkρE
†
kP
†Ek) (83)
=
1
2m
∑
P∈Pm\{I},k∈{−1,1}m
αPTr(Π
|ψ〉
0 E
†
kPEkρE
†
kP
†Ek) (84)
Notice that each term in the above sum represents a generalized Pauli attack on the signed polynomial code. We
now provide a lemma which states that the signed polynomial code allows detection of adversary interventions
which are generalized Pauli operators (we will prove this lemma in Section 5.3):
Lemma 5.2 (Sign Key Security) The signed polynomial code is 1
2m−1 -secure against (generalized) Pauli attacks.
More formally, for a density matrix ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗m−1 and a generalized Pauli operator P ∈ Pm \ {I}:
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
Tr(Π|ψ〉0 E
†
kPEkρE
†
kP
†Ek) ≤
1
2m−1
(85)
We can now use the bound from Lemma 5.2 on each term in the sum in equation 84 to obtain:
Tr(Π|ψ〉0 ρBob) =
1
2m
∑
P∈Pm\{I},k∈{−1,1}m
αPTr(Π
|ψ〉
0 E
†
kPEkρE
†
kP
†Ek)) (86)
≤ 1
2m−1
∑
P∈Pm\{I}
αP (87)
=
1− αI
2m−1
(88)
≤ 1
2m−1
(89)
where the equality follows due to Lemma 3.3, which provides the following equality:∑
P∈Pm
αP = 1 (90)
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Similarly to the random Clifford authentication scheme, interventions that are very close to I are even more
likely to keep the state in the space defined by P |ψ〉1 .
We notice that in this scheme a q-dimensional system is encoded into a system of dimension qm = q2d+1 and
achieves security of 1
2m−1 . The Clifford QAS encodes a 2-dimensional system into a system of dimension 2
1+e and
achieves security of 2−e. The polynomial scheme is somewhat worse in parameters (since q must be at least 5), but
still with exponentially good security.
To encode several registers, one can independently authenticate each register as in the Clifford case, but in fact
we will see that we can use the same sign key k for all registers, while still maintaining security. This property will
be extremely useful in applying gates as part of the polynomial QPIP protocol and we will use it in Section 6. For
more details on how gates are applied on top of the signed polynomial code, see Section 2.5.1.
5.2 Proof of Lemma 5.1
We will require the following lemma:
Lemma 5.3 For any two generalized Pauli operators P and Q
Q†PQρQ†P †Q = PρP †
Proof of Lemma 5.3: From the observation about generalized Pauli operators in Sec. 2 we know that for any
two generalized Pauli operators P,Q PQ = βQP where β is some phase (of magnitude 1) dependent on P and Q.
Q†PQρQ†P †Q = Q†(βQP )ρ(β∗P †Q†)Q = PρP † (91)

We can now proceed to the proof:
Proof of Lemma 5.1: We start with:
1
|Pm|
∑
Q,P,P ′∈Pm
(Q⊗ I)†(P ⊗ UP )(Q⊗ I)ρ(Q⊗ I)†(P ′ ⊗ UP ′)†(Q⊗ I)
We regroup elements to write the above expression as
. . . =
1
Pm
∑
Q,P,P ′∈Pm
(I ⊗ UP )(Q†PQ⊗ I)ρ(Q†P ′Q⊗ I)†(I ⊗ UP ′)† (92)
We use Lemma 3.5 and are left only with P = P ′
. . . =
1
Pm
∑
P,Q∈Pm
(Q†PQ⊗ UP )ρ(Q†PQ⊗ UP )† (93)
Now we use Lemma 5.3 :
. . . =
∑
P∈Pm
(P ⊗ UP )ρ(P ⊗ UP )† (94)

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5.3 Proof of Lemma 5.2
In this section, we will prove Lemma 5.2 (security against Pauli attacks due to the sign key).
Proof: Our goal is to show for a density matrix ρ = |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗m−1 and a generalized Pauli operator
P ∈ Pm \ {I}:
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
Tr(Π|ψ〉0 E
†
kPEkρE
†
kP
†Ek) ≤
1
2m−1
(95)
Throughout this proof, we will ignore phases which come about from Cliffords conjugating Pauli operators or
moving Pauli operators past each other. This is due to the format of ρB; whenever we manipulate P to obtain a
phase ωaq , we obtain ω
−a
q by manipulating P
† in the same manner. We first need to develop tools to understand how
a generalized Pauli attack affects a signed polynomial state. This is done in the following subsection, after which
we will return to the proof of Lemma 5.2.
5.3.1 k-Correlated Pauli Operators
We begin with definitions and their corresponding properties, and then proceed to analyze how generalized Pauli
operators affect a signed polynomial state.
Definitions and Properties We now define what a correlated Pauli operator is:
Definition 5.1 For a sign key k ∈ {−1, 1}m, we will call a non identity Pauli operatorQ k-correlated if there exist
one qudit states |ψ〉 and |φ〉:
QEk |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 = Ek |φ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 (96)
In other words, Q maps a state encoded with the signed polynomial code to another state with the same encoding
and therefore cannot be detected. We will show that a non identity generalized Pauli operatorQ can be k-correlated
for at most 2 sign keys k according to the above definition. We will then show that for all sign keys k, all non identity
Pauli operators Q which are not k-correlated can be written as a product of a k-correlated Pauli operator Qk and a
non identity, uncorrelated operator Q̂k of a specific form. Q̂k will always be detected by B’s decoding procedure,
as it will change the auxiliary states. This implies that a non identity Pauli operator will be caught with probability
1
2m−1 (it will be caught for all but at most two sign keys for which it is k-correlated).
Next, we describe what a k-correlated Pauli X operator looks like. We will require the following fact.
Fact 5.1 For k, k̂ ∈ {−1, 1}m (where k 6= k̂), there exist polynomials f, g of degree at most d such that
(k1f(α1), . . . , kmf(αm)) = (k̂1g(α1), . . . , k̂mg(αm)) (97)
only if k = −k̂.
Proof: There must either be at least d + 1 indices on which k and k̂ agree or at least d + 1 indices on which
they differ. First consider the case in which there are at least d + 1 indices where they agree. Since the values of
k and k̂ at these indices uniquely define f and g, f and g must be equal. It follows that ki = k̂i for all i. If we
instead consider the case when k and k̂ differ on at least d+1 indices, we obtain that f is equal to−g and therefore
ki = −k̂i. 
Claim 5.4 A non identity Pauli operator X = Xx is k-correlated if and only if it has the following form:
Xx = βXk1f(α1) ⊗ · · · ⊗Xkmf(αm)
where β is a phase with |β|2 = 1, f is a polynomial of degree at most d. The Pauli operatorXx can be k-correlated
for at most 2 sign keys k.
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Proof: It follows by Definition 5.1 that
Xk1f(α1) ⊗ · · · ⊗Xkmf(αm) (98)
is k-correlated. We will now show that if Xx is k-correlated it must have the form above. An X Pauli operator can
only be k-correlated if it adds a low degree polynomial signed with k to the encoded state it is acting on. Therefore,
if it is k-correlated, it must equal
Xk1f(α1) ⊗ · · · ⊗Xkmf(αm) (99)
for a polynomial f of degree at most d. We now show that a non identity Pauli operator Xx can be k-correlated for
at most 2 sign keys. Assume now that X is also k′-correlated. By the argument above, it follows that it must equal
Xk
′
1g(α1) ⊗ · · · ⊗Xk′mg(αm) (100)
for a polynomial g of degree at most d. However, Fact 5.1 implies that either k = k′ or k = −k′. 
Next, we describe what a k-correlated Pauli Z operator looks like:
Claim 5.5 A non identity Pauli operator Z = Zz is k-correlated if and only if it has the following form:
Zz = βZc1k1f(α1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zcmkmf(αm)
where β is a phase with |β|2 = 1, f is a polynomial of degree at most d and ci is the interpolation coefficient
defined in Lemma 2.3 with the following property:∑
1≤i≤m
cif(αi) = f(0)
The Pauli operator Zz can be k-correlated for at most 2 sign keys k.
Proof: We first show that if Zz is k-correlated it must also have the form above. Assume that Zz for z ∈ Fmq is
k-correlated. Then it follows from Definition 5.6 that there exist one qudit states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 such that:
ZzEk |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 = Ek |φ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 (101)
Now if we apply a logical Fourier operator (described in Claim 2.4), the left hand side of the above equation
becomes:
F̃ZzEk |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 = F̃ZzF̃ †F̃Ek |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 (102)
= F̃ZzF̃ †EkF |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 (103)
where the last equality follows since F̃ is a logical operator (which is also proven in Claim 2.4). The right hand
side of equation 101 becomes:
F̃Ek |φ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 = EkF |φ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 (104)
Then (by setting the right and left hand side of the equations equal to each other) we have:
F̃ZzF̃ †EkF |ψ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 = EkF |φ〉 ⊗ |0〉m−1 (105)
Due to the conjugation properties of F̃ (for more details about the conjugation behavior of F̃ , see the Fourier
description in Section 2.4), we have (where α is a phase)
F̃ZzF̃ † = αX−c
−1
1 z1 ⊗ · · · ⊗X−c−1m zm (106)
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and due to equation 105 we can see that the above operator is k-correlated. By Claim 5.4, the X Pauli operator in
equation 106 can be k-correlated for at most 2 sign keys k. It follows that the Pauli operator Zz can be k-correlated
for at most 2 sign keys. Finally, if Zz is indeed k-correlated, we can combine the fact that the X operator in
equation 106 is k-correlated and Claim 5.4, to write Zz as:
Zc1k1f(α1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zcmkmf(αm) (107)
for a polynomial f of degree at most d. We now need to show the opposite direction: if Zz can be written as
Zc1k1f(α1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zcmkmf(αm) (108)
it is k-correlated. To see this, we can obtain the following equality from equation 106
F̃ZzF̃ † = αX−k1f(α1) ⊗ · · · ⊗X−kmf(αm) (109)
Since this is a correlated X operator, it follows by Definition 5.1 that Zz is a correlated Z operator. 
We can extend the claims for X and Z Pauli operators to general Pauli operators:
Claim 5.6 A non identity Pauli operator can be k-correlated for at most 2 sign keys k.
Proof: Consider a non identity Pauli operator ZzXx. In order for it to be correlated, Xx must add a low degree
signed polynomial to a state encoded by Ek which it is acting on. This means that Xx is k-correlated. It follows
by Claim 5.4 that if x 6= 0, the Pauli operator ZzXx can be k-correlated for at most 2 sign keys k. If x = 0, Claim
5.5 implies that the Pauli operator ZzXx can be k-correlated for at most 2 sign keys. 
Correlation Properties of Generalized Pauli Operators Now that we have defined k-correlation, we can see
how a generalized Pauli operator will behave on a signed polynomial state. We begin by showing that for a
fixed sign key k, a Pauli operator Q can be broken down into a product of a k-correlated Pauli operator and an
uncorrelated Pauli operator:
Claim 5.7 Let k be a sign key and Q ∈ Pm \ {I} be an uncorrelated Pauli operator. Then Q = ZzXx can be
written as
Q = Q̂kQk (110)
whereQk is k-correlated and Q̂k is uncorrelated (and in particular, non identity) and can be written (up to a phase)
as:
I ⊗ Z ẑ2 ⊗ · · ·Z ẑd+1 ⊗X x̂d+2 · · · ⊗X x̂m (111)
where if z = 0, (ẑ2, . . . , ẑd+1) = 0d and if x = 0, (x̂d+2, . . . , x̂m) = 0d.
Proof: Observe that a signed low degree polynomial is determined by d + 1 points. For a given sign key k and
d+ 1 points yi1 , . . . , yid+1 ∈ Fq, where i1, . . . , id+1 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let
sk(yi1 , . . . , yid+1) = (k1f(α1), . . . , kmf(αm)) ∈ F
m
q (112)
be the signed polynomial that is obtained by interpolating the d+ 1 points yi1 , . . . , yid+1 . Let:
[s′k(yi1 , . . . , yid+1)]i = ci · [sk(yi1 , . . . , yid+1)]i (113)
For Q = ZzXx = Zz1Xx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ZzmXxm , we claim that
Qk = (Z
s′k(c
−1
1 z1,c
−1
d+2zd+2,...,c
−1
m zm))(Xsk(x1,...,xd+1)) (114)
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is k-correlated. Claims 5.4 and 5.5 imply that both the Z and X operators of Qk are k-correlated. It follows by
the definition of a k-correlated operator (Definition 5.1) that the product of two k-correlated operators (Qk in this
case) is k-correlated. Now we define Q̂k such that:
Q̂k = QQ
†
k (115)
It can be readily checked, using the definition of Qk in equation 114, that Q̂k is of the following form (up to a
phase):
Q̂k ≡ I ⊗ Z ẑ2 ⊗ · · ·Z ẑd+1 ⊗X x̂d+2 · · · ⊗X x̂m (116)
Observe that Q̂k as written in the above equation is uncorrelated. If it was k-correlated, then Q would be a product
of two k-correlated operators (Qk and Q̂k) which implies that Q is also k-correlated, which contradicts our starting
assumption that Q is uncorrelated. Observe also that the last line of the claim (about the implication of z = 0 or
x = 0) follows immediately from the definitions of Qk and Q̂k. 
Observe that an operator of the form of Q̂k is always detected, as it will change the auxiliary qudits:
Claim 5.8 For all one qudit states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 and a fixed sign key k ∈ {−1, 1}m, an uncorrelated operator Q̂k of
the form described in Claim 5.7 in equation 111 satisfies the following equation:
Tr(Π|ψ〉0 E
†
kQ̂kEk |φ〉 〈φ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗m−1E†kQ̂
†
kEk) = 0 (117)
Proof: We claim the following equality holds up to a phase:
E†kQ̂kEk = I ⊗X
ẑ2 ⊗ · · ·X ẑd+1 ⊗X x̂d+2 · · · ⊗X x̂m (118)
Recall (from Section 2.5.2) that
Ek = Dk(I ⊗ F⊗d ⊗ I) (119)
The conjugation behavior of E†k can be determined by looking at the conjugation properties of Clifford operators
(see Section 2.4). As a brief description, recall from Section 2.5.2 that E†k consists of the interpolation circuit
(D†k), which is a series of inverse controlled sum operations and an inverse multiplication operator on the first
register (see Claim 2.6). The final operation in E†k is an inverse Fourier transform ((I ⊗ F
⊗d ⊗ I)†). Using the
conjugation properties given in equations 21, 23, and 22 in Section 2.4, we obtain the following equalities. Inverse
sum operations have the following conjugation behavior (up to a phase):
SUM †(Zz1Xx1 ⊗ Zz2Xx2)SUM = Zz1+z2Xx1 ⊗ Zz2Xx2−x1 (120)
where the SUM operator above is controlled by the left register. The inverse multiplication operation, M †r (for
r 6= 0), has the following conjugation behavior (up to a phase):
M †r (Z
zXx)Mr = Z
rzXr
−1x (121)
Fourier operations have the following conjugation behavior (up to a phase):
F †ZzXxF = XzZ−x (122)
The inverse sum operations in D†k have no effect on Q̂k, since the target registers (registers 1, d+ 2, . . . ,m) never
have a non zero Z coefficient in equation 118 and the control registers (registers 1, . . . , d + 1) never have a non
zero X coefficient in equation 118. In other words, the coefficients x1 and z2 in equation 120 will be 0. The
multiplication operation (which is in between the inverse sum operations) similarly has no effect on Q̂k; it is acting
on the first register, for which both the Z and X coefficient are 0 (since it is I). The inverse Fourier operation flips
the Z operators of registers 2, . . . , d+ 1 to X operators.
Now, returning to equation 118, since Q̂k was not equal to the identity, it will make at least one of the auxiliary
qudits nonzero (recall that the auxiliary qudits are contained in registers 2, . . . ,m). 
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5.3.2 Proof of Lemma 5.2
We now use the concepts we developed in the above section to prove Lemma 5.2. To summarize, what we have
shown is that for each sign key k, a generalized non identity Pauli operator Q can be broken down into a product of
a k-correlated operator Qk and an uncorrelated operator Q̂k (Claim 5.7). The uncorrelated operator Q̂k will always
be detected (Claim 5.8) and will only be non identity for at most 2 sign keys k (Claim 5.6). Therefore, Q can only
preserve a signed polynomial state for at most 2 sign keys k.
Recall that we would like to upper bound the following expression:
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
Tr(Π|ψ〉0 E
†
kPEkρE
†
kP
†Ek) (123)
By Claim 5.6, P can be k-correlated for at most 2 sign keys k. Consider one k in the above sum for which P is not
k-correlated. We can now apply Claim 5.7, to obtain that the term is equal to
· · · = Tr(Π|ψ〉0 E
†
kP̂kPkEk |ψ〉 〈ψ| ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗m−1E†k(P̂kPk)
†Ek) (124)
= Tr(Π|ψ〉0 E
†
kP̂kEk |ψPk〉 〈ψPk | ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗m−1E†kP̂
†
kEk) (125)
= 0 (126)
where the second equality follows from the fact that Pk is a k-correlated operator and the final equality follows
from Claim 5.8. Then we only obtain a non zero expression when P is k-correlated. It follows that
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
Tr(Π|ψ〉0 E
†
kPEkρE
†
kP
†Ek) ≤
1
2m−1
(127)
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6 Quantum Interactive Proofs with Polynomial Authentication
In this section, we give a QPIP for Q-CIRCUIT (providing another proof for Theorem 1.1) using the signed
polynomial encoding from the previous section. The key advantage of this protocol is that the prover can perform
the gates on top of the encoding without knowing the encoding itself. This means that the prover does not need to
hand back the qudits to the verifier in order for the verifier to perform the gates; the prover can perform them on
his own. This also means that only one way quantum communication is required (the verifier only needs to send
qudits at the start of the protocol, and the rest of the communication is classical).
The key disadvantage of this protocol is the relative difficulty of proving soundness in comparison to the
Clifford QPIP protocol (Theorem 1.5). This difficulty arises due to the difference between Lemma 5.1 (Pauli
decoherence) and Lemma 3.2 (Clifford decoherence). The strength of Clifford decoherence allows us to prove
Claim 4.2 (the Clifford state evolution claim), which states that the prover’s state throughout the protocol is
the correct authenticated state (i.e. the state with the gates applied as requested by the verifier) with an attack
independent of the authentication acting on top of it. Essentially, this is because Claim 4.2 uses the unitary
commutation lemma, Lemma 4.6, and the Clifford decoherence lemma, Lemma 3.2, to change any logical attack
(an attack acting inside the authentication) to an attack outside of the authentication (which no longer preserves the
authenticated state). Claim 4.2 then allows us to reduce the soundness of the Clifford QPIP to the security of the
Clifford QAS.
We cannot use Pauli decoherence (Lemma 5.1) to prove a claim analogous to Claim 4.2 in the polynomial case
for the following reason. Lemma 5.1 shows that averaging over the Pauli conjugations of an operator removes cross
terms, thereby mapping the operator to a convex sum over Pauli operators. Lemma 3.2 shows that averaging over
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the Clifford conjugations of an operator not only maps the operator to a convex sum over Pauli operators, but goes
one step further to map each non identity Pauli operator to a unifrom mixture over all non identity Pauli operators.
This uniform mixture is crucial to the proof of Claim 4.2; the key part of the proof is the application of the unitary
commutation lemma (Lemma 4.6) to the mixture, which allows us to shift the prover’s attacks to the end of the
protocol.
Since we do not have a claim analogous to Claim 4.2 for the polynomial QPIP, we instead have to monitor how
the authenticated state changes throughout the protocol, as a function of the prover’s deviation. At a high level, we
do this by partitioning the Hilbert space of the prover according to the interaction transcript (as done in [FK12]). In
each partition, the transcript is fixed at the start and then the measurement results of the state are projected onto the
fixed transcript to enforce consistency. This method is formalized in Claim 6.1, which describes the state shared by
the verifier and prover throughout the protocol.
Now since each partition has a fixed interaction transcript, we can shift the prover’s attack to the end of
the protocol (his attack no longer determines the interaction transcript). After shifting the prover’s attack, we
can analyze each partition using the same main ideas we used to prove security of the polynomial QAS (Pauli
decoherence from Lemma 5.1 and sign key security from Lemma 5.2).
We begin by discussing how to apply gates on top of the signed polynomial authentication (Section 6.1). We
then describe the protocol, introduce necessary notation and assumptions and conclude with proving the soundness
and completeness of the protocol.
6.1 Application of Quantum Gates
We will describe how the prover performs a set of universal gates (consisting of the Fourier transform and Toffoli
gate) on authenticated qubits by applying only Clifford operators which do not require knowledge of the Pauli
or sign keys. The prover does this by using classical communication with the verifier and authenticated Toffoli
states sent by the verifier. As described in Section 2.3.1, if given an authenticated Toffoli state, a Toffoli gate can
be applied using logical Pauli, SUM and Fourier operations, along with measurement. We now describe how to
apply these operations on authenticated states, which will complete our description of how the prover performs a
universal set of gates.
6.1.1 Pauli Operations
To apply Pauli X and Z operations, the verifier only needs to update his Pauli keys and the prover does not need to
do anything. Recall from Section 2.5.1 that the logical X̃k operator consists of an application of Xk1⊗, . . .⊗Xkm
where k ∈ {−1, 1}m is the sign key. We claim that this operation can be applied to the authenticated state by the
verifier simply changing his Pauli key from (x, z) to (x− k, z). This is because:
Px,z
∣∣∣Ska〉 = Px−k,zP †x−k,zPx,z ∣∣∣Ska〉 (128)
= Px−k,zX
−(x−k)Z−zZzXx
∣∣∣Ska〉 (129)
= Px−k,z(X
k1⊗, . . .⊗Xkm)
∣∣∣Ska〉 (130)
= Px−k,zX̃k
∣∣∣Ska〉 (131)
The Z operator is performed in the same manner as the X operator; all that is needed is a change of the Pauli key.
We recall that Z̃k = Zc1k1⊗. . .⊗Zcmkm . We define the vector t to be ti = ciki. From the same argument as above,
it holds that the change of keys must be (x, z)→ (x, z − t).
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6.1.2 Fourier and SUM Operations
To apply Fourier and SUM operations, the verifier needs to update his Pauli keys and the prover needs to apply
the corresponding logical gate. For the SUM gate, the prover applies the logical SUM gate (S̃UM as given in
Section 2.5.1) and the verifier updates his pair of keys (for xA, zA, xB, zB ∈ Fmq ) from (xA, zA), (xB, zB) to
(xA, zA − zB) and (xB + xA, zB) where A is the control register and B is the target register. This is because the
logical SUM operator is applied on top of the Pauli keys, and must be shifted past. The update operations of the
verifier essentially perform this shift:
S̃UM(ZzAXxA ⊗ ZzBZxB )
∣∣∣Ska〉 ∣∣∣Skb 〉 = S̃UM(ZzAXxA ⊗ ZzBZxB )S̃UM†S̃UM ∣∣∣Ska〉 ∣∣∣Skb 〉 (132)
= (ZzA−zBXxA ⊗ ZzBXxA+xB )S̃UM
∣∣∣Ska〉 ∣∣∣Skb 〉 (133)
where the last equality is up to a global phase and follows due to the conjugation properties given in Section 2.4.
The Fourier gate is applied in a similar way; the prover applies the logical Fourier transform F̃ given in Section
2.5.1 (Claim 2.4) and the verifier updates his keys according to the conjugation behavior of F̃ , which we can
determine from Section 2.4. The following equality is up to a global phase:
F̃ (ZzXx)F̃ † = Zc1x1X−c
−1
1 z1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ZcmxmX−c−1m zm (134)
Therefore, for each register i, the verifier must change the key from (xi, zi) to (−c−1i zi, cixi).
6.1.3 Measurement
The prover measures the encoded state in the standard basis and sends the resulting string in Fmq to the verifier. The
verifier first removes the entire Pauli key. Note that we are assuming a classical verifier can remove the Z portion
of the Pauli key; this is because the Pauli key is acting on a measured string, and phase gates have no effect on
standard basis strings. Therefore, applying a Z operator is the same as not applying it. We choose to assume the
verifier does apply it because it simplifies the soundness proof of the protocol (specifically, it comes up in the proof
of Claim 6.3). The verifier then applies D†k (see Section 2.5.2), obtaining a string δ ∈ F
m
q . If the prover requires
the decoded measurement result, the verifier sends the prover the first coordinate of δ (which should contain the
value of the polynomial at 0). If the last d coordinates of δ are not 0, the verifier records the measurement as invalid
and aborts at the end of the protocol.
Observe that the verifier is not applying E†k (the full decoding circuit). It turns out that this is actually enough
for the interactive protocol, since we only need to be able to catch attack operators involving Pauli X deviations.
Attack operators involving Z deviations will not change measurement results. We will see below (in Corollary 6.9)
that applying D†k and checking the appropriate auxiliary qudits allows the verifier to catch Pauli X deviations.
6.1.4 Conversion to Logical Circuit
Now that we have described how to apply gates, we can describe how to convert a quantum circuit on n qubits
consisting of gates from the above universal set, U = UN · · ·U1, into a logical circuit acting on authenticated
states. Assume U contains L Toffoli gates. Then
U = ALTL · · ·A1T1A0 (135)
where Ai is a Clifford circuit. To apply U to authenticated states, we instead apply
ÃLT̃L · · · Ã1T̃1Ã0 (136)
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where ÃL denotes a logical operation, as described above. Each T̃i involves Clifford entanglement operations
(which we will denote by B̃i) with a new magic state followed by a measurement, the results of which are sent
to the verifier. Assume that the ith measurement result decodes to βi ∈ F 3q . Then T̃i consists of B̃i, followed by
measurement, followed by correction C̃βi (which is the logical version of Cβi - see Section 2.3.1 for a reminder
of how the Toffoli gate is applied). Now combine the Clifford entangling operators with the preceding Clifford
operators in the circuit:
Q̃i = B̃i+1Ãi (137)
where BL+1 = I. Then to apply U to authenticated states, we first apply Q̃0. Then for 1 ≤ i ≤ L, we measure,
obtaining βi ∈ F 3q , and then apply Q̃iC̃βi .
Properties of Toffoli Gate by Teleportation In order to prove soundness of the polynomial QPIP, we will need
to better understand the result of applying a circuit using Toffoli states (as described immediately above in Section
6.1.4). More specifically, this understanding will come in to play when we are analyzing the behavior of Pauli
attacks on the state at the end of the protocol (this is done in Claim 6.4 and Claim 6.5). In this section, we will
not work with logical operators and authenticated qudits, but with unauthenticated qudits. However, the analysis
can immediately be extended to authenticated qudits. To begin, assume the measurement results βi ∈ F 3q of each
Toffoli gate are fixed beforehand. Then the circuit which will be applied (as described above) is:
QLCβL · · ·Q1Cβ1Q0 (138)
We will now provide a fact (used in Claim 6.4 and Claim 6.5) which characterizes what the state looks like
(including measurement results) after applying the circuit in equation 138 on n + 3L qudits (the circuit acts on
n input qudits initially in state |φ〉 and L Toffoli states of 3 qudits each):
Fact 6.1 For a string β = (β1, . . . , βL) ∈ F 3Lq , where βi ∈ F 3q , the result of applying
QLCβL · · ·Q1Cβ1Q0 (139)
to
|φ〉 (1
q
∑
a,b∈Fq
|a, b, ab〉)⊗L (140)
is
1√
q3L
∑
l∈F 3Lq
|l〉 |ψ〉β,l (141)
where |φ〉 is a state on n qudits and |ψ〉β,l is a state on n qudits which equals U |φ〉 if β = l.
Before proving the fact, observe that if we project the first register containing l onto β, we obtain the state U |ψ〉.
This makes sense; if the measurement results obtained are the same ones we fixed for the Clifford corrections,
then each Toffoli gate is applied as intended. Moreover, note that without this projection, each l ∈ F 3Lq is equally
probable. We now prove the fact.
Proof of Fact6.1: First consider what happens if we would like to apply one Toffoli (as described above) to a 3
qudit state |ψ〉 using a magic state. After the Clifford operations entangling |ψ〉 and the magic state, but preceding
the measurement (i.e. at the stage of equation 17), the state is:
1√
q3
∑
a,b,l∈Fq
ω−le |a, b, ab+ e, c− a, d− b, l〉 = 1√
q3
∑
x,y,z∈Fq
ω−ze |c− x, d− y, (c− x)(d− y) + e〉 |x, y, z〉
=
1√
q3
∑
x,y,z∈Fq
((T (Xx ⊗Xy ⊗ Zz)T †)†T |ψ〉) |x, y, z〉 (142)
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We can write the state in this format because we know that when the measurement result is x, y, z, the operation
T (Xx ⊗ Xy ⊗ Zz)T † corrects the state to T |ψ〉. Let’s swap the first 3 registers with the last 3 registers (to be
consistent with how the state is written in Fact 6.1). The state is now:
1√
q3
∑
x,y,z∈Fq
|x, y, z〉 (T (Xx ⊗Xy ⊗ Zz)T †)†T |ψ〉 (143)
Now let’s assume the correction operator applied is T (Xa ⊗Xb ⊗ Zc)T †. The result is:
1√
q3
∑
x,y,z∈Fq
|x, y, z〉 ⊗ |ψ〉(a,b,c),(x,y,z) (144)
where
|ψ〉(a,b,c),(x,y,z) = T (X
a−x ⊗Xb−y ⊗ Zc−z) |ψ〉 (145)
Observe that
|ψ〉(a,b,c),(a,b,c) = T |ψ〉 (146)
In other words, when the correction β matches the measurement result l, we get the desired result: the application
of a Toffoli gate to the initial state. To prove the fact, the above analysis is simply applied each time the Toffoli
protocol is performed. 
6.2 Protocol Description
Protocol 6.1 Polynomial based Interactive Proof for Q-CIRCUIT Fix a security parameter ε. Given is a quantum
circuit on n qubits consisting of gates from the above universal set, U = UN · · ·U1, which can be converted to a
logical circuit on authenticated qudits as in Section 6.1.4. We assume there are L Toffoli gates. We assume the
circuit U has error probability ≤ γ. The verifier sets m = dlog 1ε e+ 1, d =
m−1
2 and uses 3 registers of m qudits
each, where each qudit is of dimensionality q > m. The verifier uses the polynomial QAS with security parameter
d to authenticate n input qudits and L Toffoli states and sends the authenticated states to the prover. The verifier
uses the same sign key (but independent Pauli keys) for each state. This is done sequentially using 3m qudits at
a time. Round 0 consists of the prover and verifier performing the Clifford gates Q̃0. At the start of round i, for
1 ≤ i ≤ L, the prover and verifier perform the measurement (as described in Section 6.1.3) on the 3m qudits as
required for the ith Toffoli gate. The verifier sends the prover the decoded measurement result, and then they jointly
perform the Clifford corrections required to complete the Toffoli gate and the Clifford circuit Q̃i. In round L + 1
(the final round), the verifier and prover perform the measurement of the first authenticated qudit (the verifier does
not provide the prover with the decoded measurement result). The verifier aborts if the measurement results from
any round were stored as invalid (see Section 6.1.3). If he does not abort, he accepts or rejects according to the
final decoded measurement outcome.
Theorem 1.7 For 0 < ε < 1 and γ < 1− ε, Protocol 6.1 is a QPIPO(log( 1
ε
)) protocol with completeness 1−γ and
soundness γ + ε for Q-CIRCUITγ .
This theorem implies a second proof for Theorem 1.1. The size of the verifier’s register is naively 3m, but using
the same idea as in the Clifford case, m + 2 suffice. As a reminder, the idea is to send qudits as they are encoded.
For the Toffoli state, the verifier begins with 3 qudits, encodes the first one (using m + 2 registers at this point),
sends the first encoded qudit to the prover, and continues. With ε = 1/2, m = 3 (because m = 2d + 1) giving a
register size of 5 qudits of dimension 5 (since q > m). Before we provide the proof of the theorem, we introduce
some necessary notation and make several observations about the protocol described above.
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6.3 Assumptions
• The prover’s messages are quantum states. Note that although in the protocol the prover sends the verifier
classical strings which the verifier then decodes, we can instead assume that the prover sends the verifier
qudits, then the verifier decodes and finally measures. This is because the verifier’s decoding operations
(which consist of removing Pauli keys and applying D†k, as described in Section 6.1.3) commute with
standard basis measurement. In other words, if you consider an m qudit density matrix ρ, the following
equality holds:∑
j∈Fmq
D†k(Z
zXx)† |j〉 〈j| ρ |j〉 〈j|ZzXxDk =
∑
j∈Fmq
|j〉 〈j|D†k(Z
zXx)†ρZzXxDk |j〉 〈j| (147)
• The prover’s deviation can be delayed until the end of each round. In round i (for i ≥ 1), we can assume
without loss of generality that the prover measures, sends the results to the verifier, receives the decoded
measurement results g(δi) from the verifier, and then applies a unitary V̂g(δi) to the authenticated qudits and
his extra space. Anything the prover does before the measurement can be shifted to the previous round. V̂g(δi)
can be written as
V̂g(δi) = V̂g(δi)(Q̃iC̃βi)
†Q̃iC̃βi = Vg(δi)Q̃iC̃βi (148)
In other words, we can assume that the prover measures, applies the unitaries requested by the verifier in
round i (Q̃iC̃βi) and then applies a unitary attack Vg(δi). Using similar reasoning, in round 0, we can assume
the prover first applies Q̃0 as requested and then applies a unitary attack.
6.4 Notation
Now we provide some of the notation that will be used in the proof. Please see the notation tables in Appendix
E for all notations together, which hopefully will help in reading this part of the paper, since it is quite heavy on
notation. First, throughout this protocol, we will refer to Z and I Pauli operators as trivial and all other Pauli
operators (Pauli operators containing the X operator) as non trivial. This is because, as noted in Section 6.1.3,
trivial Pauli operators cannot change measurement results and non trivial Pauli operators can. Therefore, we only
need to ensure that the verifier can detect non trivial Pauli operators.
For strings b1, . . . , bj ∈ Fmq , let
g((b1, . . . , bj)) = (b1(1), . . . , bj(1)) (149)
where bi(1) ∈ Fq is the first value of the string. This is referred to as the decoded value of a measurement result,
as it is the value the verifier will return to the prover after decoding the prover’s measurement result.
If the prover decides to deviate from the protocol, he can apply unitary operators to both the qudits sent by the
verifier and his environment. We call the register corresponding to his environment E . For convenience, we also
label the other registers of the quantum state shared between the prover and verifier as follows. Note that at the
start of round 0, the total number of qudits sent to the prover by the verifier is m′ = 3mL+mn. In every following
round, except round L+ 1, 3m qudits (which are to be measured) are sent to the verifier (m qudits to be measured
are sent in round L + 1). For i ≥ 1, we call the register containing all authenticated qudits left at the prover’s
hands at the beginning of round i (equivalently at the end of round i− 1) register Pi (it holds m(3(L− i+ 1) + n)
qudits). We call the register containing all the qudits sent to the verifier in rounds 1, . . . , i− 1 register Vi (it holds
3m(i− 1) qudits and is held by the verifier). We also add another register to the verifier’s space (which we call the
key register): at the start of round i, it contains the state τi(z, x, k), which carries the memory of the sign key k and
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the Pauli keys x, z ∈ F |Pi|q for those qudits still held by the prover (qudits in register Pi). More precisely:
τi(z, x, k) = |z〉 〈z| ⊗ |x〉 〈x| ⊗ |k〉 〈k|
Note that we are assuming the verifier no longer keeps record of the Pauli keys for qudits which were already sent
to him by the prover; after the verifier uses these Pauli keys to decode, he traces them out of the key register.
Given this notation, we can now provide Figure 1 as an illustration of Protocol 6.1.
Figure 1: This figure illustrates the gates an honest prover would apply during Protocol 6.1, and which qubits are in
which register during different rounds. In the figure, we are assuming that the measurement result in round i (after
the verifier removes the Pauli key and decodes with D†k) is δi ∈ F
3m
q . To simplify the illustration, we have left out
the detail that the decoding Pauli keys (ZzXx)−1 will be different for each register, and that the final decoding (at
the start of round L+ 1) acts on m qudits, while the previous i decodings act on 3m qudits.
6.5 Overall Proof of Theorem 1.7
Proof: The completeness is trivial, similarly to the Clifford case (see Theorem 1.5). To prove soundness, recall
that we begin with a Q-CIRCUIT instance, U , which takes as input |y〉⊗n (where y is a classical n bit string),
and for soundness we would like to show that if the first qudit of U |y〉⊗n is 0 with probability 1 − γ, the verifier
will either abort or not accept the final decoded measurement result with probability ≥ 1 − (γ + ε), which gives
the soundness parameter of γ + ε. To do this, we will characterize how the prover’s state evolves throughout the
protocol.
When each qudit is sent to the verifier at the start of round i as part of the application of the Toffoli gate, the
verifier will apply the inverse of the appropriate Pauli keys, interpolate with operator D†k (see Definition 2.8), and
measure the 3m received qudits. Let the result of this measurement be δi ∈ F 3mq . We thus denote the effect of the
measurement with this result by the projection |δi〉 〈δi| conjugating the density matrix (for δi ∈ F 3mq ). Of course
we will sum over all the different values of δi. Next (in all rounds except round L + 1), the verifier will send the
prover the decoded measurement results g(δi) so the prover will be able to apply the Clifford correction Cg(δi), as
written in equation 19. The verifier will then instruct the prover to apply the next set of Clifford gates Q̃i in the
circuit. Since the verifier sent the prover g(δi), the prover’s next attack can be dependent on this value.
We now provide the claim characterizing the state shared between the prover and the verifier, as a summation
over all of the measurement results from previous rounds (∆i−1 = (δ1, . . . , δi−1)):
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Claim 6.1 (Polynomial QPIP State Evolution) For 1 ≤ i ≤ L+ 1, the state shared by the prover and the verifier
at the start of round i can be written as:
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F |Pi|q
k∈{−1,1}m
τi(z, x, k)⊗
∑
∆i−1,z1,x1∈F
|Vi|
q
W i∆i−1,ẑ,x̂,k(ρ
k
g(∆i−1)
⊗ ρE)W i†∆i−1,ẑ,x̂,k (150)
where m′ = 3mL+mn,
ẑ = (z1, z), x̂ = (x1, x), (151)
W i∆i−1,ẑ,x̂,k = (|∆i−1〉 〈∆i−1| (D
†
k)
⊗|Mi|(Zz1Xx1)†Vi ⊗ IPi,E)Ug(∆i−1)((Z
z1Xx1)Vi ⊗ (ZzXx)Pi ⊗ IE) (152)
where Ug(∆i−1) is a unitary operator dependent on g(∆i−1) and
ρkg(∆i−1) = (Q̃i−1C̃g(δi−1) · · · Q̃1C̃g(δ1)Q̃0)ρ
k((Q̃i−1C̃g(δi−1) · · · Q̃1C̃g(δ1)Q̃0)
† (153)
for ∆i−1 = (δ1, . . . , δi−1) ∈ F |Vi|q , where ρ is the initial state on 3L+ n qubits (consisting of L Toffoli states and
an n qudit input state), ρk indicates authentication as described in equation 25, and ρE is the initial state of the
prover’s environment.
The projection |∆i−1〉 〈∆i−1| denotes the verifier’s measurement (it acts on register Vi), part of which has been
sent back to the prover in the form of g(∆i−1) (hence the dependence of U and ρk on g(∆i−1)).
As a brief aside, recall that (as mentioned at the start of Section 6) one key difference between the Clifford and
polynomial protocols is that the authenticated state throughout the polynomial protocol is not necessarily the correct
authenticated state (i.e. the authentication of the state which would result by applying the Q-CIRCUIT instance
U ). This can be seen by observing the form of ρkg(∆i−1). Note that if the projection |∆i−1〉 〈∆i−1| acted directly on
the state, it would indeed be the correct state. However, the projection acts after the attack Ug(∆i−1), which implies
that if Ug(∆i−1) acts non trivially on register Vi, ρkg(∆i−1) will not necessarily be the correct authenticated state.
Before we proceed with the proof of soundness, we will write down the state at the start of round 1 as an
example of how Claim 6.1 works. At the start of round 1, the state shared between the verifier and the prover is:
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F |R1|q
k∈{−1,1}m
τ1(z, x, k)⊗ V0(ZzXxQ̃0 ⊗ IE)ρk ⊗ ρE(ZzXxQ̃0 ⊗ IE)†V †0 (154)
where ρk is the initial state of the qudits sent to the prover and V0 is the unitary attack of the prover applied at the
end of round 0. Note that as the prover and verifier performed the Clifford operator Q̃0, the verifier updated his
initial Pauli keys to account for this operator (as described in Section 6.1). This is why the Pauli operator ZzXx
acts after Q̃0 on ρk in equation 154. As you can see, Claim 6.1 holds for i = 1.
We now proceed with the proof of soundness. Claim 6.1 implies that at the start of the final round, round L+1,
the joint state of the prover’s registers, PL+1 and the environment E , and the verifier’s registers, VL+1 and the key
register containing the sign key and Pauli keys of qudits in PL+1, is:
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F
|PL+1|
q
k∈{−1,1}m
τL+1(z, x, k)⊗
∑
∆L,z1,x1∈F
|VL+1|
q
WL+1∆L,ẑ,x̂,k(ρ
k
g(∆L)
⊗ ρE)(WL+1∆L,ẑ,x̂)
† (155)
As in previous rounds, the verifier decodes the final authenticated qudit sent by the prover, with both the Pauli and
sign key. Let F denote the register containing the final authenticated qudit. Let Pfinal denote the register of the
remaining authenticated qudits (this contains all qudits in PL+1 except those in register F). Let Vfinal = F∪VL+1
be the register containing all qudits sent to the verifier during the protocol.
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Corollary 6.2 The state shared between the prover and verifier after the decoding of register F is:
ρL+1
def
=
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F
|Pfinal|
q
k∈{−1,1}m
τfinal(z, x, k)⊗
∑
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
z1,x1∈F
|Vfinal|
q
V∆L,ẑ,x̂,k(ρ
k
g(∆L)
⊗ ρE)V †∆L,ẑ,x̂,k (156)
where ẑ = (z1, z), x̂ = (x1, x) and
V∆L,ẑ,x̂,k = ((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|(Zz1Xx1)†Vfinal⊗IPfinal,E)Ug(∆L)((Z
z1Xx1)Vfinal⊗(Z
zXx)Pfinal⊗IE)
Proof: The only change between this state and equation 155 is the decoding of register F (by applying the inverse
Pauli key and the signed polynomial decoding D†k). Observe that W
L+1
∆L,ẑ,x̂
and V∆L,ẑ,x̂,k differ only to the left of
Ug(δ); nothing changes to the right. This is because in the state above, we are averaging over all Pauli operators
acting on registers Vfinal and Pfinal and in equation 155 we are averaging over all Pauli operators acting on
registers VL+1 and PL+1. To see that this is the same, observe that
Vfinal ∪ Pfinal = VL+1 ∪ PL+1 (157)
To the left of Ug(δ), one additional register (F ) is decoded first by the corresponding Pauli keys (which is reflected
by the replacement of (Zz1Xx1)†VL+1 with (Z
z1Xx1)†Vfinal) and then by D
†
k. The projection does not change (as
indicated by IF in the projection) as we are only decoding register F . 
Note that the verifier only holds the first key register (containing τfinal(z, x, k)) and register Vfinal. Recall that
our goal is to show that for the Q-CIRCUIT instance U , if the first qudit of U |0〉⊗n is 0 with probability 1− γ, the
verifier will either abort or not accept the final decoded measurement result with probability ≥ 1 − (γ + ε). For
this purpose, we define the following projection on Vfinal = F ∪ VL+1:
Π̂0
def
= (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗3LVL+1 ⊗ (|1〉 〈1| ⊗ I
⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)F
def
= (Π̂0)VL+1 ⊗ (Π̂0)F (158)
The first term in the above projection describes the space of valid measurement results (i.e. strings which interpolate
to low degree polynomials). The second term describes the space of a final qudit which is accepted and decodes to
1. We would like to show that
Tr(Π̂0ρL+1|Vfinal) ≤ γ + ε (159)
In other words, if the decoded measurement result of the final qudit does not yield 1, the verifier rejects or aborts
with high probability. Each block of m qudits in the register VL+1 is projected onto I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d as we are
not looking for a specific decoded value in the measurement registers; we are only checking that the measurement
results are valid.
Observe that in order to bound soundness, we only need to look at ρL+1 on Vfinal; the key register containing
τfinal(z, x, k) was unnecessary. This is because the keys z, x acting on Pfinal will not be used; that register is
never sent to the verifier. Also, the verifier no longer needs to remember the sign key, since it has already been used
to decode the qudits in Vfinal. Therefore, the verifier can trace out the first register containing τfinal(z, x, k).
Before continuing to prove equation 159, we can simplify ρL+1|Vfinal :
Claim 6.3 (Final State) ρL+1|Vfinal is equal to
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
σk =
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
∑
P∈P|Vfinal|
σPk (160)
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where
σPk =
∑
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
αP,g(∆L) ·((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )σkg(∆L)((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )† (161)
and TrPfinal(ρ
k
g(∆L)
) = σkg(∆L),
αP,g(∆L) =
1
q|Pfinal|
Tr(UPg(∆L)(IPfinal ⊗ ρE)(U
P
g(∆L)
)†) (162)
and
Ug(∆L) =
∑
P∈P|Vfinal|
P ⊗ UPg(∆L) (163)
Starting from the form of ρL+1 in equation 156 in Corollary 6.2, we show this claim by first summing over z, x
(this can be done since τfinal(z, x, k) is traced out), which has the effect of mixing register Pfinal, as shown in
the Pauli mixing lemma, Lemma 4.5 (which is analogous to Lemma 4.4 and also proven in Appendix B). Next, we
can use z1, x1 to decohere (or remove all cross terms of) the part of Ug(∆L) acting on register Vfinal (by applying
Lemma 5.1).
Now let’s return to our goal of proving equation 159. With the above state simplification, we are now proving:
1
2m
Tr(Π̂0(
∑
k
σk) =
∑
P∈PVfinal
1
2m
Tr(Π̂0
∑
k
σPk ) ≤ γ + ε (164)
We first consider terms σPk for which P is trivial (i.e. P consists only of Z and I operators). To prove the following
claim, we first observe that trivial Pauli operators have no effect on measurement results, since they commute with
the verifier’s decoding process (application of D†k and the inverse Pauli keys). Given this observation, we can see
that the prover’s decoded final answer will be 0 with probability 1− γ (as it should be), and therefore we can upper
bound the projection of the state onto Π̂0:
Claim 6.4 (Trivial Deviation) For trivial P ,
1
2m
Tr(Π̂0
∑
k
σPk ) ≤
γ
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a
Next, we consider terms σPk for which P is non trivial. By using Lemma 5.2, which implies that P can produce a
non zero trace (after the state is projected onto Π̂0) for at most 2 values of k, we show:
Claim 6.5 (Nontrivial Deviation) For non trivial P ,
1
2m
Tr(Π̂0
∑
k
σPk ) ≤
1
q3L2m−1
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a
By combining both claims, we obtain:
1
2m
Tr(Π̂0
∑
k
σk) =
1
2m
∑
P∈PVfinal
Tr(Π̂0
∑
k
σPk ) (165)
≤ max(γ, 1
2m−1
)
1
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
(
∑
P∈PVfinal
αP,a) (166)
= max(γ,
1
2m−1
) (167)
≤ γ + 1
2m−1
(168)
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The final equality follows because: ∑
P∈PVfinal
αP,a = 1
by Lemma 3.3. 
6.6 Proof of Claim 6.1 (Polynomial QPIP State Evolution)
Proof: We will prove this claim by induction. The base case (round 1) is proven already in Section 6.5, equation
154. We assume the claim holds in round i and show that it holds in round i+ 1. By the inductive hypothesis, we
have the state shared by the prover and verifier in round i is:
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F |Pi|q
k∈{−1,1}m
τi(z, x, k)⊗
∑
∆i−1,z1,x1∈F
|Vi|
q
W i∆i−1,ẑ,x̂,k(ρ
k
g(∆i−1)
⊗ ρE)W i†∆i−1,ẑ,x̂,k (169)
where ẑ = (z1, z), x̂ = (x1, x) and
W i∆i−1,ẑ,x̂,k = (|∆i−1〉 〈∆i−1| (D
†
k)
⊗|Vi|(Zz1Xx1)†Vi ⊗ IPi,E)Ug(∆i−1)((Z
z1Xx1)Vi ⊗ (ZzXx)Pi ⊗ IE)
Recall that the verifier holds register Vi and registers Pi and E are held by the prover. When the prover measures
and sends the verifier his measurement results, the verifier decodes them with both the Pauli keys and the sign key
(as in equation 147) to obtain δi ∈ F 3mq . The shared state at this point is:
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F
|Ri+1|
q
k∈{−1,1}m
τi+1(z, x, k)⊗
∑
∆i,z1,x1∈F
|Mi+1|
q
T∆i,ẑ,x̂,k(ρ
k
g(∆i−1)
⊗ ρE)T †∆i,ẑ,x̂,k (170)
where
T∆i,ẑ,x̂,k = (|∆i〉 〈∆i| (D
†
k)
⊗|Mi+1|(Zz1Xx1)†Mi+1 ⊗ IRi+1,E)Ug(∆i−1)((Z
z1Xx1)Mi+1 ⊗ (ZzXx)Ri+1 ⊗ IE)
Note that ∆i = (δi,∆i−1), where δi ∈ F 3mq (δi is the measurement result obtained in round i) and ∆i−1 ∈
F
|Vi|
q (measurement results from previous rounds). The key difference here is that we have taken 3m qudits from
register Ri and added them to register Vi to create registers Ri+1 and Mi+1. We have also removed the Pauli keys
corresponding to the newly measured qudits from the first register; the verifier traces out these keys after decoding
as he no longer needs them.
The remainder of round i consists of the prover and verifier performing the Clifford gate Q̃iC̃g(δi). To show
that the shared state in round i + 1 is of the form described in Claim 6.1, we need to replace ρkg(∆i−1) with ρ
k
g(∆i)
in equation 170. This can be done by determing how the application of Q̃iC̃g(δi) changes the state. Recall that:
ρkg(∆i) = (Q̃iC̃g(δi) · · · Q̃1C̃g(δ1)Q̃0)ρ
k((Q̃iC̃g(δi) · · · Q̃1C̃g(δ1)Q̃0)
† (171)
= Q̃iC̃g(δi)ρ
k
g(∆i−1)
(Q̃iC̃g(δi))
† (172)
In order to replace ρkg(∆i−1) with ρ
k
g(∆i)
, we need to commute Q̃iC̃g(δi) past T∆i,ẑ,x̂,k. First observe that Q̃iC̃g(δi)
operates on the register held by the prover, Ri+1, and therefore commutes with operators acting on register Mi+1.
However, it does not commute with Ug(∆i−1). To take care of this issue, observe that:
Q̃iC̃g(δi)Ug(∆i−1) = (Q̃iC̃g(δi))Ug(∆i−1)(Q̃iC̃g(δi))
†(Q̃iC̃g(δi)) (173)
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Now the rightmost part of the above expression, Q̃iC̃g(δi), is acting on the Pauli operator (Z
zXx)Ri+1 which is
acting on ρkg(∆i−1). If the verifier updates his Pauli keys for register Ri+1 (as is part of the protocol for performing
a Clifford operation, described in Section 6.1), Q̃iC̃g(δi) can be commuted past the Pauli operator:
Q̃iC̃g(δi)Z
zXx = Q̃iC̃g(δi)Z
zXx(Q̃iC̃g(δi))
†Q̃iC̃g(δi) (174)
As described in more detail in Section 6.1, applying the Clifford operator Q̃iC̃g(δi) involves both the prover applying
the operator to the authenticated states and the verifier updating his Pauli keys fromZzXx to Q̃iC̃g(δi)Z
zXx(Q̃iC̃g(δi))
†
(this is a Pauli since Q̃iC̃g(δi) is a Clifford).
Now Q̃iC̃g(δi), is acting directly on ρ
k
g(∆i−1)
so we have:
ρkg(∆i) = Q̃iC̃g(δi)ρ
k
g(∆i−1)
C̃†g(δi)Q̃
†
i (175)
Note that this is still a state encoded with the signed polynomial code (hence the superscript k), since the Clifford
operators are logical operators on the signed polynomial encoding. Finally, the prover can apply another attack
Vg(∆i). Note that this attack acts only on the registers held by the prover (Ri+1 and E) and therefore can be shifted
past operators acting on register Mi+1 in T∆i,ẑ,x̂,k. We now set:
Ug(∆i) = Vg(∆i)Q̃iC̃g(δi)Ug(∆i−1)C̃
†
g(δi)
Q̃†i (176)
The prover’s state at the end of the round is then:
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F
|Ri+1|
q
k∈{−1,1}m
τi+1(z, x, k)⊗
∑
∆i,z1,x1∈F
|Mi+1|
q
W i+1∆i,ẑ,x̂,k(ρ
k
g(∆i)
⊗ ρE)(W i+1∆i,ẑ,x̂,k)
† (177)
where
W i+1∆i,ẑ,x̂,k = (|∆i〉 〈∆i| (D
†
k)
⊗|Mi+1|(Zz1Xx1)† ⊗ IRi+1,E)Ug(∆i)((Z
z1Xx1)Mi+1 ⊗ (ZzXx)Ri+1 ⊗ IE)

6.7 Proof of Claim 6.3 (Final State)
Proof: Recall that we start with the state given in equation 156 in Corollary 6.2:
ρL+1
def
=
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F
|Pfinal|
q
k∈{−1,1}m
τfinal(z, x, k)⊗
∑
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
z1,x1∈F
|Vfinal|
q
V∆L,ẑ,x̂,k(ρ
k
g(∆L)
⊗ ρE)V †∆L,ẑ,x̂,k (178)
where ẑ = (z1, z), x̂ = (x1, x) and
V∆L,ẑ,x̂,k = ((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|(Zz1Xx1)†Vfinal⊗IPfinal,E)Ug(∆L)((Z
z1Xx1)Vfinal⊗(Z
zXx)Pfinal⊗IE)
Our goal is to determine the form of the state after tracing out the first register (the key register) and registers Pfinal
and E. We begin by tracing out the key register, which allows us to sum over z, x ∈ F |Pfinal|q . We are also allowed
to sum over k, but we will keep k fixed while we simplify the state. The state can then be written as:∑
z,x∈F
|Pfinal|
q
∑
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
z1,x1∈F
|Vfinal|
q
V∆L,ẑ,x̂,k(ρ
k
g(∆L)
⊗ ρE)V †∆L,ẑ,x̂,k (179)
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By Lemma 4.5, this has the effect of mixing register Pfinal. The state is now:
1
q|Pfinal|
∑
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
z1,x1∈F
|Vfinal|
q
V ′∆L,z1,x1,k(σ
k
g(∆L)
⊗ IPfinal ⊗ ρE)V
′†
∆L,z1,x1,k
(180)
where
V ′∆L,z1,x1,k = ((|∆L〉 〈∆L| ⊗ IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|(Zz1Xx1)† ⊗ IPfinal,E)Ug(∆L)(Z
z1Xx1 ⊗ IPfinal,E)
and
TrPfinal(ρ
k
g(∆L)
) = σkg(∆L)
Next, we observe that the Pauli encoding/decoding of Zz1Xx1 on register Vfinal has the effect of decohering
(removing cross terms of) the part of Ug(∆L) that is acting on Vfinal, as shown in Lemma 5.1.
Applying the lemma with:
U = Ug(∆L) =
∑
P∈P|Vfinal|
P ⊗ UPg(∆L) (181)
we can simplify the prover’s decoded state to:∑
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
P∈P|Vfinal|
((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )(D†k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )σkg(∆L)((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )D
⊗|Vfinal|
k P )
†⊗Ug(∆L)P (IPfinal⊗ρE)(U
g(∆L)
P )
†
(182)
where the above state also has a factor of 1
q
|Pfinal|
.
We trace out registers Pfinal and E since the verifier will not look at these registers:
σk =
∑
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
P∈P|Vfinal|
αP,∆L · ((|∆L〉 〈∆L| ⊗ IF )D
⊗|Vfinal|
k P )σ
k
g(∆L)
((|∆L〉 〈∆L| ⊗ IF )D
⊗|Vfinal|
k P )
†
where αP,∆L =
1
q
|Pfinal|
Tr(Ug(∆L)P (IPfinal ⊗ ρE)(U
g(∆L)
P )
†). 
6.8 Proofs of Claim 6.4 and Claim 6.5 (Trivial and Nontrivial Deviation)
6.8.1 Necessary Claims
For both proofs, we require the three following claims. The first is regarding the state σka = TrPfinal(ρ
k
a) (for
a ∈ F 3Lq ), where ρka is defined in Claim 6.1 (in equation 153) and σka is first defined in Claim 6.3. The claim below
considers the unauthenticated version of the state (σa). In other words, if σ′a is σa with m − 1 auxiliary 0 qudits
appended to each individual qudit, then:
σka = Ekσ
′
aE
†
k (183)
This equality follows from the definition of the encoding circuit (Definition 2.7).
Claim 6.6 For a ∈ F 3Lq and σa as defined in Claim 6.3 we claim that
σa =
1
q3L
∑
l,l′∈F 3Lq
|l〉
〈
l′
∣∣⊗ TrPfinal(|ψ〉a,l 〈ψ|a,l′) (184)
where |ψ〉a,a = U |0〉
⊗n.
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The second claim involves conjugation properties of the encoding circuit Ek (see Definition 2.7) with respect to
trivial Pauli operators:
Claim 6.7 For a trivial Pauli operator P ∈ P|Vfinal|,
(ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|PE
⊗|Vfinal|
k = (E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|PE
⊗|Vfinal|
k (ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F ) (185)
where (Π̂0)F is defined in equation 158 as
(Π̂0)F = |1〉 〈1| ⊗ I⊗d |0〉 〈0|⊗d (186)
and for a = (a(1), . . . , a(3L)) ∈ F 3Lq
ΠGa = (|a(1)〉 〈a(1)| ⊗ I⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)⊗ · · · ⊗ (|a(3L)〉 〈a(3L)| ⊗ I⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d) (187)
The final claim simplifies the expression for Tr(Π̂0σPk ):
Claim 6.8 For all P = ZzXx ∈ P|Vfinal|, and for σ
P
k as defined in Claim 6.3 (equation 161),
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|Xxσka(X
x)†(Ek)
⊗|Vfinal|) (188)
where (Π̂0)F is defined in equation 158 as
(Π̂0)F = |1〉 〈1| ⊗ I⊗d |0〉 〈0|⊗d (189)
and for a = (a(1), . . . , a(3L)) ∈ F 3Lq
ΠGa = (|a(1)〉 〈a(1)| ⊗ I⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)⊗ · · · ⊗ (|a(3L)〉 〈a(3L)| ⊗ I⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d) (190)
We now proceed to proving Claims 6.4 and 6.5, and then we prove the claims listed above.
6.8.2 Proof of Claim 6.4 (Trivial Deviation)
Proof of Claim 6.4: Our goal in this proof is to show
1
2m
Tr(Π̂0
∑
k
σPk ) ≤
γ
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (191)
for a trivial Pauli operator P acting on Vfinal. We will show that for all k,
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) ≤
γ
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (192)
By Claim 6.8 (and by the fact that P is a trivial Pauli operator and therefore has no X operator), we have
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|σka(Ek)
⊗|Vfinal|) (193)
where (as defined in equation 187) for a = (a(1), . . . , a(3L)) ∈ F 3Lq
ΠGa = (|a(1)〉 〈a(1)| ⊗ I⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)⊗ · · · ⊗ (|a(3L)〉 〈a(3L)| ⊗ I⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d) (194)
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and (as defined in equation 158):
Π̂0 = (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗3LVL+1 ⊗ (|1〉 〈1| ⊗ I
⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)F = (Π̂0)VL+1 ⊗ (Π̂0)F (195)
We note that σka is the density matrix σa encoded with the signed polynomial code; i.e. if σ
′
a is the density matrix
σa with m− 1 auxiliary 0 qudits appended to each individual qudit, we have:
σka = E
⊗|Vfinal|
k σ
′
a(E
⊗|Vfinal|
k )
† (196)
It follows that
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )σ′a) (197)
Observe that the projection ΠGa⊗ (Π̂0)F does not alter the auxiliary 0 qudits; it acts as I⊗d⊗|0〉 〈0|
⊗d on each set
ofm−1 auxiliary qudits. Therefore, we can trace out all of the auxiliary qubits (and also remove the corresponding
operators from the projections). Tracing out the auxiliary qudits from σ′a simply results in σa. ΠGa can be replaced
by |a〉 〈a|, and (Π̂0)F can be replaced by |1〉 〈1|. The resulting expression is:
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr(|a1〉 〈a1|σa) (198)
Claim 6.6 implies that the state σa can be written as
σa =
1
q3L
∑
l,l′∈F 3Lq
|l〉
〈
l′
∣∣⊗ TrPfinal(|ψ〉a,l 〈ψ|a,l′) (199)
where |ψ〉a,a = U |0〉
⊗n. Given this information about σa, we can continue:
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr(|a1〉 〈a1|σa) (200)
=
1
q3L
∑
a,l,l′∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr(|a〉 〈a| |l〉
〈
l′
∣∣)Tr(|1〉 〈1| (TrPfinal(|ψ〉a,l 〈ψ|a,l′))) (201)
=
1
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr(|1〉 〈1| (TrPfinal(U |0〉 〈0|
⊗n U †))) (202)
≤ γ
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (203)
The last inequality follows because measuring U |0〉 results in 0 with probability ≥ 1− γ and 1 otherwise.
Remark 6.1 Note that if U |0〉 resulted in 0 with probability exactly 1−γ, the last inequality would be replaced by
an equality (which would replace the inequality in the statement of the claim with an equality). Also note that if in
equation 202 the projection |1〉 〈1| was replaced by I, the next line would be the same, except γ would be replaced
by 1 and the inequality by an equality. These two facts will be useful in the proof of Claim 8.2, which is required
for the proof of the polynomial version of Corollary 1.11 (Corollary 1.12)

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6.8.3 Proof of Claim 6.5 (Nontrivial Deviation)
We now prove Claim 6.5.
Proof of Claim 6.5: Our goal in this proof is to show that for a non trivial Pauli operator P = ZzXx ∈ P|Vfinal|,
1
2m
Tr(Π̂0
∑
k
σPk ) ≤
1
q3L2m−1
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (204)
To do this, we will show that at most 2 terms in the above sum over k can be non zero; each of those terms can be
at most
1
2mq3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (205)
The claim follows. We begin by using Claim 6.8 to write:
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|Xxσka(X
x)†(Ek)
⊗|Vfinal|) (206)
where (as defined in equation 187) for a = (a(1), . . . , a(3L)) ∈ F 3Lq
ΠGa = (|a(1)〉 〈a(1)| ⊗ I⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)⊗ · · · ⊗ (|a(3L)〉 〈a(3L)| ⊗ I⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d) (207)
and (as defined in equation 158):
Π̂0 = (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗3LVL+1 ⊗ (|1〉 〈1| ⊗ I
⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)F = (Π̂0)VL+1 ⊗ (Π̂0)F (208)
Note that the projection ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F includes the projection of each block of m qudits onto I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d;
it can be written as:
ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F = Π̂L0 Π̂A0 (209)
where
Π̂A0 = (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)⊗|Vfinal| (210)
Intuitively, this implies that the non trivial Pauli operator P must preserve the authenticated state (up to trivial
operators) on every block of m qudits in order end up in the subspace defined by Π̂A0 . Using similar reasoning as
used in the proof of Lemma 5.2, we should be able to say that P can only do this for at most 2 sign keys at a time.
This intuition is formalized in Corollary 6.9, which follows from Lemma 5.2 and is proven immediately after this
proof:
Corollary 6.9 For a non trivial Pauli operator Xx ∈ Ptm and a density matrix σ on m qudits, there exist at most
2 sign keys k ∈ {−1, 1}m (which are the same regardless of σ) for which the following expression
(I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗tm(E†k)
⊗tXxσk(Xx)†E⊗tk (I
⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗tm (211)
can be non zero. If Xx = Xx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xxt for xi ∈ Fmq and the expression above is non zero, Xxi must be
k-correlated for all i.
This corollary implies that Tr(Π̂A0 σ
P
k ) (where Π̂
A
0 is defined in equation 210) is non zero for at most 2 sign keys.
Fix one sign key for which Tr(Π̂A0 σ
P
k ) is non zero. We will now simplify the expression in equation 206 for this
fixed sign key k.
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|Xxσka(X
x)†(Ek)
⊗|Vfinal|) (212)
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Now due to Corollary 6.9, we know thatXx is k-correlated (see Definition 5.4). BecauseXx maps an authenticated
state to a different authenticated state, it is by definition equal to a logical Pauli operator X̃xk , so it maps σka to
σka,xk = (X
xkσa(X
xk)†)k:
. . . =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|σka,xk(Ek)
⊗|Vfinal|) (213)
=
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F ))σ′a,xk(ΠGa ⊗ IF )) (214)
where the equality follows because σka,xk is the density matrix σa,xk encoded with the signed polynomial code,
and σ′a,xk is the density matrix σa,xk with m − 1 auxiliary 0 qudits appended to each qudit of σa,xk . Note that
the projection ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F does not alter the auxiliary 0 qudits, as it acts on each set of m − 1 0 qudits as
I⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d. Then we can trace out all the auxiliary 0 qudits and also remove them from the projection
ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F . The projection is now simply |a〉 〈a| ⊗ |1〉 〈1| and we have:
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
1
2m
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((|a1〉 〈a1|)Xxkσa(Xxk)†) (215)
Now we use Claim 6.6 to write σa as
σa =
1
q3L
∑
l,l′∈F 3Lq
|l〉
〈
l′
∣∣⊗ TrPfinal(|ψ〉a,l 〈ψ|a,l′) (216)
where |ψ〉a,a = U |0〉
⊗n. Let σa,l,l′ = TrPfinal(|ψ〉a,l 〈ψ|a,l′) and let Xxk = X
xk
VL+1 ⊗X
xk
F . Now we have:
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
1
q3L
∑
a,l,l′∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((|a1〉 〈a1|)Xxk(|l〉
〈
l′
∣∣⊗ σa,l,l′)(Xxk)†) (217)
=
1
q3L
∑
a,l,l′∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr(|a〉 〈a| (XxkVL+1 |l〉
〈
l′
∣∣ (XxkVL+1)†))Tr(|1〉 〈1|XxkF σa,l,l′(XxkF )†))
=
1
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr(|1〉 〈1|XxkF σa,a−xk,a−xk(X
xk
F )
†)) (218)
≤ 1
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (219)
where we have obtained the second to last equality because l = l′ = a−xk in order for Tr(|a〉 〈a| (Xxk |l〉 〈l′| (Xxk)†))
to be 1 (otherwise the trace will be 0). The last equality is obtained because σa,a−xk,a−xk is a density matrix.
Remark 6.2 Note that the final inequality would still hold if the projection |1〉 〈1| was replaced by I; this fact will
be useful in the proof of Claim 8.3, which is required for the proof of the polynomial version of Corollary 1.11
(Corollary 1.12).

Proof of Corollary6.9: Let Xx = Xx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Xxt . We show that if there exists an i for which Xxi is not
k-correlated,
(I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗tm(E†k)
⊗tXxσk(Xx)†E⊗tk (I
⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗tm (220)
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= (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗tm((E†k)
⊗tXxE⊗tk )σ((E
†
k)
⊗tXxE⊗tk )
†(I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗tm = 0 (221)
where the equality follows due to the fact that σk is the density matrix σ encoded with the signed polynomial code.
It follows by Claim 5.4 that the expression can be non zero for at most 2 sign keys, which completes the proof. Note
that it is implied that the choice of k for which the expression is non zero is independent of σ; it is dependent only
on whether Xx is k-correlated or not. Assume there exists an i for which Xxi is not k-correlated. By Claim 5.7 we
can break down Xxi into a product of a k-correlated operator Qk and an uncorrelated operator Q̂k. By equation
116, we know that Q̂k can be written as
Q̂k = I⊗d+1 ⊗X x̂id+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗X x̂im (222)
where (x̂id+2, . . . , x̂im) 6= 0d since Xxi is not k-correlated. Now we can refer to equation 118 to write:
E†kQ̂kEk = I
⊗d+1 ⊗X x̂id+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗X x̂im (223)
Returning to the expression above (equation 221), but just the leftmost part of the expression which operates on the
ith register of σ, we have:
(I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)E†kX
xiEk = (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)E†kQ̂kQkEk (224)
= (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)E†kQ̂kEkE
†
kQkEk (225)
Plugging in the expression for E†kQ̂kEk from equation 223, we have
. . . = (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)(I⊗d+1 ⊗X x̂id+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗X x̂im)E†kQkEk (226)
Observe that Qk is k-correlated; by definition, it preserves a state authenticated with a sign key. Then the rightmost
part of equation 226 is simply E†k acting on an authenticated state. When E
†
k acts on an arbitrary authenticated
density matrix, it performs the following map:
E†kσ
k = σ ⊗ |0〉 〈0|m−1 (227)
It follows that the above expression (equation 226) contains the inner product below:〈
0d
∣∣∣ (X x̂id+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗X x̂im) ∣∣∣0d〉 (228)
which must be equal to 0 since (x̂id+2, . . . , x̂im) 6= 0d. 
6.8.4 Proofs of Necessary Claims
We begin with Claim 6.6.
Proof of Claim 6.6: Recall that we are considering the unauthenticated state σa (defined in Claim 6.3), where
σa = TrPfinal(ρa), for a = (a1, . . . , aL) (ai ∈ F 3q ) and, as defined in Claim 6.1 (in equation 153),
ρa = (QLCaL · · ·Q1Ca1Q0)ρ(QLCaL · · ·Q1Ca1Q0)
† (229)
Note that ρa is a pure state and can be written as |ψa〉 〈ψa| (since ρ consists of n 0 qudits and L resource states).
Fact 6.1 states that |ψa〉 can be written as:
|ψa〉 =
1√
q3L
∑
l∈F 3Lq
|l〉 |ψ〉a,l (230)
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where |ψ〉a,a = U |0〉
⊗n (recall that U is the Q-CIRCUIT instance which the prover was asked to apply). It follows
that the state σa can be written as
σa = TrPfinal(|ψa〉 〈ψa|) =
1
q3L
∑
l,l′∈F 3Lq
|l〉
〈
l′
∣∣⊗ TrPfinal(|ψ〉a,l 〈ψ|a,l′) (231)
 We proceed to proving Claim 6.7.
Proof of Claim 6.7: Recall that we would like to prove
(ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|PE
⊗|Vfinal|
k = (E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|PE
⊗|Vfinal|
k (ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F ) (232)
for a trivial Pauli operator P ∈ P|Vfinal|, where ΠGa is defined in equation 187 and (Π̂0)F is defined in 158.
In other words, we want to show that the Pauli operator (E†k)
⊗|Vfinal|PE
⊗|Vfinal|
k commutes with the projection
ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F when P is trivial. Observe that
(E†k)
⊗|Vfinal|PE
⊗|Vfinal|
k (233)
must be trivial in the registers 1, d + 2, . . . ,m; only registers d + 2, . . . ,m can be non trivial. This follows from
the definition of Ek (see Section 2.5.2). In more detail, E
†
k consists of SUM and multiplication operations (which
compose D†k) followed by Fourier operations. As shown in Section 2.4 (in equations 21 and 23), the SUM and
multiplication operators in D†k map trivial operators to trivial operators by conjugation. The Fourier operators,
which flip Z and X operators, act only on registers 2, . . . , d + 1, so only these registers can be mapped to non
trivial operators.
Note that trivial operators commute with standard basis projections, and ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F acts with standard basis
projections on registers 1, d + 2, . . . ,m for each block of m registers. Since ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F acts as I on registers
2, . . . , d+ 1 for each block of m registers, the non trivial portion of (E†k)
⊗|Vfinal|PE
⊗|Vfinal|
k also commutes with
ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F . 
Finally, we prove Claim 6.8.
Proof of Claim 6.8: Recall that our goal is to prove the following equality for all P = ZzXx ∈ P|Vfinal|:
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|Xxσka(X
x)†(Ek)
⊗|Vfinal|) (234)
where σPk was defined as follows in Claim 6.3:
σPk =
∑
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
αP,g(∆L) ·((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )σkg(∆L)((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )† (235)
and the projection Π̂0 acting on Vfinal = VL+1 ∪ F was defined in equation 158 as follows:
Π̂0 = (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗3LVL+1 ⊗ (|1〉 〈1| ⊗ I
⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)F = (Π̂0)VL+1 ⊗ (Π̂0)F (236)
Before continuing, note that the projection Π̂0 makes it unnecessary to sum over all ∆L in the expression for σk;
we can instead sum over a subset of ∆L, and split the sum according to the value a ∈ F 3Lq of g(∆L):
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) = Tr(Π̂0
∑
a∈F 3Lq
∆L∈Ga
αP,a · ((|∆L〉 〈∆L| ⊗ IF )(D†k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )σka((|∆L〉 〈∆L| ⊗ IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )†)
(237)
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where
Ga
def
= {((s1, 0d), . . . , (s3L, 0d))|s1, . . . , s3L ∈ F d+1q , g(s1, . . . , s3L) = a} (238)
Instead of summing over all ∆L ∈ F
|VL+1|
q , we have restricted to ∆L ∈ ∪aGa. This is because ∆L must equal
((s1, 0
d), . . . , (s3L, 0
d)) to give a non zero trace when projected onto Π̂0. Next, since |∆L〉 〈∆L| ⊗ IF commutes
with Π̂0, we can remove |∆L〉 〈∆L| ⊗ IF from the right hand side of equation 237 (due to the cyclic nature of
trace), obtaining:
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) = Tr(Π̂0
∑
a∈F 3Lq
∆L∈Ga
αP,a · ((|∆L〉 〈∆L| ⊗ IF )(D†k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )σka((D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )†) (239)
= Tr(Π̂0
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · ((ΠGa ⊗ IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )σka((D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )†) (240)
where for a = (a(1), . . . , a(3L)) ∈ F 3Lq
ΠGa =
∑
∆L∈Ga
|∆L〉 〈∆L| = (|a(1)〉 〈a(1)|⊗I⊗d⊗|0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗· · ·⊗ (|a(3L)〉 〈a(3L)|⊗I⊗d⊗|0〉 〈0|⊗d) (241)
We can further simplify to:
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|PσkaP
†(Dk)
⊗|Vfinal|) (242)
because
(Π̂0)VL+1ΠGa = ΠGa (243)
Recall (from 31) that
D†k = (I ⊗ F
⊗d ⊗ I⊗d)E†k (244)
It follows that:
(ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal| = (ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )((I ⊗ F⊗d ⊗ I⊗d)†)⊗|Vfinal|(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal| (245)
= ((I ⊗ F⊗d ⊗ I⊗d)†)⊗|Vfinal|(ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal| (246)
The commutation in the final equality occurs because of the structure of (ΠGa⊗(Π̂0)F ); for each set ofm registers,
it acts as identity on registers 2, . . . , d+ 1 in the set. Plugging in the equality obtained above, we obtain:
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a · Tr(((ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F )(E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )σka((E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )†) (247)
Note that we have removed the terms corresponding to ((I ⊗ F⊗d ⊗ I⊗d)†)⊗|Vfinal|; these terms canceled due to
the cyclic nature of trace, since they were present on both ends of the above expression.
To complete the claim, we need to show that P = ZzXx can be replaced by Xx. To begin, observe that in the
expression for σPk , we can replace
(E†k)
⊗|Vfinal|P (248)
with
(E†k)
⊗|Vfinal|ZzE
⊗|Vfinal|
k (E
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|Xx (249)
By Claim 6.7, we know that the Pauli operator (E†k)
⊗|Vfinal|ZzE
⊗|Vfinal|
k can be commuted past the projection
ΠGa ⊗ (Π̂0)F . Note that since we have now pulled the Pauli operator
(E†k)
⊗|Vfinal|ZzE
⊗|Vfinal|
k (250)
past the projection, we can remove it from the expression, due to the cyclic nature of trace. 
54
7 Blind QPIP
In this section, we will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1.8 Theorem 1.1 holds also in a blind setting, namely, the prover does not get any information regarding
the function being computed and its input.
To begin, we define blindness:
Definition 7.1 [AS06, BFK08, Chi01] Secure blind quantum computation is a process where a server computes a
function for a client and the following properties hold:
• Blindness: The prover gets no information beyond an upper bound on the size of the circuit. Formally, in a
blind computation scheme for a set of circuits Cn which take as input strings in {0, 1}n, the prover’s reduced
density matrix is identical for every C ∈ Cn and input x ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Security: Completeness and soundness hold the same way as in QAS (Definition 2.1).
We use the QPIP protocols for Q-CIRCUIT in order to provide a blind QPIP for any language in BQP. To do this,
we require a universal circuit. Roughly, a universal circuit acts on input bits and control bits. The control bits can
be thought of as a description of a circuit that should be applied to the input bits. Universal circuits can be formally
defined as follows:
Definition 7.2 For a circuit U acting on n qubits, let c(U) ∈ {0, 1}k be the canonical (classical) description of U .
The universal circuit Un,k acts in the following way:
Un,k |φ〉 ⊗ |c(U)〉 −→ U |φ〉 |c(U)〉 (251)
Constructing such a circuit is an easy exercise. We would like the universal circuit to simulate any circuit made of
Toffoli and Hadamard gates on n qubits - it is well known that such circuits are quantum universal. Assume there
is an upper bound of m gates in the circuit. The universal circuit is split up into m layers. Each layer i consists of
every possible gate on the n input qubits, and each such gate is controlled by 1 qubit. Only 1 of these control qubits
will be set to 1, based on which is the ith gate applied in U .
To perform a blind computation, the verifier will compute, with the prover’s help, the result of the universal circuit
acting on input and control bits. It follows that to prove blindness, we need to show that the input to the universal
circuit is hidden from the prover. To do this, we show that the prover’s density matrix in both the Clifford and
polynomial schemes remains independent of the input (to the universal circuit) throughout the computation. We
begin with the Clifford scheme.
Theorem 1.9 (Blindness of the Clifford based QPIP) The state of the prover in the Clifford based QPIP (Protocol
4.1) is independent of the input to the circuit which is being computed throughout the protocol.
Proof of Theorem 1.9: We do not need to consider the prover’s extra space, since that contains no information
about the input. We need only consider the qubits sent to the prover by the verifier. Whenever the prover receives
a state from the verifier (at the beginning of the protocol and during the protocol), the verifier has chosen new,
independent keys to encode the state using the Clifford QAS. Therefore, each density matrix sent to the prover by
the verifier is the maximally mixed state (by Lemma 4.4) regardless of the input. This remains true throughout
the protocol, since when the prover sends a register to the verifier, the verifier returns a completely mixed state,
independent of the remaining registers. It follows that the prover’s state (other than his extra space) is always
described by the completely mixed state. 
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We now consider the polynomial QPIP.
Theorem 1.10 (Blindness of the Polynomial Based QPIP) The state of the prover in the polynomial based QPIP
(Protocol 6.1) remains independent of the input to the circuit which is being computed throughout the protocol.
We remark that the proof of this fact turns out to be rather cumbersome, because we are relying on the randomness
provided by the measurement results to prove blindness. In fact, the proof can be greatly simplified by adding
additional randomness to the Toffoli states (intuitively, this adds a one time pad to the decoded measurement results
sent to the prover). However, it is interesting to note that this additional randomness is not needed for blindness,
and that the randomness of the measurement results is indeed enough.
Proof of Theorem 1.10: This case is more complicated, due to the classical interaction in each round. Without
the classical interaction, the prover’s initial state is just the maximally mixed state, due to the Pauli keys (by Lemma
4.5), so blindness follows easily in this case. Returning to the case in which there is classical interaction, we need
to show that the joint quantum state and classical information of the prover are independent of the input to the
computation. Recall that each message sent back by the verifier is a decoded measurement result which is required
in order to apply the Toffoli gate. We will argue that due to the way the Toffoli gate is applied (see Section 2.3.1
and Fact 6.1), the decoded measurement results are uniformly random regardless of the input. This implies that
revealing the decoded measurement result leaks no information about the input. We now proceed to prove this
formally.
We will show that at the start of the final round (round L + 1) the prover’s state (which includes the classical
messages from the verifier) is independent of the input. As given in Claim 6.1 and equation 155 the joint state of
the prover’s registers, PL+1, the environment E , the verifier’s registers, VL+1 and the key register containing the
sign key and Pauli keys of qudits in PL+1, is:
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F
|PL+1|
q
k∈{−1,1}m
τL+1(z, x, k)⊗
∑
∆L,z1,x1∈F
|VL+1|
q
WL+1∆L,ẑ,x̂,k(ρ
k
g(∆L)
⊗ ρE)(WL+1∆L,ẑ,x̂)
† (252)
where
ẑ = (z1, z), x̂ = (x1, x), (253)
WL+1∆L,ẑ,x̂,k = (|∆L〉 〈∆L| (D
†
k)
⊗|VL+1|(Zz1Xx1)†VL+1 ⊗ IPL+1,E)Ug(∆L)((Z
z1Xx1)VL+1 ⊗ (Z
zXx)PL+1 ⊗ IE)
(254)
where Ug(∆L) is a unitary operator dependent on g(∆L), ρE is the initial state of the prover’s environment and
ρkg(∆L) = (Q̃LC̃g(δL) · · · Q̃1C̃g(δ1)Q̃0)ρ
k(Q̃LC̃g(δL) · · · Q̃1C̃g(δ1)Q̃0)
† (255)
for ∆L = (δ1, . . . , δL) ∈ F
|VL+1|
q and where ρk is the initial density matrix, containing an authentication of the
input state on n qudits and authentications of L Toffoli states on 3 qudits each.
First, since we are only considering the prover’s state, we can trace out the verifier’s registers VL+1 and the first
register containing the keys. This gives the following state:
1
2m|Pm′ |
∑
z,x∈F
|PL+1|
q
k∈{−1,1}m
∑
∆L,z1,x1∈F
|VL+1|
q
TrVL+1(W
L+1
∆L,ẑ,x̂,k
(ρkg(∆L) ⊗ ρE)(W
L+1
∆L,ẑ,x̂
)†) (256)
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Next, the sum over z, x ∈ F |PL+1|q allows us to use the Pauli mixing lemma (Lemma 4.5) to replace ρkg(∆L) with
TrPL+1(ρ
k
g(∆L)
)⊗ 1
q|PL+1|
I⊗|PL+1| (257)
We can now rewrite the prover’s state as:
1
2m|P|VL+1||
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
∆L,z1,x1∈F
|VL+1|
q
TrVL+1(W
′
∆L,z1,x1,k
(σg(∆L),k)(W
′
∆L,z1,x1,k
)†) (258)
where
σg(∆L),k = TrPL+1(ρ
k
g(∆L)
)⊗ 1
q|PL+1|
I⊗|PL+1| ⊗ ρE (259)
W ′∆L,z1,x1,k = (|∆L〉 〈∆L| (D
†
k)
⊗|VL+1|(Zz1Xx1)†VL+1 ⊗ IPL+1,E)Ug(∆L)((Z
z1Xx1)VL+1 ⊗ IPL+1 ⊗ IE) (260)
Since ρkg(∆L) is a pure state, it can be written as
∣∣ψg(∆L)〉k 〈ψg(∆L)∣∣k. Recall from Fact 6.1 that the unauthenticated
state
∣∣ψg(∆L)〉 can be written as ∣∣ψg(∆L)〉 = 1√
q3L
∑
l∈F 3Lq
|l〉 |ψ〉g(∆L),l (261)
Given this form of the unauthenticated state, we revert back to analyzing the authenticated state, which is:
ρkg(∆L) = (
∣∣ψg(∆L)〉 〈ψg(∆L)∣∣)k = 1q3L ∑
l,l′∈F 3Lq
(|l〉
〈
l′
∣∣)k ⊗ (|ψ〉g(∆L),l 〈ψ|g(∆L),l′)k (262)
Since VL+1 corresponds to the first register in the above sum (containing the authentication of l) and PL+1
corresponds to the register containing the authentication of |ψ〉g(∆L),l, we have:
TrPL+1(ρ
k
g(∆L)
) =
1
q3L
∑
l,l′∈F 3Lq
Tr(|ψ〉g(∆L),l 〈ψ|g(∆L),l′)
k · (|l〉
〈
l′
∣∣)k (263)
In the following claim (which we prove after this proof), we show that once we plug in the above expression into
the prover’s state as given in Equation 258, the state is only non zero when l = l′. To see this, observe that summing
over z1, x1 ∈ F
|VL+1|
q results in decohering (removing cross terms of) the part of Ug(∆L) acting on register VL+1
by the Pauli decoherence lemma (Lemma 5.1). Then due to the standard basis projection onto |∆L〉 〈∆L|, the state
will be zero unless l = l′.
Claim 7.1 The following expression (from equation 258), which represents the prover’s state at the start of round
L+ 1
1
2m|P|VL+1||
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
∆L,z1,x1∈F
|VL+1|
q
TrVL+1(W
′
∆L,z1,x1,k
(σg(∆L),k)(W
′
∆L,z1,x1,k
)†) (264)
is equal to
1
q3L2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
P∈P|VL+1|
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q ,l∈F 3Lq
µ∆L,l,P,k · UP,g(∆L)(
1
q|PL+1|
I⊗|PL+1| ⊗ ρE)U †P,g(∆L) (265)
57
where
Ug(∆L) =
∑
P∈P|VL+1|
P ⊗ UP,g(∆L) (266)
and
µ∆L,l,P,k = Tr(|∆L〉 〈∆L| (D
†
k)
⊗|VL+1|P (|l〉 〈l|)kP †(Dk)⊗|VL+1|) (267)
The above state is the same regardless of the input density matrix ρk; therefore, we have shown blindness for the
polynomial scheme. 
We proceed to the proof of the claim.
Proof of Claim 7.1: We begin with
1
2m|P|VL+1||
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
∆L,z1,x1∈F
|VL+1|
q
TrVL+1(W
′
∆L,z1,x1,k
(σg(∆L),k)(W
′
∆L,z1,x1,k
)†) (268)
where
σg(∆L),k = TrPL+1(ρ
k
g(∆L)
)⊗ 1
q|PL+1|
I⊗|PL+1| ⊗ ρE (269)
and
W ′∆L,z1,x1,k = (|∆L〉 〈∆L| (D
†
k)
⊗|VL+1|(Zz1Xx1)†VL+1 ⊗ IPL+1,E)Ug(∆L)((Z
z1Xx1)VL+1 ⊗ IPL+1 ⊗ IE) (270)
We can now apply the Pauli decoherence lemma (Lemma 5.1) with the decomposition of Ug(∆L) as given in
equation 266 (and with Zz1Xx1 playing the role of Q in the lemma) to simplify the state in equation 268 to:
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m,∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
P∈P|VL+1|
TrVL+1(W
′′
∆L,P,k
(σg(∆L),k)(W
′′
∆L,P,k
)†) (271)
where
W ′′∆L,P,k = |∆L〉 〈∆L| (D
†
k)
⊗|VL+1|P ⊗ UP,g(∆L) (272)
Now we can plug in the expression for TrPL+1(ρ
k
g(∆L)
) from equation 263 to obtain:
σg(∆L),k =
1
q3L
∑
l,l′∈F 3Lq
Tr(|ψ〉g(∆L),l 〈ψ|g(∆L),l′)
k · (|l〉
〈
l′
∣∣)k ⊗ 1
q|PL+1|
I⊗|PL+1| ⊗ ρE (273)
Plugging this in to equation 271 we obtain:
1
q3L2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
P∈P|VL+1|
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q ,l,l′∈F 3Lq
µ∆L,l,l′,P,kTr((|ψ〉g(∆L),l 〈ψ|g(∆L),l′)
k) · UP,g(∆L)(
1
q|PL+1|
I⊗|PL+1| ⊗ ρE)U †P,g(∆L)
(274)
where
µ∆L,l,l′,P,k = Tr(|∆L〉 〈∆L| (D
†
k)
⊗|VL+1|P (|l〉
〈
l′
∣∣)kP †(Dk)⊗|VL+1|) (275)
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Observe that µ∆L,l,l′,P,k is only non zero when l = l
′. This follows due to two observations. First, note that
(Dk)
⊗|VL+1| |∆L〉 〈∆L| (D†k)
⊗|VL+1| (276)
is a standard basis projection, because |∆L〉 〈∆L| is a standard basis projection, and Dk consists only of sum and
multiplication operations (see Claim 2.6). Next, note that if we have a standard basis projection S acting on a
matrix P |ψ〉 〈ψ′|P † in register VL+1, where |ψ〉 =
∑
i αi |i〉 and |ψ′〉 =
∑
i βi |i〉, we need not consider the cross
terms of |ψ〉 〈ψ′|:
Tr(SP |ψ〉
〈
ψ′
∣∣P †) = ∑
i,j
αiβ
∗
jTr(SP |i〉 〈j|P †) (277)
=
∑
i
αiβ
∗
i Tr(SP |i〉 〈i|P †) (278)
Since the authenticated states (|l〉 〈l′|)k consists only of cross terms unless l = l′, this implies that l must equal l′
in order for µ∆L,l,l′,P,k to be non zero. Therefore, we can now write equation 274 as
1
q3L2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
P∈P|VL+1|
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q ,l∈F 3Lq
µ∆L,l,P,kTr((|ψ〉g(∆L),l 〈ψ|g(∆L),l)
k) · UP,g(∆L)(
1
q|PL+1|
I⊗|PL+1| ⊗ ρE)U †P,g(∆L) (279)
Since Tr((|ψ〉g(∆L),l 〈ψ|g(∆L),l)
k) = 1, the above expression is equal to
1
q3L2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
P∈P|VL+1|
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q ,l∈F 3Lq
µ∆L,l,P,k · UP,g(∆L)(
1
q|PL+1|
I⊗|PL+1| ⊗ ρE)U †P,g(∆L) (280)

8 Interpretation of Results
In this section, we prove Corollary 1.11.
8.1 Clifford QPIP
Corollary 8.1 For the Clifford QPIP protocol (Protocol 4.1) with security parameter ε (where ε = 12e by defini-
tion), if the verifier does not abort with probability ≥ β then the trace distance between the final density matrix
conditioned on the verifier’s acceptance and that of the correct state is at most εβ
Proof of Corollary8.1: The final state of the protocol before the verifier’s cheat detection can be written as
(see Eq. 62):
sTrA(ρN+1) +
1− s
4m − 1
∑
Q∈Pm\{I}
Q(TrA(ρN+1))Q† (281)
where s represents the weight of the prover’s attack on the identity, A is the space of all computational qubits other
than the first, and ρN+1 is the correct final state of the protocol:
ρN+1 = (UN · · ·U1)ρ(UN · · ·U1)† (282)
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where ρ is equal to the initial density matrix. Note that ρN+1 includes the auxiliary 0 states, but the circuit does not
act on the auxiliary 0 states (so it includes I operators which we have not included for ease of notation). We can
instead write
ρ′N+1 = (UN · · ·U1)ρ′(UN · · ·U1)† (283)
where ρ′ is the input state ρ without the auxiliary 0’s. Then
TrA(ρN+1) = TrA′(ρ′N+1)⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗e def= ρC ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗e (284)
where A′ is the space of all compuational qubits other than the first (but excluding the auxiliary 0’s).
We now rewrite the state from equation Eq. 281:
sρC ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗e +
1− s
4m − 1
∑
Q1⊗Q2∈Pm\{I}
Q1ρCQ
†
1 ⊗Q2 |0〉 〈0|
⊗eQ†2 (285)
Let V ⊂ Pm\{I} be the set of Pauli operators which pass the cheat detection procedure (i.e. preserve the auxiliary
0 states). Assume the verifier declares the computation valid with probability β. After he declares the computation
valid (and we trace out the auxiliary 0 states), his state is:
σ =
1
β
(sρC +
1− s
4m − 1
∑
Q1⊗Q2∈V
Q1ρCQ
†
1) (286)
Then the trace distance to the correct state ρC is:
T (σ, ρC) ≤
1
β
(sT (ρC , ρC) +
1− s
4m − 1
∑
Q1⊗Q2∈V
T (Q1ρCQ
†
1, ρC)) (287)
≤ 1
β
· |V |
4m − 1
(288)
≤ ε
β
(289)
where the first inequality follows by convexity of trace distance and the final inequality follows from the same
argument used to prove the security of the Cliford QAS- more specifically, see the explanation preceding equation
44. 
8.2 Polynomial QPIP
We now continue to the polynomial QPIP. In this setting, we are concerned with the trace distance between density
matrices after measurement. This is because the verifier in the polynomial QPIP protocol only performs a classical
verification circuit; therefore, he cannot detect phase attacks on the correct state. Once the state is measured,
phase attacks have no effect on the state. For this purpose, let σM represent a density matrix σ on one qudit after
measurement:
σM =
∑
i∈Fq
|i〉 〈i|σ |i〉 〈i| (290)
We will require the following fact:
Fact 8.1 For all density matrices ρ, σ on 1 qudit,
T (σM , ρM ) ≤ T (σ, ρ) (291)
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We require a bit more notation before stating the corollary. Recall that the register Vfinal, which is the register of
containing the 3mL+m qudits held by the verifier at the end of the protocol, is equal to VL+1 ∪ F . We will only
be interested in the first qudit of register F ; this is the qudit which contains the final result of the circuit. For this
purpose, we introduce the following notation. For a density matrix σ on Vfinal, let σ′ = Tr2,...,m(TrVL+1(σ)).
Corollary 1.12 For the polynomial QPIP protocol (Protocol 6.1) with security parameter ε (where ε = 1
2m−1
by definition), assume the verifier aborts with probability at most 1− β. Then the trace distance between the final
measured density matrix conditioned on the verifier’s acceptance (σ′M ) and that of the correct measured state (ρC)
is at most 2εβ .
Proof of Corollary1.12: Recall the final state on register Vfinal held by the verifier (before the verifier checks
for errors, but after he decodes) from Claim 6.3:
ρL+1|Vfinal =
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
σk =
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
∑
P∈P|Vfinal|
σPk (292)
where
σPk =
∑
∆L∈F
|VL+1|
q
αP,g(∆L) ·((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )σkg(∆L)((|∆L〉 〈∆L|⊗IF )(D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P )† (293)
and TrPfinal(ρ
k
g(∆L)
) = σkg(∆L),
αP,g(∆L) =
1
q|Pfinal|
Tr(UPg(∆L)(IPfinal ⊗ ρE)(U
P
g(∆L)
)†) (294)
and
Ug(∆L) =
∑
P∈P|Vfinal|
P ⊗ UPg(∆L) (295)
We begin by conditioning on the verifier’s acceptance, by applying the projection
(Π̂0)Vfinal
def
= (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗3L+1 (296)
on the state and then re-normalizing. The projection above represents the verifier’s test of checking that the last
d qudits of each block of m qudits are 0 (for a reminder of why this is the test and how the protocol works, see
Protocol 6.1). The resulting state after conditioning on acceptance (where β is the probability of acceptance) is
σ =
1
β
(Π̂0)Vfinal(ρL+1|Vfinal)(Π̂0)Vfinal (297)
=
1
2mβ
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
∑
P∈P|Vfinal|
γPk σ̂
P
k (298)
where
σ̂Pk =
1
γPk
(Π̂0)Vfinal(σ
P
k )(Π̂0)Vfinal (299)
and
γPk = Tr((Π̂0)Vfinal(σ
P
k )) (300)
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Our goal is to show that the trace distance T (σ′M , ρC) between ρC and σ
′
M is at most
2ε
β . Note that the expression
in equation 298 is a convex sum over density matrices; this is because σPk is an unnormalized density matrix. To
see this, observe that σPk (written in equation 293) is a sum over terms of the following form: there is a density
matrix (σkg(∆L)), followed by a unitary operation (D
†
k)
⊗|Vfinal|P , followed by a projection. Each term has a non
negative coefficient (αP,g(∆L) from equation 294). Therefore, by convexity of trace distance, we can upper bound
the trace distance as follows:
T (σ′M , ρC) ≤
1
2mβ
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
∑
P∈P|Vfinal|
γPk T ((σ̂
P
k )
′
M , ρC) (301)
=
1
β
∑
P∈P|Vfinal|
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk T ((σ̂
P
k )
′
M , ρC) (302)
Next, we will require two claims (which we prove immediately after the current proof). The first claim shows that
when P is a trivial Pauli operator, it preserves the correct final state on the first qudit of register F :
Claim 8.2 For all trivial P ∈ P|Vfinal| (i.e. P consisting of only Z and I operators):
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk T ((σ̂
P
k )
′
M , ρC) = 0 (303)
The next claim shows that if P is a non trivial Pauli operator, the trace distance will still be small; intuitively, this
is because the state with attack operator P can only pass the verifier’s test for 2 (out of 2m) sign keys:
Claim 8.3 For all non trivial P ∈ P|Vfinal|:
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk T ((σ̂
P
k )
′
M , ρC) ≤
1
2m−1q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (304)
Given the two claims, we can further simplify the bound in equation 301 by first using Claim 8.2 to remove trivial
Pauli operators from the expression (let P ∈ PT|Vfinal| be the set of all non trivial Pauli operators):
T (σ′M , ρC) ≤
1
β
∑
P∈PNT|Vfinal|
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk T ((σ̂
P
k )
′
M , ρC) (305)
≤ 1
2m−1q3Lβ
∑
P∈PNT|Vfinal|
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (306)
=
1
2m−1q3Lβ
∑
a∈F 3Lq
∑
P∈PNT|Vfinal|
αP,a (307)
(308)
The second inequality follows from Claim 8.3. Next, we can use Lemma 3.3, which provides the following equality:∑
P∈P|Vfinal |
αP,a = 1 (309)
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Continuing with the upper bound, we obtain:
T (σ′M , ρC) ≤
1
2m−1q3Lβ
∑
a∈F 3Lq
1 (310)
=
1
2m−1β
(311)
which completes the proof. 
8.2.1 Proof of Claim 8.2
Proof of Claim 8.2: We would like to show that for all trivial P ∈ P|Vfinal| (i.e. P consisting of only Z and I
operators):
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk T ((σ̂
P
k )
′
M , ρC) = 0 (312)
To do so, we need to show that for all k,
Tr(|1〉 〈1| (σ̂Pk )′) = Tr(|1〉 〈1| ρC)
def
= p1 (313)
where p1 is the probability that the correct state outputs 1 when measured. The reason the above statement is
equivalent to equation 312 is because we are considering the measured density matrices; therefore, we need only
prove that both density matrices obtain 1 with the same probability to prove that the trace distance is 0.
Recall from equation 299 that:
σ̂Pk =
1
γPk
(Π̂0)Vfinal(σ
P
k )(Π̂0)Vfinal (314)
Plugging this in to equation 313, we obtain:
Tr(|1〉 〈1| (σ̂Pk )′) =
1
γPk
Tr((I⊗|Vfinal| ⊗ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ I⊗m−1)(Π̂0)Vfinal(σ
P
k )(Π̂0)Vfinal) (315)
=
1
γPk
Tr((I⊗|Vfinal| ⊗ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ I⊗m−1)(Π̂0)Vfinal(σ
P
k )) (316)
=
1
γPk
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) (317)
where the second equality follows because (I⊗|Vfinal| ⊗ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ I⊗m−1) commutes with (Π̂0)Vfinal and due to
the cyclic nature of trace. The third equality follows due to the following equality:
Π̂0 = (I⊗|Vfinal| ⊗ |1〉 〈1| ⊗ I⊗m−1)(Π̂0)Vfinal (318)
where we recall (from equation 158) that
Π̂0 = (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗3LVL+1 ⊗ (|1〉 〈1| ⊗ I
⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)F
def
= (Π̂0)VL+1 ⊗ (Π̂0)F (319)
and (from equation 296) that
(Π̂0)Vfinal = (I
⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗3L+1 (320)
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Next, Claim 6.4 gives the following inequality:
1
γPk
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) =
1
γPk
p1
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (321)
Note that Claim 6.4 is not stated in this format. The first difference is that instead of p1, the claim has γ; this is
simply the probability that the circuit applied by the honest prover outputs 1, which is p1 in this case. The second
is that the statement of the claim also has a summation over k. However, in the proof of the claim, that summation
is not used at all; the claim is shown for individual elements of the sum over k, and the sum over k is only used in
the statement. Finally, Claim 6.4 has an inequality rather than an equality; see Remark 6.1 for why it is okay to use
equality in this setting.
Finally, we claim that γPk =
1
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a. Given this claim, we have
Tr(|1〉 〈1| (σ̂Pk )′) =
1
γPk
Tr(Π̂0σPk ) (322)
=
1
γPk
p1
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (323)
= p1 (324)
which completes the proof, since we have proven the equality in equation 313.To see why γPk satisfies the above
equality, recall from equation 300 that
γPk = Tr((Π̂0)Vfinal(σ
P
k )) (325)
We can again apply Claim 6.4 here; the two differences are that we are using (Π̂0)Vfinal rather than Π̂0 and that we
require equality rather than inequality. The difference between these two projections is that the latter projects the
first qudit of F onto |1〉 〈1|. See Remark 6.1 for why the claim still applies, but with γ in the statement of the claim
replaced by 1 and the inequality replaced by equality, which gives
γPk = Tr((Π̂0)Vfinal(σ
P
k )) =
1
q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (326)

8.2.2 Proof of Claim 8.3
Proof of Claim 8.3: We would like to show that for all non trivial P ∈ P|Vfinal|:
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk T ((σ̂
P
k )
′
M , ρC) ≤
1
2m−1q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (327)
First, we use Fact 8.1 and then upper bound the trace distance by 1 to obtain:
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk T ((σ̂
P
k )
′
M , ρC) ≤
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk T ((σ̂
P
k )
′, ρC) (328)
≤ 1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk (329)
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Next, note that by the definition of γPk in equation 300
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
γPk =
1
2m
∑
k∈{−1,1}m
Tr((Π̂0)Vfinalσ
P
k ) ≤
1
2m−1q3L
∑
a∈F 3Lq
αP,a (330)
where the final inequality follows from Claim 6.5. Note that in Claim 6.5 the projection is Π̂0 rather than (Π̂0)Vfinal .
Recall (from equation 158) that
Π̂0 = (I⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗3LVL+1 ⊗ (|1〉 〈1| ⊗ I
⊗d ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)F
def
= (Π̂0)VL+1 ⊗ (Π̂0)F (331)
and (from equation 296)
(Π̂0)Vfinal = (I
⊗d+1 ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗d)⊗3L+1 (332)
The difference between the two is that the first qudit of register F is projected onto |1〉 〈1| in Π̂0 and onto I in
(Π̂0)Vfinal . However, the proof of Claim 6.5 holds if Π̂0 is replaced with (Π̂0)Vfinal ; see Remark 6.2. 
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A A Symmetric Definition of QPIP
Here we provide the definition of QPIPsymκ and then prove Corollary 1.3 and Corollary 1.13. We begin with the
definition of QPIPsymκ :
Definition A.1 A language L is in the class symmetric quantum prover interactive proof (QPIPsymκ ) with com-
pleteness c and soundness s (where c − s is constant) if there exists an interactive protocol with the following
properties:
• The prover P and verifier V are exactly the same as in the definition of QPIPκ (Definition 1.1). Namely, a
BQP machine and quantum-classical hybrid machine for the prover and verifier respectively.
• Communication is identical to the QPIPκ definition.
• The verifier has three possible outcomes: 1, 0, and ABORT:
– 1: The verifier is convinced that x ∈ L.
– 0: The verifier is convinced that x /∈ L.
– ABORT: The verifier caught the prover cheating.
• Completeness: ∀x ∈ {0, 1}∗, after interacting withP, the verifier’s outcome is correct with high probability:
Pr
r
([V,P] (x, r) = 1L) ≥ c
where 1L is the indicator function of L, r represents the randomness used by the verifier, and [V,P] (x, r) is
the verifier’s outcome after using randomness r and interacting with P on input x.
• Soundness: For all provers P′ (with the same description as P) and for all x ∈ {0, 1}∗, the verifier is
mistaken with bounded probability, that is:
Pr
r
([V,P] (x, r) = 1− 1L) ≤ s
We now prove Corollary 1.3:
Proof of Corollary1.3: We will prove that QPIPc = QPIPsymc . It follows from the definitions of QPIPc
(Definition 1.1) and QPIPsymc (Definition A.1) that QPIPc ⊆ QPIP
sym
c . We obtain the other direction by showing
that for any language L, if L is in QPIPc then L,Lc ∈ QPIPsymc . First note that if L is in QPIPc, then so is
Lc, since BQP is closed under complement and BQP = QPIPc by Theorem 1.2. Let VL,PL denote the QPIPc
verifier and prover for the language L. By the assumption, there exists such a pair for both L and Lc. We define
the pair P̃ and Ṽ to be QPIPsymc verifier and prover in the following way: on the first round the prover P̃ sends
to Ṽ “yes” if x ∈ L and “no” otherwise. Now, both P̃ and Ṽ behave according to VL,PL if “yes” was sent or
according to VLc ,PLc otherwise. Soundness and completeness follow immediately from the definition.

Finally, we prove Corollary 1.13:
Proof of Corollary1.13: This corollary uses QPIPsym rather than QPIP (recall from Corollary 1.3 that
QPIPsym = BQP). First note that if we run QPIPsym (either the polynomial based or Clifford based protocol)
on an instance x drawn from D and the verifier does not abort with probability β, the probability that the verifier
outputs the incorrect answer is at most 2εβ + γ, by Corollary 1.11 and Corollary 1.12. We need to amplify this
probability so that the verifier outputs the incorrect answer with probability which is at most inverse exponential
in n. If we can do so, the corollary follows since any BPP machine would err with non-negligible probability on
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instances drawn from D, by assumption. Therefore, the prover cannot be simulated by a BPP machine.
To amplify the probability of outputting an incorrect answer, we run QPIPsym polynomially many times (in n)
and take the output to be the majority of the output values, ignoring runs on which the verifier aborted. Since β is
constant, if we repeat the protocol polynomially many times, we expect to collect polynomially many output values
(we fail to do so with probability p which is inverse exponential n). Since each output is correct with probability
1 − (2εβ + γ) >
1
2 , by taking the majority of these output values, we can reduce the error of the output to be p
′,
which is inverse exponential in n. The overall probability of error is then (1−p)p′+p, which is inverse exponential
in n. 
B Clifford and Pauli Operators
Here are some useful lemmas about Clifford/Pauli operators. We first prove the Pauli mixing lemma:
Proof of Lemma 4.5 (Pauli Mixing): First, we write ρ as:∑
ij
|i〉 〈j|A ⊗ ρij
It follows that:
TrA(ρ) =
∑
i
ρii
Next, observe that: ∑
P∈Pn
P |i〉 〈j|P † =
∑
zx
ZzXx |i〉 〈j| (ZzXx)† (333)
=
∑
zx
ωz(i−j)q X
x |i〉 〈j| (Xx)† (334)
This expression is 0 if i 6= j. If i = j, we obtain qnI. Plugging in this observation to the above expression, we
have:
1
|Pn|
∑
P∈Pn
(P ⊗ IB)ρ(P ⊗ IB)† =
1
|Pn|
∑
ij
∑
P∈Pn
P |i〉 〈j|A P
† ⊗ ρij (335)
=
1
|Pn|
∑
i
∑
P∈Pn
P |i〉 〈i|A P
† ⊗ ρij (336)
=
qn
|Pn|
I ⊗
∑
i
ρii (337)
=
1
qn
I ⊗ TrA(ρ) (338)

Now we prove the Clifford mixing lemma:
Proof of Lemma 4.4 (Clifford Mixing): To prove this lemma, we observe that applying a random Clifford
includes applying a random Pauli, and the lemma then follows from Lemma 4.5. In more detail, we have the
following equality for all Q ∈ Pn:
1
|Cn|
∑
C∈Cn
(C ⊗ IB)ρ(C ⊗ IB)† =
1
|Cn|
∑
C∈Cn
(CQ⊗ IB)ρ(CQ⊗ IB)† (339)
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Now we have:
1
|Cn|
∑
C∈Cn
(C ⊗ IB)ρ(C ⊗ IB)† =
1
|Cn||Pn|
∑
C∈Cn
∑
Q∈Pn
(CQ⊗ IB)ρ(CQ⊗ IB)† (340)
Regrouping terms, we have
. . . =
1
|Cn|
∑
C∈Cn
(C ⊗ IB)(
1
|Pn|
∑
Q∈Pn
(Q⊗ IB)ρ(Q⊗ IB)†)(C ⊗ IB)† (341)
By Lemma 4.5 (with q = 2) the above expression is equal to:
. . . =
1
|Cn|2n
∑
C∈Cn
(C ⊗ IB)(I ⊗ TrA(ρ))(C ⊗ IB)† (342)
=
1
2n
I ⊗ TrA(ρ) (343)

C Clifford Technical Details
Here we prove Lemma 3.4, Lemma 3.5 and Lemma 3.6, which were used to prove Lemma 3.2 (and Lemma 3.5 is
also used to prove Lemma 5.1).
Lemma 3.4 (Pauli Partitioning by Cliffords) For everyP,Q ∈ Pm\{I} it holds that :
∣∣{C ∈ Cm|C†PC = Q}∣∣ =
|Cm|
|Pm|−1 =
|Cm|
4m−1 .
Proof of Lemma 3.4: We first claim that for every Q,P ∈ Pm \ I there exists D ∈ Cm such that D†PD = Q.
We will prove this claim by induction. Specifically, we show that starting from any non identity Pauli operator one
can, using conjunction by Clifford group operator reach the Pauli operator X ⊗ I⊗m−1.
We first notice that the swap operation is in C2 since it holds that:
SWAPk,k+1 = CNOTk→(k+1)CNOT(k+1)→kCNOTk→(k+1) (344)
Furthermore, we recall that K†(XZ)K ∝ X and H†ZH = X . Therefore, any non identity Pauli P =
P1⊗. . .⊗Pm can be transformed using SWAP,H and K to the form: X⊗k ⊗ I⊗m−k (up to a phase and for
some k ≥ 1). To conclude we use:
CNOT †1→2(X1 ⊗X2)CNOT1→2 = X ⊗ I (345)
which reduces the number of X operations at hand. Applying this sufficiently many times results in reaching the
desired form. Since this holds for any non-identity Pauli operators: P,Q we know there are C,D ∈ Cm such that:
X ⊗ I⊗m−1 = C†PC = D†QD (346)
⇒ DC†PCD† = Q (347)
therefore CD† is the operator we looked for.
Given P ′ ∈ Pm \ I, define AP ′,Q as follows AP ′,Q
def
=
{
C ∈ Cm|C†P ′C = Q
}
. We will show that |AP ′,Q|
is independent of P ′. Now fix P ′ ∈ Pm \ I and let D ∈ Cm be one of the operators for which the following
equality holds: D†P ′D = Q. Then it holds that for all Q′ ∈ Pm \ I, D†C ∈ AQ′,Q ⇐⇒ C ∈ AP ′,Q′ . Therefore
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|AQ′,Q| = |AP ′,Q′ | for all non identity P ′, Q′ and Q. Using the fact that |AP ′,Q′ | = |AQ′,P ′ |, it follows that
|AP ′,Q′ | is independent of Q′ and P ′.
Now note that the sets {AP ′,Q′ : ∀P ′} form a partition of Cm. These sets clearly do not intersect. Observe that
for each C ∈ Cm, there exists P ′ ∈ Pm \I such that P ′ = CQ′C†. Since all the sets in the partition have the same
size, we obtain:
|Cm| =
∑
P ′∈Pm\I
∣∣AP ′,Q∣∣ = (4m − 1) |AP,Q| (348)
which concludes the proof. 
Lemma 3.5 (Pauli Twirl) Let P 6= P ′ be generalized Pauli operators. For any density matrix ρ′ on m′ > m
qubits it holds that ∑
Q∈Pm
(Q†PQ⊗ I)ρ′(Q†(P ′)†Q⊗ I) = 0
Proof of Lemma 3.5: Let P 6= P ′ be generalized Pauli operator P = XaZb and P ′ = Xa′Zb′ .∑
Q∈Pm
(Q†PQ⊗ I)ρ′(Q†P ′†Q⊗ I) =
q−1∑
d,c=0
((XcZd)†XaZb(XcZd)⊗ I)ρ′((XcZd)†(Xa′Zb′)†(XcZd)⊗ I)
We use the fact that ZdXc = ωdcq X
cZd (see Definition 2.2) and some algebra:
. . . =
q−1∑
d,c=0
ωd(a−a
′)+c(b−b′)
q (X
aZb ⊗ I)ρ′(Z−b′X−a′ ⊗ I) (349)
= (XaZb ⊗ I)ρ′(Z−b′X−a′ ⊗ I)
q−1∑
c=0
ωc(b−b
′)
q
q−1∑
d=0
ωd(a−a
′)
q (350)
To conclude the proof we recall that a 6= a′ or b 6= b′, hence one of the above sums vanishes.

Lemma 3.6 (Clifford Twirl) Let P 6= P ′ be Pauli operators. For any density matrix ρ′ on m′ > m qubits it
holds that ∑
C∈Cm
(C†PC ⊗ I)ρ′(C†(P ′)†C ⊗ I) = 0
Proof of Lemma 3.6: Notice that applying a random Clifford operator “includes” the application of a random
Pauli: ∑
c∈Cm
(C†PC ⊗ I)ρ′(C†(P ′)†C ⊗ I) =
∑
c∈Cm
((CQ)†P (CQ)⊗ I)ρ′((CQ)†(P ′)†(CQ)⊗ I) (351)
Equality holds for any Q ∈ Cn since it is nothing but a change of order of summation.
. . . =
∑
Q∈Pm
1
|Pm|
∑
c∈Cm
((CQ)†P (CQ)⊗ I)ρ′((CQ)†(P ′)†(CQ)⊗ I) (352)
=
∑
c∈Cm
1
|Pm|
∑
Q∈Pm
((CQ)†P (CQ)⊗ I)ρ′((CQ)†(P ′)†(CQ)⊗ I) (353)
=
∑
c∈Cm
1
|Pm|
∑
Q∈Pm
(Q†(C†PC)Q⊗ I)ρ′(Q†(C†(P ′)†C)Q⊗ I) (354)
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By Lemma 3.5 (with q = 2), we know that this expression is 0 if C†PC 6= C†P ′C. 
D Logical Gates on Signed Polynomial Codes
In this section we prove that the logical operators given in Section 2.5.1 behave as claimed. We first prove that the
logical X operator is correct.
Proof of Claim 2.1: We can easily verify that applying Xk1x ⊗ · · · ⊗Xkmx is the logical X̃xk operation:
X̃xk
∣∣∣Ska〉 =(Xk1x ⊗ · · · ⊗Xkmx) 1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|k1f(α1), . . ., kmf(αm)〉
=
1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|k1(f(α1) + x), . . ., km(f(αm) + x)〉
(355)
Setting f ′(α) = f(α) + x:
. . . =
1√
qd
∑
f ′:deg(f ′)≤d,f ′(0)=a+1
∣∣k1f ′(α1), . . ., kmf ′(αm)〉
=
∣∣∣Ska+x〉 (356)

We now prove that the logical SUM operator is correct.
Proof of Claim 2.2:
S̃UM |Sa〉 |Sb〉 = (SUM)⊗m
1
qd
∑
f(0)=a
|k1f(α1), . . ., kmf(αm)〉
∑
h(0)=b
|k1h(α1), . . ., kmh(αm)〉
=
1
qd
∑
f(0)=a,h(0)=b
|k1f(α1), . . ., kmf(αm)〉 |k1(h(α1) + f(α1)), . . ., km(h(αm) + f(αm))〉
(357)
We set g(α) = f(α) + h(α)
. . . =
1
qd
∑
f(0)=a,g(0)=a+b
|k1f(α1), . . ., kmf(αm)〉 |k1g(α1), . . ., kmg(αm)〉
=
∣∣∣Ska〉 ∣∣∣Ska+b〉
(358)

We proceed to the proof of the lemma needed for the logical Fourier transform.
Proof of Lemma 2.3: A polynomial p of degree ≤ m− 1 is completely determined by it’s values in the points
αi. We write p as in the form of the Lagrange interpolation polynomial: f(x) =
∑
i
∏
j 6=i
x−αj
αi−αj f(αj). Therefore,
we set ci =
∏
j 6=i
−αj
αi−αj and notice that it is independent of p, and the claim follows. 
We continue to the proof of the logical Fourier transform.
Proof of Claim 2.4: We denote |kf〉 = |k1f(α1), . . ., kmf(αm)〉
Fc1 ⊗ Fc2 . . .⊗ Fcm
∣∣∣Ska〉 = q−d/2Fc1 ⊗ Fc2⊗. . .⊗Fcm ∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|kf〉 (359)
= q−d/2q−m/2
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
∑
b1,...,bm
ω
∑
i cikif(αi)bi
q |b1, . . ., bm〉 (360)
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We think of the bi’s as defining a signed polynomial g of degree ≤ m − 1 that is kig(αi) = bi and split the sum
according to g(0):
. . . = q−(m+d)/2
∑
f :def(f)≤d
f(0)=a
∑
b
∑
g:deg(g)≤m−1
g(0)=b
ω
∑
i cikif(αi)kig(αi)
q |kg〉 (361)
= q−(m+d)/2
∑
f :def(f)≤d
f(0)=a
∑
b
∑
g:deg(g)≤m−1
g(0)=b
ω
∑
i cif(αi)g(αi)
q |kg〉 (362)
We temporarily restrict our view to polynomials g with degree at most m− d− 1 and therefore the polynomial fg
has degree at most m− 1. We use Lemma 2.3 on fg:
m∑
i=1
ci(fg)(αi) = fg(0) = ab (363)
Going back to Eq. 362:
q−(m+d)/2
∑
f,g
∑
b∈Fq
ω
∑
i ci(fg)(αi)
q |kg〉 = q−(m+d)/2
∑
b∈Fq
∑
f,g
ωabq |kg〉 (364)
Where the summation is over all f, g such that f(0) = a and g(0) = b while the degrees of f and g are at most d
and m− d− 1 respectively.
The sum does not depend on f and there are exactly qd polynomials f in the sum, therefore, we can write the
expression as :
. . . = q−(m+d)/2
∑
b∈Fq
qd
∑
g
ωabq |kg〉
=
1
√
q
∑
b∈Fq
ωabq
1√
qm−d−1
∑
g:deg(g)≤m−d−1,g(0)=b
|kg〉
=
1
√
q
∑
b∈Fq
ωabq
∣∣∣S̃kb 〉
(365)
Since the above expression has norm 1, if follows that the coefficients that we temporally ignored at Eq. 361 all
vanish. 
Finally, we prove that the logical Z operator is correct.
Proof of Claim 2.5:
Z̃zk
∣∣∣Ska〉 = (Zk1c1z ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zkmcmz) 1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
|k1f(α1), . . ., kmf(αm)〉 (366)
=
1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
ω
∑
i kicizkif(αi)
q |k1f(α1), . . ., kmf(αm)〉 (367)
=
1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
ω
z
∑
i cif(αi)
q |k1f(α1), . . ., kmf(αm)〉 (368)
=
1√
qd
∑
f :def(f)≤d,f(0)=a
ωzf(0)q |k1f(α1), . . ., kmf(αm)〉 (369)
= ωzaq
∣∣∣Ska〉 (370)

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E Notation Tables
We begin with notation used for both the Clifford and polynomial protocols, and then proceed to notation used only
in the polynomial protocol (beginning with the sign key k, Definition 2.6).
Notation Reference Explanation
γ Protocol 4.1, 6.1 Error of circuit which is being applied; used in both protocols
ε Protocol 3.1, 5.1 Security parameter
Π0,Π1 Definition 2.1 Projections used to define security of a QAS
L Protocol 6.1 Number of Toffoli gates in the circuit
n Protocol 4.1,6.1 Number of qubits in the circuit which is being applied
N Definition 1.2 Number of gates in the circuit which is being applied
E Theorem 1.4,1.6,1.5 Eve’s environment
E Section 6.4 Prover’s environment register in QPIP protocol
k Definition 2.6 Sign key for signed polynomial code; used as superscript for encoded states
Ũ Section 2.5.1 Logical version of a gate U for the signed polynomial code
m, d Definition 2.6 Length and degree of polynomial code
Ek, Dk Definition 2.7, 2.8 Encoding circuit for signed polynomial code (Ek = Dk(F⊗d ⊗ I))
Pm Definition 2.3 Group of generalized Pauli operators
g Equation 149 g takes as input strings in Fmq and returns the first coordinate of each string
ρk Definition 2.6 Initial state in polynomial QPIPcontaining n authenticated 0 states and L
authenticated magic states
Pi Section 6.4 Register containing prover’s 3m(L − i + 1) + mn qubits at the end of round
i− 1
Vi Section 6.4 Register containing the 3m(i − 1) qubits which have been sent to the verifier
in rounds 1, . . . , i− 1
F After equation 155 Register of m qudits containing the final authenticated qudit given to the
verifier in the final round
Pfinal After equation 155 Register of authenticated qudits remaining with the prover at the end of the
protocol (PL+1 = Pfinal ∪ F)
Vfinal After equation 155 Register containing allm(3L+1) qudits sent to the verifier during the protocol
(Vfinal = F ∪ VL+1)
τi(z, x, k) Section 6.4 Keys held by verifier at the start of round i (z, x ∈ F |Pi|q )
δi Section 6.4 Measurement result in F 3mq of prover in round i
∆i Claim 6.1 Measurement results (composing a string in F 3miq ) from rounds 1 to i
Q̃i Section 6.1.4 Logical Clifford operators applied in round i
C̃βi Section 6.1.4 Clifford correction operators for Toffoli gate i if measurement result is βi ∈ F 3q
ρkg(∆i−1) Claim 6.1 The state on mn + 3mL qudits resulting from applying operations requested
in rounds 1, . . . , i− 1
l ∈ F 3Lq Fact 6.1 Used in the sum over all possible teleportation measurement results
β ∈ F 3Lq Fact 6.1 Used to denote one fixed measurement result
Π̂0 Equation 158 Used to denote the accepting subspace on 3mL+m qudits in the polynomial
QPIP
ΠGa Equation 187 Projection (on 3mL qudits) onto a valid, decoded measurement result a ∈ F 3Lq
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